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ABSTRACT 
This capstone project analyses subterranean threats in the contemporary operational 
environment.  It identifies the doctrinal gap in the U.S. military regarding operations 
within tunnels, urban and natural cavities, and other underground facilities, and outlines 
the changes necessary to prepare ground forces to operate in these complex 
environments.  This paper reviews historical cases spanning back over half a millennium, 
proposes a new typological classification system, and investigates the subterranean 
environment in terms of the United States Army doctrine, organization, training, matériel, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities process.  Additionally, it provides 
analysis geared toward countering subterranean threats through indirect means to include: 
incendiary weapons, cyber-based attacks, and military information support operations.  
The capstone finds that: 1) Current U.S. military doctrine does not properly prepare units 
for operations in subterranean environments; 2) Future conflicts will require general 
purpose forces to deal with subterranean threats; and 3) Understanding the use of indirect 
approaches is critical in the conduct of subterranean operations.  This research leads to 
the recommendation that the Training and Doctrine Command Intelligence Support 
Activity recognize “subterranean” as an operational environment.  Additionally, this 
capstone provides guidance to commanders and staffs to assist in pre-mission training 
even before the doctrinal gap is filled. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Subterranean Working Group (SWG) Capstone represents a combined effort with the 
Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis Department and the Asymmetric Warfare 
Group (AWG).  The result of this effort is an analysis of subterranean threats in the 
contemporary operational environment (COE) and a description of what actions must be 
taken to prepare ground forces to operate underground.  More importantly, this project 
has created a subterranean lexicon which ranges from the most rudimentary tunnels to 
deeply buried hardened facilities.  With this lexicon, the Subterranean Working Group 
has created a tool that can assist commanders in planning and executing subterranean 
operations.  Proliferation of subterranean structures continues unabated among those with 
hostile intentions, including rogue states and criminal, insurgent, and terrorist networks.  
The most modern underground facilities, incorporate design features that make them 
essentially impervious to air or missile attack.  Currently, ground-assault options are 
limited to small special operations forces (SOF) contingents.  This research suggests that 
general purpose forces (GPF) solutions may prove necessary to meet these threats. 
The Military Problem 
The current courses of action for defeating subterranean threats are insufficient.  
Techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) for U.S. forces encountering urban and natural 
cavities and tunnels are developed ad hoc.  However, such responses lack efficiency and 
require soldiers to assume unnecessary risks.  These risks cannot be effectively mitigated 
unless U.S. forces have conducted training in subterranean operations.  The current 
course of action for the defeat of underground facilities (UGF) is the use of earth- 
penetrating munitions and, possibly, tactical nuclear weapons.  However, deep 
penetrating munitions will not destroy some reinforced UGF and the use of nuclear 
weapons is simply not politically or morally feasible.  Thus, ground forces must be 





The Department of Defense provides training, doctrinal, organizational and 
matériel support to U.S. forces conducting operations in jungle, mountainous, and urban 
environments.  However, few resources address the subterranean threat.  The Asymmetric 
Warfare Group (AWG) has published a handbook for subterranean warfare that focuses 
on the tactical level in terms of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and safety 
considerations.  This capstone seeks to provide an analysis of historical cases ranging 
from the fall of Constantinople in the 15th century to the modern era, proposes a new 
typological classification system, and investigates the subterranean environment in terms 
of the United States Department of Defense doctrine, organization, training, matériel, 
leadership and education, personnel, facilities, (DOTMLPF) process. 
Typology 
To create a subterranean typology and classification the Subterranean Working 
Group (SWG) conducted case studies of: 
• The Siege of Constantinople (1453) 
• The Siege of Petersburg during the American Civil War (1864) 
• The Mining of Messines Ridge during WWI (1917) 
• The Battle of Okinawa during WWII (1945) 
• Vietnam War Tunnel Warfare (1966) 
Additionally, the SWG participated in fieldwork facilitated by NPS, AWG, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC) 
Fire Department New York, and the Colorado School of Mines at the following locations: 
• Edgar Experimental Mine, CO 
• Long Island Rail Road East Side Access Grand Central Station, 
New York City, NY 
• Cu Chi, Long Phoc, and Vinh Moc tunnels, Vietnam 
• White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM 
• Manzano Mountain Underground Facility, Kirkland AFB, NM 
• Raven Rock Military Complex, PA 
• Iron Mountain Data Storage Facility, PA 
 xx 
With an information gathered from the case studies and fieldwork, the SWG was 
able to create a typology that encompasses all forms of subterranean environments (see 
Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1. Subterranean Typology 
A classification methodology was also created that will enable ground elements 
and military planners to understand what information is critical to underground 
operations.  The coding system and graphical symbol proposed will enable commanders 
and staffs to plan subterranean operations effectively within their areas of operation. 
Subterranean Targeting Attributes 
Within subterranean physical structures, targeting attributes have been identified 
to assist commanders and staff in identifying intelligence and operational gaps.  The fact 
that the tool can be applied to all case studies and current subterranean threats shows the 
flexibility of this typology and classification methodology.  This system recognizes the 
multitude of subterranean systems.  It also permits leaders at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical level to use the same planning tool with the same terminology mitigating 
confusion at all levels of the fight.  By understanding the types of subterranean 
 xxi 
environments and identifying targeting attributes, leaders and planners will be made 
aware of the multiple challenges that could be faced underground.  These targeting 
attributes are represented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Subterranean Targeting Attributes 
Incendiary Weapons, Cyber-Based Attacks, and Military Information 
Support Operations  
This capstone also provides examples in countering subterranean threats with 
non-traditional means including incendiary weapons, cyber-based attacks, and military 
information support operations (MISO). 
The case studies show that incendiary weapons have been effective in the tunnels 
and underground facilities (UGFs) of Constantinople, Turkey; Okinawa, Japan; and 
Vietnam.  Incendiary weapons are a simple, cost effective means of combating 
underground threats and cause immediate psychological and physical damage.  Due to 
the irresponsible use of incendiary weapons in the past, a normative taboo has formed 
against this effective enabler.  This capstone explains how the taboo is hindering U.S. 
forces conducting operations against subterranean threats.  Ground forces conducting 
underground operations should receive proper training on the effects of incendiary 
weapons, when they should be used, and how they should be used. 
A cyber-based attack, as shown in the Stuxnet incident, is a valid option against 
UGFs.  This form of attack limits exposure and risk to ground forces.  Cyber-based 
attacks have mitigated other underground threats in the past.  Given the lack of training in 
 xxii 
and doctrine for subterranean operations, electronic warfare should be further explored 
and incorporated to fill this gap. 
Military information support operations (MISO) have historically been successful 
against subterranean threats.  Psychological operations can be applied to all types of 
underground environments.  If shown to be viable, MISO can influence the audience 
through themes, messages, and actions such as contaminated air supply, structure 
collapse, food/supply shortage, fire/smoke inhalation, flooding, tunnel remediation, social 
media, and local populace engagement.  Military information support operations (MISO) 
can assist U.S. forces in shaping the information environment in order to persuade, 
change, or influence the behaviors of those associated with a subterranean threat. 
Conclusion 
This capstone finds that: 
• Current U.S. military doctrine does not properly prepare units for 
operations in a subterranean environment 
• Future conflicts will require GPF to deal with subterranean threats 
• Understanding the use of indirect approaches is critical when 
conducting subterranean operations. 
This research leads to the recommendation that the U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) recognize “subterranean” as 
an operational environment.  Additionally, this capstone provides guidance to 
commanders and staffs to assist in pre-mission training until the doctrinal gap is filled.  In 
recent conflicts, wherever U.S. forces have overwhelming combat power, their 
adversaries strive to force fighting on a primitive level.  The subterranean environment 
offers enemies a cost-effective safe haven for protecting themselves and their sensitive 
equipment.  By empowering ground forces with the proper understanding, training, and 
personal protective equipment (PPE) to operate underground, the overall risk to our 
forces is lowered and our ability to operate in asymmetric environments is increased. 
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Historic and current intelligence shows both a persistent and an immediate 
subterranean threat to the U.S. and its allies.  However, little has been done in terms of 
official doctrine for operations within subterranean environments.  Furthermore, there has 
been little research conducted to increase the survivability of forces when operating in 
these complex environments.  As seen in the past, the use of subterranean environments 
provides a cheap and effective form of maneuver, concealment, and protection.  
Historical examples of subterranean warfare include: the Siege of Petersburg, Virginia 
during the American Civil War; the Battle of Messines during World War I; multiple 
tunnel, cave, and trench battles in Okinawa, Japan during World War II; and the Cu Chi 
Tunnels in Vietnam.  Subterranean warfare has played a significant role in each of these 
conflicts.  In the contemporary operational environment (COE), subterranean warfare is 
used by non-state actors in Israel, Afghanistan, and in countries of Central America, to 
circumvent international borders, defeat force protection barriers, and move without 
detection despite advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.  
Subterranean systems are also used by many state actors.  These systems range from 
subway transportation to military underground facilities (UGFs) housing strategic level 
infrastructure and sensitive munitions. 
Even though large amounts of national resources and intelligence collection are 
invested in munitions with the purpose of penetrating and destroying subterranean 
systems, limitations on their use requires a reassessment of the methods used to prepare 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) to operate in the 
subterranean domain.  Historical analysis has shown that adversaries in the future 
operational environment (FOE) will likely use subterranean systems to protect personnel 
and equipment and that they may include weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In order 
to fill the operational gap, U.S. ground forces must be prepared to operate within 
subterranean environments.  
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B. DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this project is to conduct an analysis of subterranean threats in the 
COE, and describe the changes necessary to prepare ground forces to operate in this 
unique environment.  Subterranean warfare has significantly impacted warfare in the past 
and will continue to do so in the future.  Historical cases studies will illustrate a trend in 
the use of subterranean environments in warfare and illuminate subterranean warfare as a 
problem set that cannot be avoided by ground forces in the COE and FOE. 
This project seeks to explore a doctrinal gap in the U.S. military regarding 
operations within underground tunnels and deeply buried hardened facilities.  Despite the 
fact that the U.S. military has fought in subterranean environments since prior to the 
American Civil War, currently no military doctrine exists that identifies “subterranean” 
as a unique operational environment, apart from being subsumed as a minor component 
of the urban environment.  However, the U.S. ground forces organized, trained, and 
equipped for urban environments are not prepared for the unique challenges of 
underground engagements.  Increasingly, more adversaries are turning to the 
underground in order to minimize U.S. air power and ISR effectiveness.  The purpose of 
this capstone project is to create awareness of this complex problem-set in order for the 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) intelligence support activity to 
recognize “subterranean” as a unique operational environment. 
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The primary scope of this research is to define subterranean as an operational 
environment.  Present U.S. Army doctrine designates urban, mountain, desert and jungle 
as unique environments, while subterranean has not been given such a distinction.  As a 
consequence, any semblance of doctrine relating to subterranean warfare is fragmented 
across many publications.  An analysis of military history can illustrate a pattern of 
subterranean warfare during some of the most significant military conflicts and can show 
it emerging with renewed importance today.  The group’s research assumes that when 
ground forces encounter subterranean environments, commanders will direct soldiers to 
secure, clear, defeat or destroy the underground site.  Not doing so could provide the 
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enemy a safe haven and potentially enable the enemy to operate rear of friendly lines.  
Such an advantage acquired by the enemy cannot be discounted if a military force is to 
achieve success.  Through understanding historical patterns more fully, and by placing 
such historical analysis in a sound theoretical framework, contemporary military leaders 
will be able to anticipate and plan for the subterranean problem-set. 
This project focuses on subterranean operations in three areas of emphasis: 
typological classification, empirical case studies, and a doctrine, organization, training, 
matériel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis.  These 
tasks were chosen according to the following logic.  First, the task of creating a typology 
is an effort to create the relevant conceptual space for the problem.  This typology is an 
improvement on existing efforts as it centers on the operationally relevant aspects of 
subterranean structures, threats, and conditions.  Second, the empirical case studies have 
been chosen to refine the typology and deduce additional factors or aspects of 
subterranean operations that may have been omitted from previous studies.  Finally, 
investigation of the DOTMLPF implications of the analysis serves to ground the 
theoretical and historical aspects of the work firmly in the service of current and future 
operations. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How should U.S. ground forces prepare to deal with the increasing use of 
subterranean environments by state and non-state actors within the contemporary 
operational environment? 
Following the end of the Cold War, enemies of the U.S. have recognized that they 
must counter military and technological might with unconventional tactics.  In order to 
counter U.S. air and space dominance, and the technical capabilities of ISR, today’s 
opponents are reverting to the underground. 
Non-state actors such as trans-national criminal organizations (TCOs), and violent 




move men, weapons, and equipment across international borders.  Subverting a nation’s 
ability to control its borders directly holds sovereignty at risk and creates irregular 
challenges for defense forces. 
State actors attempting to conceal and protect military capabilities are doing so by 
placing them underground, and in some cases, beyond the projected capabilities of kinetic 
air strikes.  Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have long been used as a deterrent 
against state aggression.  The international community seems to have accepted the status 
quo on current proliferation and regularly engages in efforts to reduce stockpiles and 
counter any further acquisitions.  States that feel an unequal balance in deterrence 
capability, however, can choose to undermine counter-proliferation efforts by building 
storage and production facilities deep underground where detection, surveillance, and 
destruction are difficult. 
This project is designed to address the anticipated challenges faced by ground 
forces as they prepare to engage in subterranean environments where threats are provided 
protection from air or missile attack.  The project will establish a common typology of 
subterranean uses by military and paramilitary forces in order to address unique 
challenges. Pertinent historical cases of subterranean warfare will be explored with 
reference to the necessity of preparing for this style of combat.  Current military doctrine 
will be analyzed to evaluate the sufficiency of planning and guidelines as they relate to 
subterranean environments.  Recommendations will be made for changes in the way 
current ground forces organize, train, and equip for combat where subterranean 
environments are expected to be encountered.  Finally, the project will address the use of 
incendiary weapons and information dominance operations as unique methods that may 
be used with significant effects against subterranean targets. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An array of thought exists regarding subterranean environments on best practices 
for mitigating the underground threat.  The principle contributing organizations upon 
which this capstone focused include academia, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the Department of Defense.  Despite differing methodologies and purposes, the 
following positions were consistent among all literature referred to. 
1. Doctrinal Void  for General Purpose Forces 
The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Lexicon of Hardened Structure Definitions 
and Terms is a comprehensive and useful document.  The target audience for countering 
subterranean threats however is limited to the U.S. kinetic air strike community.  
Likewise, the doctrine-producing arm for the U.S. Army (TRADOC) is also limited to a 
minimal solution utilizing ground forces.  Aside from being abbreviated in its planning 
nature, the content within FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 90-10 Urban 
Operations, and FM 90-10-1 An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas is 
fundamentally out of date in regards to today’s COE.   
2. Historical Trajectory of Subterranean Threats 
Past adversaries, in conventional, irregular, and total war have used underground 
structures for various activities that have grown in complexity over time.  The group 
researched five hand-selected case studies that not only followed this trend, but also 
incorporated the full spectrum of the typology seen today.  The proliferation of the 
underground phenomenon was explored in chronological order, starting with 
subterranean warfare at Constantinople in 1453, followed by the siege of Petersburg in 
the American Civil War and the Flanders Campaign in the First World War, the battle of 
Okinawa in the Second World War, and finishing with the Tunnels of Cu Chi in the 
Vietnam conflict.  Research shows this trend of underground threats seems to be growing 
in the present operational environment. 
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3. Non-standard Approaches Have Value 
Non-standard approaches such as the use of fire and smoke have had immense 
value towards combating subterranean threats for centuries.  The battle of Constantinople 
was among the first recorded subterranean warfare events that captured the value of fire 
and smoke in a confined environment when the Ottomans used it against the Byzantines.  
Centuries later such approaches proved useful yet again, this time for Soviet forces in 
their fight against the Mujahedeen, annotated in Underground Combat, Stereophonic 
Blasting, Tunnel Rats, and the Soviet-Afghan War and AWG’s Subterranean Warfare 
Handbook.  While fire and smoke remain relevant today, newer indirect approaches such 
as cyber-based attacks and MISO are also impacting the battlefield. 
B. ARGUMENTS 
1. Current U.S. Military Doctrine Does Not Properly Prepare Units for 
Operations in Subterranean Environments 
Currently, the U.S. military does not possess adequate doctrine addressing 
effective operation in a subterranean environment.  All current field manuals and/or joint 
publications address the subterranean environment as an additional factor, such as sewers 
and basements, to consider while operating in an urban environment.  The subterranean 
environment that exists as part of the urban operational environment does not adequately 
encompass the level of planning needed when considering all the possible subterranean 
threats used by today’s adversaries.  From a mission planning perspective, much of the 
tactical considerations regarding the subterranean environment are scattered across 
several manuals.  Some major subterranean concerns that are not addressed in current 
manuals are: command and control, communications, movement techniques, navigation, 
vulnerabilities of a tunnel above/below ground and environmental factors that hinder 
soldiers underground.  These factors will be a primary focus for current U.S. adversaries 
that are increasing their use of underground facilities.  
Current and historical doctrine does address rudimentary tunnels and urban 
cavities.  However, it does not consider structures that are larger, deeper, more complex 
and reinforced.  Military planning considerations need to be updated to address the 
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current threat as well as to update technological advances and capabilities that should 
increase the survivability of U.S. troops.  Failure to do so will jeopardize future 
operations and the lives of soldiers forced to operate underground. 
2. Future Conflicts Will Require General Purpose Forces to Deal With 
Subterranean Threats 
The global proliferation of underground tunnels and facilities has grown far 
beyond the capabilities of air power and special mission units (SMUs) to effectively 
succeed alone.  This is especially true, given the small percentage of the SMU 
community trained in the complexities associated with UGFs and Counter-WMD 
scenarios.  This is not to say that a GPF unit could not clear an underground structure 
today.  It has been learned from more than 11 years of fighting the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT), and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), that units have 
encountered and achieved much success utilizing varying techniques and procedures 
against underground enemies.  As early as the American Civil War, GPF units used 
intrinsic capabilities when encountering such structures based on individual soldier 
backgrounds and experiences.  Unfortunately, following the Vietnam conflict, 
observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) regarding subterranean warfare were not 
effectively captured or recorded for future generations.  All GPF units need to be 
provided with education and training, in the form of a more comprehensive Army 
doctrine and training publication, which defines subterranean as its own operational 
environment.  This is not to say that GPF units need to restructure their missions or 
organizations since the COE has seen enemy forces continuing to seek subterranean 
environments as a means to limit U.S. kinetic capabilities and ISR platforms.  The SMUs 
simply do not have the manpower to engage every subterranean threat.  In order to 
discourage the proliferation of subterranean threats, unilateral capabilities and 
preparedness within GPF and SOF must be increased. 
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3. Understanding the Use of Indirect Approaches is Critical in the 
Conduct of Subterranean Operations 
In some situations, the risk of ground forces entering a subterranean system may 
be too great.  Indirect approaches like incendiary weapons, cyber-based attacks, and 
MISO can assist in lowering risk and possibly defeating a subterranean threat.  A better 
understanding of these topics could provide commanders and staffs with a variety of 
options for “prepping” an underground target. 
Historically, incendiary weapons have been effective against underground enemy 
positions.  Specifically, during the Siege of Constantinople in 1453, in World War II, and 
the Vietnam War, these weapons were documented as having positive results.  There are 
no national or international laws that prevent U.S. forces from using incendiary weapons 
against confirmed enemy forces and facilities.  However, due to irresponsible use during 
previous wars and conflicts, leaders are hesitant to move past the normative taboos that 
accompany incendiary weapons.  Considering the extreme danger and complexity of 
operating underground, the use of incendiary weapons should be reconsidered.  Once 
deemed necessary by decision makers, incendiary weapons employed in a subterranean 
environment are lethal.  Extreme heat compromises the structural integrity of a facility 
and can cause collapse.  Fire may also cause catastrophic damage to the infrastructure of 
a facility as well by impacting ventilation, power, and water.  Bi-products of incendiary 
weapons, smoke and particulates, also can incapacitate or kill enemy occupants within 
the subterranean facility.  Though not all subterranean operations will require the use of 
incendiary weapons, understanding their uses and effectiveness underground is critical in 
the conduct of subterranean operations. 
Cyber-based attacks have also proven effective against subterranean threats.  The 
Stuxnet virus was used in Natanz, Iran is one example that proves the valid applicability 
of cyber-based attacks.  Open-source reports have stated that the physical damage done to 
the underground centrifuges set the nuclear program back approximately three years.  An 




crucial to combating such a threat.  Due to the lack of subterranean doctrine and limited 
underground training, the employment of electronic warfare should be researched in 
order to be incorporated and fill this gap. 
Military support operations are another capability that can shift the offense/ 
defense balance.  Where cyber-based attacks may only be used against subterranean 
systems with modern infrastructure, MISO is flexible enough to be used against both 
primitive and modern underground threats.  These operations can be used to influence the 
behavior of personnel contributing to and operating within a subterranean complex.  This 
capstone will explore a multitude of themes, messages, and actions to support this 
argument. 
In his book, Spec Ops Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 
Practice, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Admiral 
William McRaven stated that relative superiority is the condition that exists when a 
smaller force gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy.1  In the 
subterranean environment, the defending force has an intrinsic advantage over the 
attacking force.  Understanding the use of indirect approaches is critical for U.S. forces to 
achieve the required degree of relative superiority in the conduct of subterranean 
operations. 
C. TYPOLOGY 
1. Defining the Typology 
The purpose of a typological classification of subterranean environments is to 
evaluate what aspects are most important to the ground force commander.  This involves 
identifying the defining attributes of subterranean structures used by both state and non-
state actors and laying out the variation of, and permutations among these dimensions.  A 
subterranean lexicon, that spans the scale from the most rudimentary tunnels to deeply 
buried hardened facilities, is useful for developing an understanding of vulnerabilities 
commanders can use prior to engaging in the subterranean environment. 
                                                 
1 William H. McRaven. Spec Ops Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(Monterey, CA: Presidio Press, 1996). 
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An explanatory typology is a multidimensional conceptual classification based on 
observations that allows the description of a subterranean environment likely to be 
encountered by ground forces.  This typology acknowledges the complexity of the 
subterranean operational environment and seeks to consolidate the number of possible 
types and heterogeneity of such types into categories that may affect the operational 
posture of ground forces.2  Using a classificatory function, empirical case studies can be 
inserted into this typology and evaluated as to a particular category.  In addition, 
typological attributes can be used to create a common graphical control measure or 
symbol that enables commanders to quickly determine resources required to defeat 
threats within identified subterranean areas.  The attributes associated with the 
subterranean environment are numerous and different audiences have different 
information requirements.  Geologists, for example, concern themselves with types of 
soil and rock, weapons developers want to know the depth and construction 
characteristics, and intelligence analysts want to know everything else.  For the ground 
force commander who is directed to commit lives into these unknown spaces, 
information requirements are more intimate.  Pragmatic compression will allow linking 
of the many different types of underground structures into categories with similar 
attributes where expansion would not better serve the ground force commander.3 At this 
stage of research, it is important to lay out the entire breadth of the typological property 
space.  The purpose of this style of typology, therefore, is to begin the process of  
evaluating what attributes constitute a particular type of underground structure, providing 
the commander with the knowledge of what to expect based on known characteristics. 
2. Typological Attributes 
The property-space of the subterranean operational environment is framed by 
attributes which can be measured in order to build a constructed typology. These 
attributes are given operational definitions and assist in building an index from which 
                                                 
2 Kenneth D. Bailey, “Constructing Monothetic and Polythetic Typologies by the Heuristic Method,” 
The Sociological Quarterly (Midwest Sociological Society), 14, no. 3 (Summer, 1973):291, last accessed 
August 10, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4105680. 
3 John C. McKinney, “Typification, Typologies, and Sociological Theory,” Social Forces 48, no. 1 
(September 1969): 3, last accessed August 10, 2013, http://jstor.org/stable/2575463. 
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particular subterranean structures can be coded.4  The Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) maintains a coding or categorization system of hardened structures based on 
physical characteristics.5  One drawback of this system is its limitation to hardened 
structures, and  its use of structural elements or characteristics that would affect the 
behavior of earth penetrating munitions.  A typology of the subterranean operational 
environment must consider a wider spectrum of subterranean structures and must relate to 
intelligence requirements of the ground forces likely to enter these areas.  The 
subterranean typology presented here is based on five attributes: function, infrastructure, 
mobility, threat, and accessibility. 
The function attribute is used to describe the purpose of the particular 
subterranean target area.  Understanding the function attribute provides the commander 
with insight into resources required to achieve a functional defeat.  Ground forces do not 
typically have the resources to achieve a structural defeat of a subterranean target area, 
thus focus should remain on functional defeat.  Functions within the subterranean 
environment include: command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), 
production, storage, and conveyance. 
The infrastructure attribute is used to describe the support systems tied to a 
particular subterranean target area.  Understanding the infrastructure attribute provides 
the commander with insight into a potential single point of vulnerability (SPV).  
Identifying support infrastructure may provide the ground force commander with the 
opportunity to achieve a functional defeat without directly targeting or entering the 
subterranean environment.  The criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, 
effect and recognizability (CARVER) matrix, a target analysis tool used by special 
operations forces (SOF), can be used to evaluate infrastructure elements in terms of the 
most efficient application of combat power.  Subterranean infrastructure includes: 
ventilation, power supply, water supply, waste discharge, transportation, and 
communications. 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Defense Intelligence Agency, Lexicon of Hardened Structure Definitions and Terms 
(UNCLAS/FOUO), Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2011, 85. 
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The mobility within a subterranean passage typically coincides with the largest 
item that can be conveyed through or housed within the functional workspace.  Mobility 
within the subterranean environment in terms of the maneuverability of ground forces 
will ultimately determine the tactics employed.  The specific assessment of mobility 
refers to the dimensions of the access portal or entrance, as well as that of the entrance 
tunnel or adit.  The mobility attributes are defined as restricted, semi-restricted, 
permissive, and unrestricted.  Restricted adits are characterized by their confined space 
that permits only the single file movement of persons in a prostrated or less than fully 
upright posture.  Semi-restricted adits allow for the fully upright movement of persons in 
single file.  Permissive adits allow for the fully upright movement of persons in columns 
of two.  Unrestricted adits are large enough to support upright movement of more than a 
two-person column and may even support the movement of vehicles. 
 
Figure 1.  Restricted6 
                                                 




Figure 2.  Semi Restricted7 
 
Figure 3.  Permissive8 
                                                 
7 “IDF Fighters Go Underground for Subterranean Warfare Training,” [image], July 26, 2013, Defence 
Talk, http://www.defencetalk.com/idf-fighters-go-underground-for-subterranean-warfare-training-48577/. 




Figure 4.  Unrestricted9 
The threat attribute characterizes the potential risk to forces entering the 
subterranean environment.  This threat attribute may also factor into the size, 
composition, weapons posture, and special equipment needed to effectively operate in a 
particular subterranean environment.  Threat characteristics within subterranean 
environments include environmental, personnel, and matériel.  Environmental hazards 
include: naturally occurring gasses that affect air quality; dangerous insects, arachnids, 
reptiles, and other wildlife; unstable ground control; stagnant water that may release 
deadly gases such as hydrogen sulfide or deep water that could create a drowning hazard.  
Personnel hazards account for the presence of potentially hostile persons within the 
subterranean structure.  These could include armed defense forces or non-combatants that 
may become hostile once encountered.  Matériel hazards include those hazards artificially 
introduced into the environment.  These can include: explosives, booby traps, and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs); nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) storage or 
production equipment; fuel and other petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); as well as 
other man-made implements. 
                                                 
9 Aeroflight [image], accessed December 12, 2013, http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/albania/af/pics/F-
6%208-25%20CLOFTING%20IMG_0539%202.jpg. 
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Hardness classifications related to the subterranean environment have typically 
been spoken in terms of the effects of kinetic weapons.  For the soldier this definition of 
hardened, which relates to the structural design, geology, and topography, has little use.  
For purposes better suited to ground force operations the attribute title of accessibility 
will be used. In order for soldiers to hold the subterranean environment which is at risk 
they must first be capable of gaining access to critical components.  Accessibility relates 
to the capabilities required to breach portal entrances, gain access to critical support 
infrastructure, and reduce obstacles between portals and functional workspaces.  An 
accessibility level I structure is one which requires  few, none, or only simple tools used 
in mechanical breaching to gain access, such as a Halligan tool, grappling hooks, sledge 
hammers, or bolt cutters.  An accessibility level II structure may contain hatches or doors 
that require explosive or ballistic breaching techniques.  An accessibility level III 
structure may contain blast doors, steel gates, or security doors that require dynamic 
breaching including advanced cutting and extrication tools.  An accessibility level IV 
hardened structure may be beyond the capabilities of the individual soldier and may 
require heavy engineer equipment or kinetic munitions to reduce exterior obstacles. 
 
Figure 5.  Subterranean Targeting Attributes 
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3. Categorizing Subterranean Structures 
Different names are given to a wide spectrum of subterranean structures.  
Subterranean structures can range from a small pipe-sized cavity, used to hydraulically 
pass illicit material, to hardened, deeply buried targets (HDBTs) located hundreds of 
meters below the surface and used to store or produce WMD.  The goal of this paper is to 
compress the characteristics of the many types of structures into a pragmatic taxonomy, 
enabling commanders to better understand the complexities within the subterranean 
operational environment.  With respect to ground force operations, subterranean 
structures can be characterized into three primary categories with each category having 
two sub-categories.  The three primary categories are (i) tunnels, (ii) urban and natural 
cavities, and (iii) underground facilities (UGFs).  Tunnels are broken down into 
rudimentary and sophisticated.  Urban and natural cavities are broken down into 
substructures (i.e., basements and caves) and civil works (i.e., sewers, subways, 
aqueducts).  The UGFs are broken down into shallow underground facilities (UGS), and 
deep underground facilities (DUG).   
 
Figure 6.  Subterranean Categorization 
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Tunnels are generally used as a means to move people and items between two or 
more locations.  Non-state actors typically use both rudimentary and sophisticated tunnels 
to move personnel, supplies, and equipment without detection.  Subterranean movement 
that circumvents state borders often supports smuggling or black market economies, as 
well as facilitates insurgent activities.  Access portals are generally not hardened and 
adits can be vertical, leading down to an operationally desired depth, or horizontal, into 
the side of existing terrain.  Although state actors have historically used rudimentary 
tunnels in subterranean siege warfare, today’s nation states use technology and financial 
resources to build sophisticated tunnels to establish lasting means of conveyance or 
storage.  Tunnels can be connected to form a complex subterranean network with 
multiple access portals and increased infrastructure; a higher degree of sophistication 
which earns the classification of UGF.   
Rudimentary tunnels are typically hand-dug using mechanical and/or general 
purpose tools.  The tunnel walls are bare and have limited or no support features or 
shoring to prevent structural collapse.  Infrastructure is rarely installed.  Instead, these 
tunnels rely on natural air flow for ventilation and structurally designed water removal.  
Such tunnels are both labor and time intensive to dig.  However, they are relatively cheap 
and are often found in areas where a large labor force is available.  In terms of typology, 
rudimentary tunnels generally function as storage or conveyance, have limited 
infrastructure, are restricted to semi-restricted in mobility, and have level I accessibility.  
These tunnels are generally only occupied at times when movement of persons or goods 
is taking place.  Due to the small size and level of sophistication, contact with hostile 
elements is unlikely, and any resistance would be to facilitate escape.  Likely threats 
include environmental hazards, as well as matériel hazards near access portals. 
Sophisticated tunnels are typically dug using mechanical tools or larger heavy 
equipment.  Equipment must rely on air compressors or electricity for power, unless 
significant ventilation is available to support the use of combustion engines.  A noticeable 
characteristic in sophisticated tunnels is the effort placed in the shoring up of access 
portals and walls.  The use of concrete-like material or masonry and timber to line the 
walls indicates a deliberate effort to maintain a lasting subterranean passage.  These 
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tunnels are more expensive to build; however, greater distances can be achieved with that 
added financial investment.  Sophisticated tunnels routinely have ventilation conduits and 
are tied to existing power supplies.  Ground water removal is also either structurally 
engineered or drainage lines and pumps are installed.  The size of sophisticated tunnels 
can range from semi-permissive to unrestricted.  Umbilical infrastructure will likely be 
vulnerable and portals will likely have a level I accessibility.  Because of the amount of 
financial investment in the construction of sophisticated tunnels, they are most likely 
used for conveyance of persons and goods that offer returns on the investment.  
Environmental hazards are still a consideration; however, they are less likely with 
increased levels of support infrastructure.  Personnel encountered may be more prepared 
to engage in hostilities to protect the structure, but the small narrow passages would not 
support any sustained resistance.  In order to protect the structure, matériel hazards such 
as IEDs or booby traps would likely be placed near portals to deny access. 
Urban and natural cavities earn their own category particularly based on the 
characteristic that most have dual usage; the original structure can be adapted for military 
purposes.  Special considerations must be taken into account with dual use facilities due 
the impact they may have on civilian populations.  Urban and natural cavities cover a 
wide variety of structures, and the focus is on potential impacts on the civilian 
population.  As such, the size of these cavities can range from restricted to unrestricted.  
Urban and natural cavities are not hardened in terms of special construction material or 
design.  These subterranean spaces gain additional protection from existing above ground 
structures and naturally occurring overburden.  In terms of accessibility, these adapted 
structures would likely be rated as a level I or II.  The subcategories of urban and natural 
cavities are substructures and civil works. 
Substructures consist of basements and similar subterranean spaces that are 
attached to an above ground structure.  These basement facilities may be accessed from 
within the above ground structure, but may also have exterior access points and umbilical 
infrastructure.  Spaces such as caves and caverns are naturally occurring subterranean 
substructures that can be adapted for military purposes.  Above ground structures 
typically support any infrastructure such as power, environmental and life-support 
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systems, communications, and transportation supplied to these places.  Adapted 
substructures can be expected to function as C3I, storage, and potentially as conveyance.  
Threats within urban cavities are likely to be personnel and matériel, often with added 
environmental threats within natural cavities. 
Civil works such as sewers, subways, electrical and exhaust tunnels, and 
aqueducts, all support habitability in a growing urban population.  Although these 
structures are primarily used to support a civilian population, both state and non-state 
actors can use these same structures to facilitate clandestine movement of high value 
personnel and equipment, and storage of weapons and illicit matériel.  Civil work 
subterranean structures may be significantly large and have multiple ingress and egress 
points.  Although these structures may appear similar to sophisticated tunnels, or have an 
infrastructure similar to a UGF, the significant collateral damage considerations make 
these structures unique in terms of how ground forces can hold threats in these areas at 
risk.  Similar to tunnels, these areas are likely to be unoccupied unless movement activity 
is taking place.  Caution should be used when entering civil work structures due to 
increased environmental hazards of water, gases, and electrical conduits. 
The UGFs are characterized by their purpose-built design and construction to 
resist destruction by conventional and nuclear munitions.  The DIA’s Underground 
Facility Analysis Center (UFAC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) 
Hard Target Research and Analysis Center (HTRAC) work in concert to identify and 
characterize UGF’s around the world.  Along with direct observations made at 
continental U.S. (CONUS) based operational UGFs, and research done on Cold War Era 
UGFs, DIA’s Lexicon of Hardened Structure Definitions and Terms provides most of the 
needed understanding of what constitutes a UGF.  The primary difference between a 
UGS and a DUG is the level of overburden between the ground surface and the UGF 
mission space.  The DIA distinguishes DUGs as having 20 meters or more of overburden 
between the mission space and the ground surface.10  Anything less would be considered 
a shallow UGF or UGS.  For the soldier, the particular depth of a UGF is of less concern 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 15. 
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than the physical characteristics which may present a functional defeat option or access 
vulnerability. 
The DIA identifies four types of shallow underground hardened structures: 
shallow underground bunker, basement bunker, missile silo, and tunnel.11  Again, the 
DIA’s focus on the term “hardened” deals with military-purposed or adapted civil 
structures designed and constructed to resist the effects of kinetic munitions.12  For 
research purposes, these types are compressed into the single category of shallow 
underground facility or UGS.  Additionally, UGSs include any subterranean structures 
that are military purposed, or have the potential to be adapted for military purpose, with 
less than 20 meters of overburden and not having dual usage with a civilian population.  
It is also the level of sophistication in construction and design that distinguishes UGSs 
and other UGFs from the other categories.  The amount of infrastructure that supports the 
UGS is increased due to the need to sustain life or maintain a particular environment for 
special matériel. For this reason the function of UGSs are typically C3I or storage.  It is 
also likely that the level of accessibility is increased to protect personnel and equipment 
or to contain blasts within.  Accessibility levels of II or greater should be expected.  The 
function of UGSs also lends itself to larger size structures with mobility ranging from 
permissive to unrestricted.  Due to the level of sophistication in construction, 
environmental hazards are less likely unless purposely introduced.  Personnel and 
matériel hazards are more likely due to the direct correlation with function. 
Deep underground facilities (DUGs) are purposely built or adapted facilities, used 
by governments to protect and house strategic level information, personnel, equipment, or 
production.  Also, they may function as part of a national level C3I system.  Designed to 
sustain conventional weapon penetration, and resist air-blast and ground shock from 
nuclear weapon effects, these structures are built using advanced tunneling methods, 
often using a tunnel-boring machine (TBM).13  Caves and mines can also be adapted for 
strategic usage.  In less developed countries, converted mines can create an ideal 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Ibid., 2. 
13 Ibid.,15. 
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opportunity for the construction of a DUG.  The sizes of these structures are typically 
very large and mobility would be considered permissive to unrestricted.  These facilities 
are designed to be tied to surface infrastructure; however, they maintain enough critical 
internal infrastructure, such as water and fuel reservoirs, power generation, air filtration 
systems, and food rations, to sustain operations from anywhere from 60–90 days in a 
“buttoned-up” posture.  Some facilities may boast longer sustainment capabilities; 
however, human psychological factors are likely more of a limiting factor, particularly if 
under siege.  The entrances to DUG facilities can be either horizontally or vertically dug 
to reach the desired depth of operational workspace.14  These entrances are typically well 
hardened to resist kinetic munitions and will likely require accessibility level III or IV 
breaching methods.  Additionally, interior spaces may require additional level III 
breaching methods.  Because of the sustainability mechanisms and life support systems, 
merely collapsing access portals may not be sufficient to achieve a functional defeat.  
Facilities may contain excavation implements to remove rubble and repair portals.  
Threats found within these facilities are likely to be personnel and matériel related. 
Using this typology and classification methodology to describe the subterranean 
operational environment will assist ground forces in mission preparation and intelligence 
analysts in understanding what information is critical before commanders commit lives 
into these unknown spaces.  The coding system, along with the graphical symbol, 
illustrated below, allows commanders and planners to use a common reference to quickly 
identify and communicate the disposition of subterranean threats within their areas of 
operations. 
                                                 
14 Ibid.,16–17. 
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Table 1.   Subterranean Operational Environment Typological Coding System 
TUNR Tunnel, Rudimentary Element Code Description
TUNS Tunnel, Sophisticated C3I Command, Control, Comms, and Intel
SUBS Substructure, Basement, Cave PROD Production
CWKS Civil Works, Sewers, Subways, Aqueducts STOR Storage
UGS Shallow Underground, Bunkers, Silos MOVE Movement/Conveyance










I Level I - basic mechanical tool breach
II Level II - explosive or ballistic breach
III Level III - advance cutting/dynamic breach
IV Level IV - heavy engineer equip/munitions
E Environmental, respirators required
P Personnel, ballistic protection/restraints












Figure 7.  Subterranean Area Graphical Symbol 
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D. CASE STUDY LOGIC AND SELECTION 
The case studies selected for use in this project have been chosen because of their 
historical significance and impact on military forces operating underground.  The case 
studies span over half a millennium of military conflict.  In each highlighted case, the 
aggressor or the defender determined that the ability to maneuver conventionally was 
severely restricted and the best remaining option was subterranean.  The case studies 
have served to assess and refine the typological space in reference to a military’s 
subterranean efforts.  They also allow for the development of DOTMLPF implications 
from broad but relevant perspectives. 
In 1453, during the siege of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks reached a 
decision point.  After three weeks of inconclusive frontal assaults and artillery barrages, 
the Byzantines showed no sign of capitulation.  The Turks only seeming option was to 
dig under the city walls to break the stalemate.  Even though this Turkish underground 
approach was defeated, massive Byzantine resources were expended to counter the threat.  
The action severely degraded the city’s defenses, causing the eventual fall of 
Constantinople.  This case set a precedent for armies to employ an underground solution 
when maneuver is not an option.  The subterranean operations that occurred during the 
siege of Constantinople are the earliest documented examples that could be found, and it 
is from this point in history that the use of a distinct form of subterranean warfare can be 
traced.  The motives that influenced combatants to seek the subterranean environment 
have not changed in hundreds of years and the rudimentary methods pioneered in this 
case can still be seen today.  Although technology has often driven advances in warfare, 
the techniques used in tunnel detection and counter-tunneling at Constantinople 
continued to be used through the first World War. 
The siege of Petersburg during the American Civil War in 1864 provides an 
example of a subterranean approach during what can be called “the first modern war.”  
The Union Army laid siege to a strongly held Confederate defensive position in 
Petersburg, Virginia.  In order to break the stalemate, the Union looked to an 
underground solution.  Former miners, who were now Union soldiers, tunneled 
underneath Confederate lines in order to breach the defensive positions. Union miners 
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detonated a large amount of explosives under the Confederate trenches, creating a huge 
crater.  Union troops rushing into the massive crater were trapped. Confederates 
counterattacked and easily dispatched the Union troops trapped inside.  This action was a 
catastrophe for the Union Army and extended the siege for another eight months.  
Regardless of the tactical error, the cunning behind the design of this particular tunnel 
should not escape analysis.  The employment of soldiers with previous training in 
underground mining proved critical to the subterranean operation.  The efforts to mask 
the presence of a single ventilation shaft displayed understanding of the vulnerabilities 
associated with such support structures as well as efforts against detection through 
deception.  Having specially trained or adapted soldiers and understanding the art of 
deception are both essential elements to subterranean operations today. 
The Petersburg tunneling technique was used with much greater success in 1917, 
during World War I at the Battle of Messines Ridge.  In this incident, the British devised 
a more elaborate plan to detonate explosives under German trenches.  Nineteen tunnels 
were exploded, instantly killing 10,000 Germans enabling the British to capture the ridge.  
For the first time in World War I, a strong defense incurred more casualties than the 
attacking force.  This example illustrates how subterranean operations can be successful 
if incorporated into a combined arms strategy.  This case study relates the frightening 
realities of subterranean combat where miner-soldiers sometimes were engaged in hand-
to-hand combat with counter-miners.  The psychological factors associated with living 
underground for nine months or more required specially trained soldiers or those 
experienced in mining.  In order to avoid detection and destruction by bombardment, 
miners found themselves going to new depths, increasing levels of sophistication in their 
operations , and incorporating new technology to sustain life. 
In 1945, during World War II, the Battle of Okinawa became the last stand for the 
Japanese prior to a possible U.S. invasion of the home islands.  This case displays an 
army’s adaptation to underground tactics in order to inflict massive U.S. casualties.  The 
Japanese on Okinawa transitioned their efforts into a defensive strategy that utilized 
underground bunker systems connected by mutually supporting tunnels, effectively 
becoming a UGS.  The Japanese also took advantage of the terrain, which made Okinawa 
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the bloodiest and most costly single battle for the U.S. in World War II.  Choosing not to 
commit forces underground, American soldiers made effective use of specialized 
weapons such as flamethrowers and shotguns.  Capitalizing on vulnerabilities, motor oil 
was poured down ventilation shafts to spread and sustain fire and smoke.  The effective 
use of incendiary weapons as an alternative to committing forces underground, 
contributes to making this a valuable case study. 
During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong constructed a vast subterranean tunnel 
network that was intended as a staging area for the Tet Offensive of 1968.  This case 
illustrates the benefit of an irregular force remaining concealed underground and the 
difficulties with efforts to find them.  For the first time, the U.S. began to form specially 
trained units to enter tunnels to interdict and clear Viet Cong hiding inside.  This case 
exemplifies the tactics, techniques and procedures that can be effectively utilized in 
countering rudimentary tunnels.  It also shows the psychological effects on soldiers 
operating in a subterranean environment. 
In every case, the pattern of human behavior, seeking an advantage by going 
underground, is apparent.  The employment of tunnels, when the ability to maneuver 
above ground has been eliminated, becomes the overarching theme in each case.  The 
studies also serve to reveal different aspects of deception, concealment, stealth, 
incendiary weapons, explosives, detection, and other forms of combat in a subterranean 
environment.  Attention given to these historical examples will allow the military  to 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. THE SIEGE OF CONSTANTINOPLE (1453) 
1. Introduction 
Since Roman times, tunnel warfare has been utilized as a means for armies to gain 
a tactical advantage in battle.  One of the earliest and most notable uses of subterranean 
operations was employed in 1453 during the siege of Constantinople by the Ottoman 
Turks.  This battle provides an early indicator of how armies, when faced with adversity 
above ground, will seek to gain a tactical advantage underground.  The battle 
incorporated a tunneling operation by Ottoman invaders to breach city walls while 
Byzantine defenders struggled to counter it.  The battle remains a pertinent historical 
example by demonstrating an army’s natural tendency to go underground.  As modern 
technology continues to drive conflict underground, the Siege of Constantinople becomes 
more relevant to modern warfare than ever before. 
This historical example reveals an early subterranean encounter that incorporated 
a variety of offensive and defensive tunneling tactics.  The battle exemplifies the 
difficulties in tunnel construction, exposure to detection, deception and combat in the 
confines of a tunnel.  The use of fire as a weapon by both sides also reveals its 
psychological and operational effectiveness underground.  The extensive amount of 
resources and manpower required to attack underground, compared to the resources 
required to defend against, was a significant factor for success.  In the case of 
Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks’ resource allocation became the deciding factor that 
shifted subterranean efforts back to the direct mass frontal assault, resulting in victory. 
2. Background 
The siege of Constantinople was the great enterprise of Ottoman Sultan Mehmed 
II.  His goal was to capture the capital of the Byzantine Empire which was the last 
remnant of Rome.  The Byzantine emperor Constantine XI made the firm assertion that 
the city of Constantinople would hold out to the last man if invaded.  He believed that it 
was the religious duty of every Christian to show no fear in the face of their Muslim 
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enemies.  To lose such a city would be a blow to Christendom and allow Muslims the 
opportunity to invade Europe; the city of Constantinople had to make a stand.15 
When an attack on the city became imminent, Constantine rapidly mobilized the 
city to prepare defensive measures.  The Ottoman Turks had a professional army of 
80,000 which included a coalition of many countries that were loyal to the Sultan.16  
Constantinople could muster only an army of 7,000 to defend itself.  One defensive 
measure was a large chain manufactured in order to block the mouth the city’s harbor.  
The chain was so large that it was supported on the water by floating wooden barges.  
Constantine’s intent was to keep the harbor open to the possible arrival of foreign 
assistance but to also block Turkish ships.  Additionally, the walls of the city were 
reinforced to form two layers of security which where comprised of an inner and outer 
wall.  A moat was dug between the two walls with towers at every 50-60 yards.17  This 
provided the city a formidable defense which would allow the Byzantines to hold out 
until external support arrived from Rome. 
The Sultan attempted to strangle the city by sea as well as land operations. One of 
the first actions taken by the Turks was a blockade of the city by 126 Turkish ships off 
the coast of Constantinople.  Due to Constantine’s defensive measures of the massive 
chain, Turkish ships were unable to enter the harbor.  The Sultan understood the city’s 
walls had been reinforced and were formidable enough to render typical artillery of the 
time obsolete.  A new weapon was developed by the Turks to solve this problem.  The 
Sultan commissioned a German engineer to forge massive cannon called “The Basilic.”  
The Basilic was 27 feet long and was able to hurl a 600 pound stone ball over a mile.  
The Basilic was so large that it was accompanied by a crew of 60 oxen and 400 men.18  
Initially, the Turks assumed this new weapon would be all that was necessary to breach 
the outer walls of Constantinople. 
                                                 
15 Paul Davis, 100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 165. 
16 Roger Crowley, The Last Great Siege, 1453 (New York: Bloomsbury House, 2005), 95.  
17 Crowley, 79–86. 
18 Davis, 165. 
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In April of 1453, the Sultan’s troops positioned themselves to begin bombarding 
the city walls.  The Basilic’s fire was focused at the middle section of the outer wall on 
the inland side of the city.  Due to the limited size of the Byzantine army, Constantine 
only had enough troops to occupy the outer defensive wall of the city.  Initially, as the 
Basilic fired on the outer wall, massive damage was inflicted which caused the Sultan to 
assume it was only a matter of time before the walls could be breached (see Figure 10).  
However, due to the inaccuracy of the cannon and its extremely slow rate of fire (three 
hours to reload); the Byzantines were able to repair the walls after each shot.19  These 
factors severely limited the effectiveness of the Basilic and strengthened the resolve of 
the Byzantines. 
 
Figure 8.  Siege of Constantinople20 
After several unsuccessful frontal assaults compounded by the ineffectiveness of 
the Basilic, the Sultan formulated a less direct strategy to break the stalemate.  In May, 
the Sultan ordered his Serbian sappers to find a way to weaken or breach the city’s walls.  
Turkish officer Zagan Pasha was placed in command of the sappers and devised a plan to  
                                                 
19 Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1992), 80–81. 
20 “Ottoman Superguns” [image], accessed December 12, 2013, Weapons and Hardware, 
http://weaponsandwarfare.com/?m=201005&paged=3. 
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use a series of tunnels to weaken and/or breach the outer walls.21  However, the Turkish 
sappers did not anticipate the difficulties and dynamic problem sets that would come with 
such an unconventional subterranean approach. 
3. Subterranean 
Pasha and his men immediately began construction of the first Turkish tunnel, in 
full view of the defenders, just beyond the range of Byzantine weapons.  Around the 
clock digging by the Turkish sappers revealed large amounts of spoilage (excess earth 
from the tunnel) that was being removed.  Due to the amount of spoilage, the Byzantine 
defenders knew that it was only a matter of time before the Turks would reach the city 
walls.  As the Byzantine defenders continued to observe Pasha’s efforts, it became crucial 
to devise a plan to counter this new underground threat. 
Constantine dispatched all available engineers from his ranks to form a 
specialized Byzantine underground detachment.  He placed in command a Scottish 
engineer officer named Johannes Grant.22  Grant immediately went to work instructing 
his men to dig counter tunnels to interdict the Turkish underground approach. The 
counter tunnel direction was determined by simply estimating the line of sight from the 
city wall to the Turkish tunnel entrance.  As the Turkish tunnel construction progressed, 
wooden beams were placed every two feet along the tunnel.  The beams were intended to 
reinforce the tunnels and protect the sappers from collapse. 
As the Byzantine defenders came into contact with sappers underground on the 
night of May 16, intense hand to hand combat ensued.  Initially, the Byzantines were able 
to inflict massive casualties upon the Turks and blocked the Turkish approach.  As the 
intense fighting within the tunnel progressed, Greek fire and water were introduced into 
the struggle.  As the Byzantines poured Greek fire and/or water into the tunnels, the 
terrified Turks were overwhelmed by fear, causing them to flee from the tunnels.23  The 
                                                 
21 Babinger, 86. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Davis, 167. 
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Byzantine engineers were then able to block the tunnels with brick and earth.  A citizen 
of Constantinople named Tetaldi described this event in his diary by writing: 
There were many men who knew how to mine all sorts of metals from the 
earth.  Their captains led them, with cleverness and cunning, and they 
began to dig to bring down and destroy the walls.  But the Christians from 
within the city dug a counter-mine, met the Turks at some point, and killed 
them with smoke; they lost their lives underground with the stench of 
corpses.  Our side even drowned them with water and prevented them 
from accomplishing their task.24 
Greek fire created such fear for Turkish sappers that deception was used to 
conceal the direction of the tunnels and the breach point under the wall (see Figure 11).  
The Turkish sappers conducted this deception by intentionally making no attempt to 
conceal the entrance of a newly constructed tunnel leaving it in full view of the 
Byzantines.  However, the Turkish intent was to encourage the Byzantines to assume the 
tunnel would follow a straight line to the wall.  Instead, the sappers would construct the 
tunnel at an oblique angle to the wall which would make tunnel detection difficult for the 
Byzantine defenders.25  Once the Turkish sappers reached the wall undetected, piles of 
logs we set on fire under the wall.  It was the intent of the sappers to weaken the structure 
of the wall to the point of collapse.  This action by the Turkish sappers, to weaken the 
city walls in support of bombardment by the Basilic, was only moderately successful.  
The walls were never reduced enough to enable a breach that could be exploited by 
Turkish troops above ground. 
                                                 
24 Marios Philippides and Walter Hanak, The Siege and Fall of Constantinople in 1453 (Surrey, 
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 509. 
25 Crowley, 170. 
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Figure 9.  Ancient use of Greek fire26 
Pasha then decided the sappers had to focus on making a breach point under the 
walls that could accommodate a large assault force.  This was accomplished by sappers 
constructing multiple tunnels at oblique angles in preparation for a final assault on the 
city.  At this point, Grant was faced with the problem of detecting multiple Turkish 
tunnels while simultaneously having to interdict each effectively.  A young Byzantine 
engineer came up with a technique of using barrels of water to detect new tunnels.  The 
Byzantines would simply place barrels of water at close intervals along the inside of the 
city wall.27  The barrels were monitored for disturbances in the water that indicated 
vibrations from Turkish underground digging.  This method became very successful for 
the Byzantines and incurred additional casualties for the Turkish sappers.  The tunnels 
were again bricked up and filled with earth.  This caused the sappers to take even more 
care with tunnel construction in order to limit the amount of vibration and made tunnel 
detection difficult for the Byzantines, but not impossible.  The defenders continued to 
hastily interdict Turkish tunnels but Grant was determined to enhance Byzantine counter-
tunnel methods. 
An opportunity arose at one of the interdicted tunnels, resulting in the Byzantine 
capture of two Turkish sapper officers.  The two officers were submitted to severe torture 
and interrogation and revealed additional tunnels under construction.  After sufficient 
                                                 
26 “The Vatican and Islam” [image], accessed December 12, 2013, 
http://www.reformation.org/vatican-and-islam.html. 
27 Crowley, 171. 
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intelligence was obtained, the two Turkish officers were beheaded and their heads 
displayed on the city walls as a message to the Turks.28  This enraged the Turks, but new 
tunnel construction continued.  As Turkish tunnels continued to be compromised, the 
Sultan came to the realization that the number of casualties underground was far too 
costly with too little chance of success.  With tunnel efforts thwarted by the Byzantines at 
every turn, Turkish underground efforts became futile and the Sultan abandoned the 
operation. 
4. Effects 
Due to the extensive resources required to counter Turkish tunnels, the remaining 
Byzantine defenses along the city wall were degraded.  Eventually, the Sultan made the 
decision to focus his remaining resources in a massive frontal assault on the city’s 
northwest corner, which had been severely damaged by the Basilic (see figure 12).29  This 
proved to be more than the Byzantine defenders could handle; the outer wall was 
breached and an intense battle occurred within the city’s inner walls.  As the Byzantines 
continued to lose ground, the Turks penetrated deeper into the city.  The battle finally 
ended when Constantine killed himself as the Turkish invaders were on the steps of the 
city cathedral, Saint Sophia.  The Byzantine Empire expired with the fall of 
Constantinople. 
                                                 
28 Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 108. 
29 Crowley, 217. 
 34 
 
Figure 10.  Final assault of the walls of Constantinople30 
5. DOTMLPF Application 
By examining the applicability to today’s operations in subterranean warfare, 
Turkish and Byzantine subterranean operations can be analyzed in terms of doctrine, 
organization, training, matériel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF): 
• Doctrine—Doctrine did not exist in support of either side. Many Turkish 
and Byzantine sappers were educated in engineering disciplines.  The 
subterranean capabilities relied mostly on non-military experiences. 
• Organization—Byzantines and Turks did not establish a permanent 
underground capability in their ranks. Nor did they retain their sappers 
after the success.  
• Training—Training for subterranean warfare most likely did not exist.  
The siege utilized those with mining experience.  
• Leadership—Zagan Pasha’s leadership was a driving force for the Turks 
but Johannes Grant’s improvisation was vital for the Byzantine defense.  
Grant’s encouragement and openness of new and innovation ideas from 
his men was the key to his underground success. 
• Matériel—Flexibility to improvise and cannibalize resources enabled the 
Turks to reach the city walls and enabled the Byzantines to counter it. 
• Personnel—It appears to be a coincidence that both sides had access to 
former miners willing to engage in subterranean warfare. 
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• Facilities—Facilities for subterranean warfare consisted of actual time 
spent in private and commercial mines during time served in non-military 
professions. 
6. Conclusion 
Even though the subterranean battle beneath the walls of Constantinople was not 
the final determining factor in the conflict, it did influence the Turks to alter their plan of 
attack.  The Turks determined the city’s remaining defenses were neglected, due to the 
resource-intensive counter-tunneling.  Additionally, despite successful counter-tunneling 
efforts, morale within the city also began to plummet when the defenders received word 
that no reinforcements would arrive from Rome.  Mehmed knew the city’s defenses were 
at its weakest point.  The Turks resumed the frontal attack, which resulted in the fall of 
the city.  The operation exemplifies how underground warfare can be used in both the 
offense and the defense.  It is the first significant case of subterranean warfare as a 
breach, use of counter tunnels, fire as a weapon, tunnel detection and concealment.  The 
amount of underground expertise needed by skilled combat troops demonstrated the need 
for specialized units and training needed to conduct underground warfare.  Finally, the 
case showed how underground operations could work in tandem with activities 
aboveground, opening new lines of operation and relieving pressure by expanding the 
scope of the battle space.  To dismiss an underground threat could alter the tactical 
situation above ground and become disastrous in battle.  These same underground lessons 
can still be applied in today’s modern warfare. 
B. SIEGE OF PETERSBURG DURING AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1864) 
1. Introduction 
During the American Civil War, advances in small arms and artillery resulted in 
devastating casualties on both sides.  This case study examines the use of the 
subterranean operations during the siege of Petersburg by Union forces.  The case is 
another example of the trend to go underground to expand the scope of the battle space.  
The Petersburg operation showcases specific subterranean tactics of tunnel construction, 
concealment, deception, and the utilization of an explosive breach.  These examples and 
their implications are relevant to today’s threats. 
 36 
The “Battle of the Crater,” as it became known, took place on July 30, 1864, 
during the siege of Petersburg, Virginia, between the United States (Union forces) and 
Confederate States of America (CSA).  Under the command of Lieutenant General (LTG) 
Ulysses S. Grant, Major General (MG) George Meade’s forces waged a nearly month-
long struggle against entrenched, fortified, and well-armed Confederate forces.  An 
assault, facilitated by underground sappers was conducted on entrenched Confederates 
and resulted in devastating casualties for the Union; thus, subterranean warfare might be 
mistakenly disregarded as counterproductive.  To the contrary, the Union debacle was not 
due to the employment or logic behind an explosive tunnel, but more importantly to the 
leadership and tactical exploitation of the breach itself.  Without proper tactical 
coordination of troops above and below ground, as part of an overall attack plan, 
momentum gained was squandered resulting in unnecessary casualties. 
2. Background 
In the days leading up to the battle, General Meade’s force had been in a deadlock 
with Confederates; General Grant was eager for suggestions.  One idea came from 
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Henry Pleasants who had been a mining engineer in 
Pennsylvania.  Pleasants proposed digging a mineshaft that would extend beyond the 
Union breastworks and terminate under Confederate entrenchments.31  At the end of the 
shaft, explosives would be emplaced and detonated, killing the defenders above.  The 
resulting crater would enable a breach point through which Union forces could penetrate. 
The target would be an area known as Elliott’s Salient in the middle of the 
Confederate First Corps line.  This section was a fortified position that was defended by 
South Carolina troops.  The position was also occupied by several artillery pieces that 
were integrated into established Confederate entrenchments.  An explosive breach at the 
Salient was intended to neutralize its firepower while simultaneously providing a gap in 
the Confederate defensive line that could be exploited.  Thus, it was hoped that the 
Confederate defenses at Petersburg would crumble leaving the Confederate capital of 
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Richmond vulnerable.32  Additionally, five railroads converged in Petersburg providing a 
life line of supplies to the Confederate Army.  Without Petersburg, the Confederacy itself 
might fall.33 
Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants’s plan offered an opportunity to break the stalemate.  
It was reluctantly approved by Grant, even though he did not consider the action to be of 
strategic value.  However, Grant believed a tunneling operation would at least keep his 
troops occupied during the siege.  Due to Grant’s attitude, subordinate commanders also 
did not see the urgency in the endeavor resulting in minimal resources allocated in terms 
of personnel or equipment.  In the end, the tactical gain from this operation would enable 
the capture of key terrain, known as Cemetery Hill, while killing a significant number of 
Confederates. 
3. Subterranean 
During the Civil War, an operational tunnel was known by the French term “sap.”  
The term referred to a trench or tunnel that was dug beneath enemy fortifications.  The 
intent was to render the ground underneath the enemy’s defensive position unstable, 
either through the use of fire or explosives to effectively produce a penetrable breech.  
The structure was usually a rudimentary tunnel dug with hand tools with basic support 
structures for shoring.  The size was limited to the space needed to move a small number 
of men and equipment.  A restricted size also aided in the speed of construction and the 
effectiveness of fire or explosives. 
Pleasants’s plan called for a 500 foot shaft to be dug under Elliott’s Salient.  The 
mission was estimated to take twelve days and use 12,000 pounds of explosive powder.34  
General Grant remained skeptical due to his prior failed attempts with tunnels at 
Vicksburg.  During the siege at Vicksburg, 36 former Union coal miners tried to detonate 
2,200 pounds of gun powder under Confederate entrenchments.  However, the 3rd 
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Louisiana Regiment discovered the mining and countered it by digging secondary 
trenches.  The ensuing Union fiasco became known as the battle of the “Death Hole.”35 
Pleasants commanded the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, of which almost 100 were 
miners from the Schuylkill County, a Pennsylvania coal region.  The regiment had earned 
a distinguished combat record, and like most, its soldiers would do almost anything to 
end the war.36  Thus, a force with previous civilian miner experienced was utilized.  
Approximately 100 ex-miners from the regiment dug around the clock in two and a half 
hour shifts.  Without any special equipment, they improvised crate-made wheelbarrows 
and used cracker boxes for hauling dirt (see figure 13).  Understanding the need for 
operational security (OPSEC), they hauled the dirt into the woods and covered it with 
underbrush at night.37  Pleasants gave testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of 
the War in which he said, “I got pieces of hickory and nailed on the boxes in which we 
received our crackers, and then iron-clad them with hoops taken from old pork and beef 
barrels.”  Additionally, in his statement he noted that General Meade and Grant’s chief 
engineer regarded the effort as nonsense; that a mine that length had never been built in 
military operations; that the men would likely be suffocated or crushed by earth or the 
enemy would discover their intentions, and countermine.  He stated that, despite his 
request, he could get no supply of lumber for shoring and had to cannibalize wagons, an 
old bridge, and even raided a rebel saw-mill.  Without the proper hand tools, Pleasants’ 
men used blacksmiths to straighten and flatten common army picks and axes.  Pleasants 
knew that the most important calculation would be the distance mined.  If the distance 
fell short or long the explosion would have little effect.  A surveying tool, called a 
theodolite, was procured to measure distance and azimuth to the enemy defenses.38 
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Figure 11.  Entrance to Union Mine (Petersburg 1865)39 
Digging through the sand and thick clay, the 400-man regiment averaged nearly 
40 feet per day.  At about 250 feet, they hit heavy clay.  Pleasants directed the shaft to 
continue at an incline toward the Confederate lines.  The incline enabled ease of water 
drainage without congestion.  Pleasants also designed an ingenious air-exchange system 
to provide ventilation.  A single ventilation shaft was constructed vertically, well behind 
Union lines, to prevent observation.  At the base of the shaft, a canvas partition was 
installed and a fire was kept continuously burning.  The heat forced stale-air, from inside 
the mine, up the shaft while creating a vacuum of fresh air from the tunnel entrance.  To 
conceal the smoke from the shaft, General Burnside ordered round the clock campfires 
along Union lines to mask the tunnel fire. 
Having begun on June 25, the main shaft reached the Confederate lines on July 
17.  The mine was then extended into a 75-foot gallery running parallel to Confederate 
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lines.  The tunnel complex was now T-shaped.  The main shaft ran 511 feet long and 
more than 50 feet below the surface (see Figure 14).  The tunnel was narrow at three feet 
by four and a half foot high, large enough for two miners to work side by side (see Figure 
15).  Inclining upward, the 75-foot perpendicular galleries sat just 20 feet below the 
Confederate positions. 
 
Figure 12.  Petersburg Tunnel diagram40 
 
Figure 13.  Inside the Union tunnel at Petersburg41 
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General speculation and gossip along the CSA lines suggested a Union mining 
operation.  The lack of visible aggression towards the Elliott’s Salient section led to 
suspicions by the Army of Northern Virginia 1st Corps artillery chief General Edward P. 
Alexander.  No visible ventilation shafts forward of Union lines suggested a lack of 
mining efforts to most of the Confederate defenders.  Confederate Commander Robert E. 
Lee was skeptical.  However, to be safe, Lee tasked Captain Thomas H. Douglas to begin 
countermining, to be sure.  Lee’s skepticism was also fueled by an observation from a 
British journalist who stated that the British had attempted a similar tunnel of the same 
length in India.  However, the length of that tunnel caused a failure due to lack of air. 
Captain Hugh Douglas, a Confederate engineer officer, organized 90 men to 
being two separate shafts at opposite ends of Elliott’s Salient.  The shafts would extend 
toward the Union lines, and be angled toward each other.  The countermining was slow 
and lacked good intelligence.  Douglas’s men worked twelve hours shifts and usually 
halted their digging to listen for Union digging.  The men of F Company, 1st Confederate 
Engineers, lacked mining experience, and their shafts were dug between fourteen and 
eighteen feet deep.  Only one shaft extended far enough, but still overshot the 25-foot 
deep Union shaft. 
After three Confederate deserters were questioned, LTC Pleasants quickly 
realized Confederate countermining was being conducted.  Consequently, the Union’s 
48th Regiment immediately halted digging.  Pleasants personally crawled into the tunnel 
and remained quiet for over half an hour, in order to confirm or deny any Confederate 
digging.  Upon his hearing nothing, Union operations resumed and LTC Pleasants 
expressed urgency finish the mine as soon as possible.  The Confederates could not detect 
any sounds of digging and soon ceased their countermining efforts in fear of possible 
cave-ins. 
                                                                                                                                                 




After Union miners reached their limit of advance, 8,000 pounds of gunpowder 
were emplaced and tamped with earth.  On July 28, a single fuse was spliced multiple 
times to reach the entrance to the mine; 12,000 pounds of explosive powder were 
emplaced at the end of the mine and primed (see Figure 16).  The mine was set to 
explode in the early morning hours of July 30.  After the initial attempt to detonate the 
explosive failed, two brave members of the 48th Regiment crawled inside to repair the 
fuse.  After relighting of the 60-minute fuse, the mine finally erupted in a massive 
explosion.  The resulting crater was 170 feet long, 120 feet wide and at least 30 feet deep 
(see Figure 17).  The blast instantly killed 278 Confederate soldiers.  The surviving 
Confederate defenders were dazed, confused and scrambled to consolidate and 
reorganize.  While the shock of the blast was a success, Union troops failed take 
advantage of the opportunity quickly.  For more than fifteen minutes, not a single shot 
was fired by Union troops.  The delay enabled Confederates, led by Brigadier General 
(BG) William Mahone, to quickly seal the breach. (see Figure 15).  Meanwhile, as Union 
troops attempted an assault through the blast site, they became trapped inside the massive 
crater.  Confederates easily slaughtered Union troops as they continued to flow into the 
depression. 
 
Figure 14.  Charcoal sketch: Col. Pleasants supervising emplacement of explosives42   
                                                 




Figure 15.  Confederate Reinforcement of the Breach43 
The Union assault was a complete and devastating failure and the Siege at 
Petersburg continued for another eight months.  Even though the Union subterranean 
successes were squandered, this event was significant.  It displayed how a force with 
subterranean capability can overcome adversity in an unforgiving environment to achieve 
a tactical surprise.  Another significant factor to this event was that Union miners were 
given the latitude to design the tunnel themselves, indicating a “bottom up planning” 
technique.  Union commanders understood that those closest to the enemy can have a 
better understanding of what is required.  Given the qualities of this unique operation, it 
is easy to see why subterranean warfare is a special skill set that can achieve tactical 
results. 
5. Application of DOTMLPF  
Lieutenant Colonel Pleasants’ operations can be analyzed in terms of DOTMLPF: 
• Doctrine—Doctrine did not exist in to support LTC Pleasants initiative.  
Though many West Point officers were educated in engineering 
disciplines, subterranean capabilities relied mostly on non-military mining 
experience. 
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• Organization—Union Forces during the Civil War did not establish a 
permanent underground capability in their ranks. 
• Training—Training for subterranean warfare most likely did not exist.  
Petersburg incorporated soldiers with pre-existing mining experience. 
• Leadership— Pleasants’ leadership and improvisation was vital.  Without 
his understanding of the capabilities and limitation of tunneling, the 
subterranean approach would have never materialized. 
• Material—The flexibility to improvise and cannibalize resources enabled 
Union miners to dig nearly 40 feet per day. 
• Personnel—It was pure happenstance that the 48th Regiment consisted of 
ex-miners from Pennsylvania who were willing to engage in subterranean 
warfare. 
• Facilities—Facilities for subterranean warfare consisted of actual time 
spent in private and commercial mines during time served in non-military 
professions. 
6. Conclusion 
The siege of Petersburg, Virginia offers a glimpse into one of the earliest uses of 
subterranean operations by America forces.  However, the trend to dig underground still 
exists.  Even today rudimentary cross-border tunnels are seen throughout the world.  It 
would not be implausible for an insurgent to infiltrate a country or a military facility, via 
a tunnel, with a weapon of mass destruction.  Such a happening would be devastating. 
Several lessons can be drawn from the Petersburg example and applied to modern 
tactical considerations.  Rudimentary construction can be seen in any modern day 
smuggling tunnel used by criminals or insurgent groups.  Concealment is also essential to 
preventing an adversary from discovering a subterranean effort.  Even with today’s 
advances in measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and persistent 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), tunnel detection is severely limited.  
Ventilation is also a critical necessity and significant vulnerability.  Today, mechanical 
air ventilation conduits are common in most rudimentary tunnels and underground 
facilities.  Knowledge and exploitation of these characteristics can provide modern 
militaries the means to counter an enemy’s use of the subterranean environment. 
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C. THE MINING OF MESSINES RIDGE DURING WORLD WAR I (1917) 
“Gentlemen, we may not make history tomorrow, but we shall certainly 
change the geography.” 
Sir Herbert Plumer, 2nd Army Commander44 
1. Introduction 
The Western Front was caught in a quagmire; by 1916, Germany and a European 
alliance had been entrenched in static positions for two years.  Both sides were unwilling 
to yield ground, but the need for a breakthrough grew more prevalent each day if victory 
were to be achieved.  The war had already seen hundreds of thousands of men die and 
pressured military commanders to conceive a strategy that might end the war quickly.  Sir 
Herbert Plumer, Commander of the British 2nd Army, proposed that in order to defeat the 
Germans, Allied forces needed to utilize clandestine subterranean methods.  An 
underground approach along the Western Front, more specifically at Messines Ridge, was 
devised to provide a tactical advantage to the British. 
Messines Ridge was a prominent natural stronghold that had been previously 
captured by the Germans in 1914.45  Messines was located to the southeast of Ypres, 
Belgium and its significance was that it acted as a natural obstacle for the Germans.  For 
the British, clearing Germans from the ridge would open a route towards Roulers, a key 
German distribution point of matériel and troops.46  From the start of the stalemate, 
Messines Ridge had been the scene of persistent harassment for Allied Forces.  The 
Germans occupied the high ground with fortified entrenchments (machine guns and 
artillery) that made any allied assault futile.  The British pinned down in the trenches and 
receiving casualties, required drastic measures.  Sir Herbert Plumer devised an alternative 
course of action for the British to break the stalemate. 
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2. Background 
Plumer knew every inch of Messines, having fought there since 1914.  To break 
the stalemate, Plumer recommended going underground to disrupt the German defensive 
position.  At an Allied commander’s conference in England, Plumer revealed an 
operational concept to dig multiple mine shafts, fifteen feet under German 
entrenchments, nested within a massive above-ground assault.  However, tunnels at that 
depth could be easily discovered by German countermine efforts, even though they were 
not susceptible to artillery bombardment.  Plumer discussed the problem with the British 
Expeditionary Force geologist.  A solution was required that could achieve relative 
stealth in terms of preventing German detection while maintaining structural integrity.  
The sand and clay layers of Messines were analyzed at varying depths for capacity to dig, 
mine, and handle explosives.  After some debate, an agreement was reached.  The heavy 
clay found between 80–120 feet subsurface was the most optimal for the operation.  This 
would be the layer Allied Forces would use to punch through to achieve surprise. 
In preparing for the operation, Plumber had authorized the laying of 22 mine 
shafts underneath German lines all along the ten kilometer natural ridge.  The plan was to 
detonate all 22 tunnels at zero hour on June 7, 1917.47  The attack would then be followed 
by infantry assaults against a presumably dazed and confused German defense.  This 
unique operation was the largest underground attack ever attempted. 
Initially, allied countries such as England, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia 
heavily recruited civilian miners and tunnellers to join the war effort.  With civilian 
subterranean experience, a typical engineer soldier could utilize geological and 
metallurgical capability never before seen in combat.  From Australia alone, over 4,800 
miners/tunnellers were recruited and sent to a makeshift basic training camp in Sydney.  
In England, “clay kickers” were recruited due to their vast experience developing 
aqueducts and underground cisterns in Manchester and London.  Naturally, the dire need 
for mining skills meant some recruitment standards were overlooked.  Some recruits were  
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well into their late 60s, and others had disciplinary problems.  Ex-miners assigned to 
other branches were reassigned to engineer tunneling units.  In all, about 20,000 miners 
were assembled in Belgium. 
3. Subterranean 
Despite being professionals at home, these men still needed to be educated on the 
military aspects of tunneling.  For instance, a “listener” was trained to detect enemy 
digging utilizing the most rudimentary methods.  The listener would drive a stick in the 
ground and place the other end between his teeth.  The listener would feel for vibrations, 
informing him if enemy countermines were occurring underground.  Listening posts also 
contained medical stethoscopes, which became another method of detection.  If any 
digging was detected, all work ceased, even if the sound was later identified as coming 
from rats.  Strings, attached to bells hundreds of feet apart, lined tunnel ceilings in order 
to relay warnings from the listener to other miners.  Lastly, every listener had a caged 
canary nearby.  The canary’s small lungs were more susceptible to carbon monoxide and 
dioxide than a human’s.  A dead canary, or one in distress, was a tell-tale sign that the 
tunnel should be evacuated. 
Construction of the tunnels proved rigorous for the laborers.  A typical miner 
rotational schedule encompassed four days in and four days out.  As Plumer’s target date 
of June 7 loomed closer, the rotations were changed to six days in and two days out.48  
Tunneling became a 24-hour operation with a typical shift being around twelve hours.  
The living conditions underground were nearly intolerable due to the increased exposure 
to lice, bugs, and rats.  One miner described it, “If you cut your hand, it was a criminal 
offense not to go and be injected against tetanus.  Jaundice, boils and tetanus were rife.”49  
In addition, at 80 to 120 feet below ground, water became a constant hazard and miners 
were consistently operating in roughly one foot of water under poor lighting that affected 
them mentally and physically.  The military aspect of tunneling was a traumatic 
experience for most.  Many miners turned to alcohol as a means to cope with their 
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problems and alcoholism became the largest problem warranting punitive action amongst 
tunneling units.  Any spare time was used to write loved ones back home and fill sand 
bags with excess tunnel spoilage. 
One of the biggest fears every miner faced was an underground encounter with 
the enemy.  Before the war, miners did not even consider the possibility of running into 
another shaft resulting in a fight to the death.  However, in wartime, this became a real 
threat.  Typically, when one tunnel collapsed into another, fighting was a claustrophobic 
brawl, with little room to maneuver.  A miner would use anything at his disposal to defeat 
his adversary, including picks, shovels and knives.  Side arms were seldom used.  The 
sound of a pistol could give away a miner’s position and compromise the entire 
operation.  Another fear was being buried alive.  One Australian miner, William Bedson, 
faced just that outcome when German countermining efforts blew a charge to collapse the 
tunnel in which he was located.  After the collapse, Bedson was entombed for six days, 
surrounded by his dead friends.50  
For the regular infantry unit, knowing that a tunneling company was assigned or 
attached to them was not an appealing thought.  Not only were artillery shells and gas 
attacks a concern, now soldiers felt they had to also worry about an attack from below as 
well.  The Germans routinely conducted fly-overs of Allied positions.  Detection of 
mountainous heaps of spoilage alerted Germans to Allied tunneling efforts.  However, in 
reference to countermines, the Germans were deceived and did not know the Allies were 
typically digging at least five to ten feet deeper than their own tunnels. 
German counter-mining efforts routinely intercepted Allied digging efforts 
between 50–60 feet below surface.  The Germans developed geophones to measure 
seismic activity and direction.  To counter this, Allied miners deliberately made as much 
noise as possible, at odd locations and depths, to distract attention from an operational 
mine that was much deeper.  The Allies continued devising creative deception techniques 
over a year-long period.  One deception technique involved a system of pulleys attached 
to two mining picks inside a false or inactive tunnel.  Under the pulley system, a British 
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soldier would pull a rope, from above ground, which would cause the picks to strike steel 
spikes leaning against a tunnel wall at an alternate location.  The sound was enough to 
resonate onto German geophones to conceal an actual operational tunnel under 
construction.  Miners would then move the contraption forward to replicate a digging rate 
of progress.  The deception worked and left the Germans completely unaware of British 
underground preparations for a massive assault. 
Plumer’s plan was coming to fruition.  Like most great concepts, his was simple 
and easily understood multiple echelons below.  The entire operation was essentially 
broken down into three phases.  Phase One was the prolonged deception operation.  This 
phase took the form of multiple mass feint attacks later on.  Phase Two was to dig 
underneath the German position along Messines Ridge and lay 1,000,000 pounds of 
explosives.  The explosives would be distributed throughout tunnel pockets called 
galleries (see Figure 18).  Following the detonation, Phase Three encompassed the 
infantry retaking the ridge against presumably dazed German defenders.  The infantry 
would be supported by close air bombardments of high explosives and mustard gas.  The 
end state was the capture of Messines Ridge. 
 
Figure 16.  British tunnel diagram51 
In order to exploit this tactical underground advantage, the galleries were dug 
measuring three-by-six feet.  After completion of each gallery, a mine was laid in place 
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containing charges of ammonal up to 95,000 pounds.52  The charge was composed of 
ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder.  The gallery’s surrounding presented both 
advantages and disadvantages.  On the positive side, the heavy clay muffled any noise at 
that depth and Allied miners could operate in full secrecy without worry of detection.  
Another advantage was that being underground minimized artillery bombardments from 
above.  There was also little chance of the galleries being compromised due to the clay.  
However, moisture was another problem.  The miners took every precaution to ensure the 
preservation of their explosives.  Then, Plumer’s timeline was delayed due to focus being 
shifted to the Battle of Somme and this delay caused some concern about some of the 
charges which had been laid six months previously. 
In the days leading up to day zero, heavy and light artillery had been expanded on 
the Allied front lines.  Over 2,300 guns were lined up wheel to wheel with no effort to 
hide their positions.  An additional 300 heavy mortars were also brought forth.  The 
Germans on Messines Ridge included four divisions with two more divisions on reserve.  
For two weeks, artillery shells pounded food and water supplies, key roads, and supply 
dumps.  Mustard gas shells were also fired in an effort to force the Germans to don gas 
masks and lose sleep.  On two occasions the artillery fires were doubled in total output to 
deceive the Germans into believing a massive attack had commenced.  In reality, it was 
to desensitize them before the actual assault.  The bombardment was effective and by 
early June almost half of all German howitzers on the ridge were out of action. 
As Allied units conducted rehearsals in the final days leading to the assault, 
British planners conducted terrain analysis of the breach points above ground.  The 
miners were also incorporated into the assault as infantry above ground, post-detonation.  
The final time of execution was not released until June 5.  Great measures were taken to 
conceal the date of the offensive, even from the miners themselves.  To the British, it 
seemed unlikely that the Germans did not know of the deep mines beneath their own 
entrenchments.  The British assumed that captured British prisoners had been forced to 
reveal tunnel locations.  In actuality, not one prisoner of war had revealed any 
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information of the mines to the Germans.  By June 5, over 8,000 meters of tunnels had 
been dug 100 feet below the surface.  After eighteen months of mining, the offensive was 
set for execution.  Mining officers met beneath the German entrenchments, on the eve of 
day zero, for a final champagne toast. 
4. Effects 
Upon inspection of all 22 underground charges and detonating systems, the 
officers and men made their way back to their perspective attack positions.  The staging 
of Allied troops was done under the cover of darkness with an emphasis on noise and 
light discipline in the ranks.  The entrenched unsuspecting Germans remained vigilant but 
did not take any additional measures to mitigate the impending assault. 
At 0310 hours on June 7, the miners were given the order to detonate the charges.  
Nineteen of the 22 mines exploded in unison with massive ground turbulence.  
Immediately, curious miners peered over their own defenses to catch a glimpse of 
nineteen red mushroom clouds that now occupied Messines Ridge.  Large amounts of 
earth were hurled 3,000 feet into the air.  The concussion of the blast knocked the miners 
down as they watched.  The blast was so loud that Londoners even claimed to hear the 
explosion.  The simultaneous detonation of nineteen mines comprised the loudest man-
made explosion until that point.  Some British soldiers described the detonations as a 
pillar of fire across the sky.  The trembling of the earth itself could be felt in Lille, a town 
twelve miles away.  
The effect of the mine explosions upon the German defenders was devastating 
(see Figure 19).  Some 10,000 men were instantly killed during the explosion alone53.  
Within minutes, 80,000 British infantry assaulted through the blast site, capturing over 
7,300 dazed and confused Germans prisoners.  The operation was a complete success.  
Surrendering Germans waved handkerchiefs as they wept, grasping the ankles of their  
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captors.54  It was as if the earth swallowed up an entire division of men.  Craters 
hundreds of feet wide and deep took over where fortified trenches once stood and can 
still be seen to this day (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 17.  View from crater on Hill 60 (6 July 1917)55 
 
Figure 18.  Messines Present Day Crater56 
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5. Application of DOTMLPF  
By examining the applicability to today’s operations in subterranean warfare, 
World War I subterranean operations can be analyzed in terms of DOTMLPF: 
• Doctrine—Doctrine did not exist in support of either side.  Many German 
and Allied miners were educated in engineering disciplines.  Subterranean 
capabilities relied mostly on non-military experiences. 
• Organization—The Allies did establish tunneling units for a specific 
operation.  However, those units were later disbanded and absorbed back 
into the conventional force. 
• Training—Training for subterranean warfare most likely did not exist.  
The tunneling at Messines Ridge incorporated those with civilian mining 
experience prior to the war. 
• Leadership—Plumer’s leadership was a driving force for the Allies.  
German commanders underestimated the underground threat.  Without 
Plumer’s intimate knowledge of the Messines Ridge and what was 
required to defeat it, the endeavor would not have materialized.  The 
British chain of command was receptive to Plumer’s plan and properly 
nested the actions of units above ground to exploit the explosive breach. 
• Matériel—the flexibility to improvise and cannibalize resources enabled 
both sides conceal and/or detect mines.  New technology was also 
developed for tunnel detection (Geophones). 
• Personnel—It was mere coincidence that both sides had access to civilian 
miners willing to engage in subterranean warfare. 
• Facilities—Facilities for subterranean warfare consisted of actual time 
spent in private and commercial mines during time served in non-military 
professions. 
6. Conclusion 
The British offensive at Messines Ridge should not have been such a surprise to 
the Germans.  Of the original 22 mines installed for the operation, two did not detonate 
and one was actually discovered by the Germans prior to the assault.  As the Germans 
destroyed the mine, they assumed it to be a unilateral effort.  It was unconceivable to 
them that there could be 21 more mines just as deep.  Some German military 
commanders had suggested the abandonment of the ridge prior to the blast, but the 
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German higher command would not allow it.  Such an effort would have made the 
eighteen months of mining a wasted effort for the British.  The German position was firm 
as noted by an intercepted communiqué from German leadership that read: “These 
strong-points must not fall even temporarily into the enemy’s hands.  They must be held 
to the last man even if the enemy has cut them off on both sides, and threaten them from 
the rear.”57 
The battle for Messines Ridge highlighted, for the first time on the Western Front, 
that defensive casualties in a major engagement actually exceeded attacking losses.  It 
was a victory literally years in the making.  The battle exemplifies the techniques of 
deception and concealment that were never known to the Germans.  The success of the 
mission can be credited to the unconventional and innovative techniques developed by 
former civilian miners.  The British were also able to organize these soldiers into 
tunneling units which enabled the creativity needed to construct the tunnels undetected.  
Allowing the miners to develop their own tactics, technique, and procedures, without 
interference, was a significant factor that ensured mission success.  Nonetheless, the 
Battle of Messines does highlight how a group of men, with underground skill sets, were 
brought together for a tactical advantage. 
What the Battle of Messines should teach us is how lessons of the past are so 
quickly forgotten.  World War I may have been the greatest allied use of subterranean 
warfare.  However, tunneling efforts were dismissed after World War I because they 
were deemed too slow and not worth the investment.  Today, however, adversaries are 
turning to the underground in order to counter U.S. kinetic capabilities, avoid 
surveillance platforms, and as a means to cache weapons.  There is currently no U.S. 
doctrine that identifies subterranean as an operational environment despite the fact that 
the U.S. has fought in subterranean environments since the Civil War at Petersburg. 
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D. THE BATTLE OF OKINAWA (1945) 
1. Introduction 
The largest amphibious assault in the Pacific campaign was that on the island of 
Okinawa in 1945 which was larger and more costly than the D-day invasion of Europe.  
United States’ casualties from this conflict not only revealed Japanese resolve, but more 
importantly, were the deciding factor for President Truman to drop two atomic bombs on 
Japan.  The high cost to U.S. and Japanese forces, during this engagement, was due to an 
evolution of understanding in how the two militaries could better fight each other through 
tactical innovations by both sides.  One of the most significant of these developments was 
the Japanese tactic of going underground for protection as well as inflicting maximum 
casualties on the invaders.  Thus, the Japanese adopted underground bunker networks to 
optimize the effectiveness of their weapon systems and their own survivability.  The 
battle constituted the culmination of both Japanese subterranean techniques for defense, 
as well as U.S. counter-subterranean assault tactics in the Pacific theater. 
Okinawa was intended to be the last stand for the Japanese before the main 
islands of Japan were vulnerable to invasion.  The intent of U.S. forces was to capture the 
island in order to utilize it as a staging area for a subsequent invasion of Japan, vital to 
U.S. strategy.58  The Japanese viewed the island’s operations as a delaying action in order 
to buy time for the entire civilian population of Japan to mobilize for a U.S. invasion.  
Japanese military leaders also intended for the battle to inflict enough U.S. casualties to 
demoralize the U.S. in hopes of a cease fire.  It was critical to Japanese strategy, 
therefore, for the Battle of Okinawa to be one of attrition. 
2. Background 
Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, three years of combat in the Pacific had evolved 
into a series of “island hopping” maneuvers.59  From the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942 to 
the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945, the U.S. and Japanese forces incessantly refined their 
tactics, techniques and procedures.  The U.S. focused on improving its combined arms 
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concept to maximize lethality while seizing islands in the approach to Japan.  The 
Japanese similarly evolved their tactics.  The famous Japanese Banzai charge (suicide 
charge) was being utilized less frequently, but their ability to utilize subterranean bunker 
complexes began to increase as the war progressed.  As the Japanese army continued to 
lose momentum, due to superior U.S. firepower, it was forced to utilize the only tactical 
advantage it had left, preparing underground defensive positions.   
By 1945, the U.S. still did not have specially trained soldiers and marines to enter 
underground networks in its ranks.  Consequently, U.S. troops rarely entered Japanese 
tunnels.  Instead, to mitigate the underground threat, U.S. troops increased their usage of 
pinpoint indirect fire, flamethrowers as well as demolition teams.60  They used these 
techniques to neutralize the underground bunkers from above by sealing off or collapsing 
tunnel entrances, air vents and exits.  Those Japanese that survived U.S. flamethrowers, 
by retreating further underground for safety, were left to suffocate or starve to death 
unless they surrendered.  Many Japanese chose suicide or desperate Banzai charges 
against U.S. troops waiting at a solitary exit, only to be cut down by U.S. rifles and sub-
machine guns. 
The Island of Okinawa was populated by 400,000 Japanese civilians and a 
garrison of 100,000 Japanese soldiers and sailors.  The Japanese commander was a calm 
and well-liked Army General named Mitsuru Ushijima.61  From the moment Ushijima 
assumed command of the island, he immediately began to change the Japanese strategy 
from one of coastal defense to fortifying the interior of the island.  In previous battles, the 
Japanese often gave stiff resistance to a U.S. invasion force, even before the first wave hit 
the beach.  In this battle, Ushijima chose to allow U.S. troops to land on the island 
unopposed in order to allow an adequate quantity of U.S. targets to enter his kill zone.  
When U.S. troops were in position, Japanese troops pledged they would fight to the death 
while trying to inflict as many U.S. casualties as possible.  The option to surrender was 
initially not an option for Ushijima’s troops. 
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3. Subterranean 
Ushijima had formulated his battle plan into two separate defensive strategies.  In 
the North he employed a token Japanese force to keep the U.S. troops occupied and to 
reduce U.S. troop strength as much as possible.  In the South, Ushijima focused the bulk 
of his combat power into three defensive lines that stretched the entire width of the island 
(east to west).  The three defensive lines were centered on the Shuri line which became 
the most dynamic of the three.  The Shuri line also concealed Ushijima’s command and 
control center that was 160 feet below Shuri Castle (a Japanese Monastery).  The 
command bunker was made up of 1,287 feet of tunnels that encompassed 30 rooms and 
was impervious to artillery and U.S. air strikes. 
Construction of these underground networks was assisted and supported 
logistically by local civilians.62  The bunkers were dug into hillsides that consisted of 
limestone and coral rock.  This factor enabled the complex to maintain strong structural 
integrity under U.S. bombardment.  All three defensive lines consisted of underground 
bunker systems that were mutually supporting.  Each defensive fighting position was 
concealed, into the hillside, with firing ports that were no more than eighteen inches 
wide.  The firing positions were designed for rifles, machine guns, and anti-tank guns.  
Each position also had interlocking fields of fire with the position to its left and right 
flank.  Additionally, each firing position was connected to a tunnel network that could 
bring reinforcements and ammunition at will.  The tunnels were also designed with 
several sharp turns at each tunnel entrance and exit to mitigate the threat from U.S. 
flamethrowers.63  On the reverse slope of the hill, the Japanese had produced a massive 
artillery and mortar capability to support each fighting position on the other side of the 
hill.  Ushijima emphasized that every approach be pre-sighted for indirect fire support, 
while any remaining dead space was heavily mined.  Ushijima was intent on producing as 
many U.S. casualties as possible. 
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United States’ troops landed on the island of Okinawa on April 1, 1945 at 08:30 
hours.  The U.S. invasion force was under the command of Army Lieutenant General  
Simon Bolivar Buckner.  Bucker’s invasion force consisted of two Army divisions and 
two Marine divisions.  After a successful amphibious landing on the west central coast of 
the island, Buckner divided his invasion force by sending the two Marine divisions north 
and two Army divisions south.  His intent was to locate the bulk of the Japanese force 
and destroy it in a decisive battle.64  Buckner had no idea he was playing right into 
Ushijima’s defensive plan. 
Within the first six days of the operation, the Marines were able to quickly secure 
most of their northern objectives with minimal Japanese resistance.  The only exception 
to this occurred on the northwest coast of the island within the Motobu Peninsula.65  A 
small northern Japanese force utilized the wooded and rocky terrain of the peninsula to 
put up fierce resistance.  However, the underground bunker networks were not yet fully 
known and the Marines assumed the Japanese use of the natural terrain was no different 
from that of previous engagements.  The Marines secured the peninsula on April 8.  To 
the contrary, the soldiers in the south did not have such a swift success. 
While the Marines were quickly securing the north, Buckner’s two Army 
divisions began to receive stiff Japanese resistance within 48 hours of their approach 
south.  Soldiers ran directly into Ushijima’s outposts of the Japanese first line of defense.  
Without knowing the location of Ushijima’s main effort, soldiers received an introduction 
to the subterranean threat that would define the battle to come.  The initial fighting took 
place on two fortified ridgelines named the Pinnacle and Cactus Ridge.66  The first of 
Ushijima’s defensive lines was surprisingly effective and completely halted the Army 
advance south.  By April 8, the Army was finally able to clear the initial fortified outposts 
at a cost of over 1,500 U.S. casualties.  However, in the process, 4,500 Japanese soldiers  
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were killed or captured.  Buckner was now convinced that he had located Ushijima’s 
main force and began to reorganize his operations.  The Battle of Okinawa had only just 
begun. 
Buckner redirected his two Marine divisions south to reinforce his two Army 
divisions.  As U.S. troops advanced further south, the Marines were positioned on the 
western flank and the Army on the eastern flank.  Buckner’s troops then came into 
contact with Ushijima’s primary defense in depth, the Shuri line.67  Initial contact 
occurred on  April 11 as Army elements attempted to seize two hills that were connected 
by a saddle (Kakazu Ridge) forming the eastern half of the Shuri line’s defense (see 
Figures 21).  A massive Japanese artillery attack, combined with machine gun fire from 
fortified defensive positions within the two hills, inflicted severe U.S. casualties.  One 
soldier described it as “running into a beehive of bullets.”  Eventually, soldiers were able 
to utilize their combined arms approach by quickly calling for fire from artillery, naval 
guns offshore and close air support to achieve fire superiority.  However, the Japanese 
defenders simply retreated into the safety of their underground sanctuary to wait for the 
U.S. bombardment to cease.  This allowed U.S. soldiers to retrieve their wounded and 
move to safer positions.  Regardless, the U.S. advance was halted once again and the 
Japanese had received minimal casualties. 
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Figure 19.  Kakazu Ridge on the Shuri Line68 
Ushijima and his subordinate commanders were overjoyed with their initial 
success at Kakazu Ridge.  Ushijima began to give into the enthusiasm of his troops to 
exploit the situation.  On the night of April 12, he ordered a counter attack along the 
entire length of the Shuri line.  The assault was, however, a catastrophic loss that resulted 
in 7,000 Japanese killed.69  This event confirmed that Ushijima’s original defensive 
strategy was the only option in the face of U.S. fire superiority.  The Japanese would 
remain on the defensive for the remainder of the battle. 
As Ushijima’s devastated troops pulled back to the safety of their underground 
bunkers, the U.S. Army remained stalled.  Progress became slow and tedious, which 
frustrated Buckner as each Japanese fighting position had to be taken one bunker at a 
time.  In order for platoons or squads to move forward, every available asset (machine 
guns, artillery, naval guns, and close air support) had to be utilized to suppress Japanese 
positions to the left and right of the target.70  United States’ firepower had to be 
synchronized in order for demolition teams and flame throwers to rush forward to 
neutralize the targets (see Figure 22).  Satchel charges were used to collapse tunnel 
entrances as well as kill Japanese troops within range (see Figure 23).  Flamethrowers 
proved to be invaluable.  They were not only used to incinerate enemy soldiers but, more 
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importantly, to consume all oxygen inside a tunnel in order to suffocate Japanese forces 
deep within.  The process continued until May 13 when tanks where brought forward to 
capture key terrain that anchored the eastern flank of the Shuri line called Conical Hill.  
The tanks proved invaluable and were able to seize Conical Hill quickly. 
 
Figure 20.  U.S. Marine using a flame thrower to clear bunkers (Okinawa 1945)71 
 
                                                 




Figure 21.  Demo Team using satchel charge to destroy bunkers (Okinawa 1945)72 
Meanwhile on the western flank, the Marines were also running into a quagmire.  
The western anchor of the Shuri line, crucial to the Marines, was three small hills.  
Unknown to the Marines, the three hills were mutually supporting with interlocking 
fields of fire for the Japanese.  The hills were given names of Sugar Loaf, Half Moon and 
the Horseshoe, which would soon be infamous in Marine Corp history.73  Like the Army, 
the Marines also utilized U.S. advantages in firepower when approaching these hills.  
However, in this case, these hills, that had extensive underground bunkers systems posed 
a serious challenge to the Marines.  The Marines quickly realized, to move forward, all 
three hills had to be suppressed in order to approach one hill.  The Japanese fire was so 
intense that regiments were reduced to company strength and, in some cases, platoons 
and squads simply ceased to exist.  To add to the horrific conditions, monsoon rains 
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American and Japanese corpses sank into the mud and made the smell intolerable.  Any 
Marine forced to seek cover by lying on the ground could expect to be covered in 
maggots.74 
Many times, Marines were able to make it to the crest of these hills, only to be 
driven off by interlocking fire from other hills.  In most cases, due to the concealment of 
Japanese fighting positions, Marines could not even see the Japanese who were shooting 
at them.75  Once Marines were able to maneuver onto a Japanese fighting position, 
alternate methods were used to clear the tunnels (see Figure 24).  One of the most 
effective occurred when Marines poured oil into the tunnels and underground bunkers 
(see Figure 25).  A flamethrower then would set the oil ablaze, incinerating any Japanese 
deep inside.  At Sugar Loaf alone, the Marines assaulted the hill eleven times during a 
twelve-day period and sustained 2,000 casualties.  The intense Japanese fire from 
underground bunkers significantly reduced three regiments before the hill was taken on  
May 18. 
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Figure 22.  Japanese soldier emerges from smoke filled bunker76 
 
 
Figure 23.  U.S. troops using smoke to clear bunkers (Okinawa 1945)77 
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Ushijima now had his left and right flanks taken by U.S. troops.  As Army and 
Marine units began to close in on Shuri Castle, Ushijima knew he could hold the Shuri 
Line no longer.  Ushijima gave the command for his surviving troops to displace and 
move south to their third and final defensive line.  At this point, the Japanese Army was 
losing its command and control structure and organization.  As U.S. troops cautiously 
pursued the Japanese, resistance began to degrade.  The Japanese no longer had the troop 
strength to inflict massive U.S. casualties from mutually supporting fortified positions.  
The Japanese were reduced to small cells of troops intent on holding out to the death.  
The battle evolved into a manhunt as U.S. troops cleared Japanese soldiers from bunker 
to bunker.  Once again, surviving Japanese had only two options, commit suicide or 
surrender.  Most chose the former, including Ushijima himself.78  Small elements 
continued to be cleared from their defensive positions until June 22 when hostilities 
ended. 
4. Effects 
There is no doubt that the Battle of Okinawa was one of the bloodiest battles of 
the entire war.  However, if  U.S. tactics during this time had been reconsidered, U.S. 
casualties could have been reduced.  By marines and soldiers disregarding the option to 
enter and clear tunnels, they were forced to operate in full view of the Japanese from 
other fortified positions.  This caused unnecessary U.S. casualties and prolonged the 
operation.  If specially trained underground teams could have surgically cleared the 
complex from within, less manpower might have been placed at risk.  To the contrary, if 
Ushijima would have not ordered a counter attack, which wasted valuable manpower, 
Japanese troops may have continued their defensive strategy for a longer period of time.  
This most certainly would have created even more U.S. casualties and enabled a further 
delay for Japan to prepare for an inevitable invasion of its homeland. 
 
                                                 
78 Yahara, 155. 
 66 
5. Application of DOTMLPF 
By examining applicability to today’s operations in subterranean warfare, World 
War II subterranean operations can be analyzed in terms of DOTMLPF: 
• Doctrine—Doctrine did not exist in support of either side.  However, the 
Japanese refined their use of underground bunker systems out of necessity.  
The U.S. tactics were to not enter into Japanese tunnels and to counter 
them from above ground.  Even though neither side established formal 
doctrine for their evolved tactics, the U.S. (flamethrowers/satchel charges) 
and Japan (bunker networks) did establish techniques and procedures that 
were retained at the unit level. 
• Organization—The U.S. did not establish a tunneling unit due to 
dependency on firepower and policy to not enter the tunnels.  The 
Japanese utilized their entire force for tunnel construction and operation 
(untrained). 
• Training—Training for subterranean warfare most likely did not exist. The 
Japanese gained experience from prior battles and the U.S. relied on a 
combined arms approach from above ground. 
•  Leadership—Ushijima’s leadership was the driving force to shift the 
Japanese center of gravity to an underground defense in order to inflict 
massive U.S. casualties.  Buckner did not want to involve his force in an 
underground fight.  Instead, he encouraged his troops to rely heavily on 
U.S. fire superiority to neutralize bunker networks. 
• Matériel—Flexibility to improvise and cannibalize resources enabled the 
Japanese to create bunker systems that were mutually supporting.  The 
U.S. refined the use of flamethrowers and satchel charges in conjunction 
with fire and maneuver tactics. 
• Personnel—Neither side had designated subterranean units.  Soldiers on 
both sides developed tactics through trial and error. 
• Facilities—Facilities for subterranean warfare consisted of prior combat 
operations that involved subterranean bunker systems. 
6. Conclusion 
In the end, only 7,000 of the 100,000 Japanese soldiers surrendered.  Most were 
killed in combat or committed suicide.  Approximately, one third (150,000) of the 
civilian population of Okinawa was also killed.  The U.S., in total, had approximately 
13,000 killed and 38,000 wounded.  To President Truman, the prospect of even more 
U.S. casualties to be expected from another underground threat became an unthinkable 
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option.  It was an indication of what an invasion on the home island of Japan would 
entail.  Measures would have to be taken in order to save American lives, and therefore, 
Truman thought, using the atomic bomb became the only reasonable option. 
Underground bunker systems are even more likely today than ever before, due to 
the superiority of U.S. airpower.  Several lessons can be learned from the Battle of 
Okinawa and applied to tactical considerations today.  One of the most significant is the 
decision not to enter a bunker system in order to clear it with superior firepower.  It is 
well known that currently most adversaries will certainly seek cover while 
simultaneously attempting to inflict high numbers of U.S. casualties.  The choice to not 
enter a subterranean system leaves dead space on the flanks and to the rear that can be a 
threat to U.S. troops; this may result in a prolongation of the mission and unnecessary 
U.S. lives lost due to not clearing tunnels surgically with troops.  On Okinawa, if U.S. 
troops had cleared tunnels from below ground, an advance could have been more 
efficient with fewer risks to U.S. soldiers above ground.  Thus, the need for U.S. troops to 
advance while being fired upon by multiple positions would have been mitigated.  In 
other words, the decision to not enter enemy tunnel systems appears to have been  
detrimental in a combat environment. 
E. TUNNEL WARFARE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (1966) 
1. Introduction 
One of the most notable subterranean efforts by the United States military was 
during the Vietnam War.  The Viet Cong use of tunnel warfare forced the U.S. military to 
reevaluate its subterranean tactics, techniques, and procedures.  For the first time, the 
U.S. military decided to no longer avoid entering enemy tunnel systems.  An 
underground capability was needed to breach and clear subterranean safe havens, and 
thus, a specialized unit of subterranean warriors was formed to operate underground.  A 
new method was established by organizing and training soldiers that were specially 




transformed themselves into subterranean specialists.  Using only a handgun, knife and 
flashlight, they trained themselves in tunnel-exploration and tunnel-warfare.  They are 
best known as “Tunnel Rats.” 
Unlike past experiences in World War II, when U.S. troops rarely entered a tunnel 
complex, the Vietnam War presented a new underground problem set that U.S. troops 
were forced to confront.  The Viet Cong (VC) was an insurgent force that preferred not to 
reveal its position unless it was at a tactical advantage.  In order to conceal its safe havens 
and movements, the VC constructed tunnel complexes that ranged from the rudimentary 
to sophisticated in construction.  These tunnels gave the VC a sense of invulnerability, 
which boosted their moral.  The tunnels were usually located in the rural areas and 
villages of South Vietnam, which “afforded the VC excellent cover and allowed them to 
pop-up at any time” while concealing movement to and from combat operations.79  In 
most cases, U.S. troops would rarely see more than a glimpse of the VC during an 
engagement.  
2. Background 
The VC utilized hit-and-run techniques that frustrated U.S. troops.  This 
frustration occurred when U.S. troops attempted to pursue VC members, which then 
culminated in only catching a glimpse of them as they melted away into the jungle.  
Frequently, U.S. troops would receive sniper fire from a position that was assumed to be 
hidden in a tree line.  After the tree line was searched, no sign of the enemy was present.  
The U.S. troops could not understand how the VC was able to disappear without a trace.  
In reality, the VC had utilized a tunnel system to escape and escape out of the area 
undetected (see Figure 26). 
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Figure 24.  Example of Viet-Cong Tunnel System80 
After several clearing operations, through VC controlled areas, there were very 
few considerable engagements that enabled U.S. troops to close with and destroy VC 
units.  This all changed in January, 1966 when the 173rd Airborne (ABN) Division 
conducted Operation Crimp in a notorious VC stronghold known as the Iron Triangle.  
During the operation, U.S. troops encountered several booby-traps and bunkers.  
Australian engineer sappers were called in which were attached to the 173rd ABN.  As the 
Aussie sappers began to clear, they stumbled onto a heavily concealed door that led into a 
tunnel entrance.  An American working dog was called in to investigate.  After the dog 
refused to enter the tunnel entrance, the Aussie sappers stood by unsure of what action to 
take next.  After a brief deliberation, the Aussie sappers entered the tunnel entrance with 
a flashlight and a bayonet.81  Once inside, the Aussie sappers were astonished to see the 
level of sophistication in tunnel construction.  The tunnel complex “turned out to be VC 
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headquarters and one of the biggest intelligence coups in the war to that time.”82  It was 
also the first example of soldiers entering a VC tunnel complex in Vietnam.  This 
complex would be known as the Cu Chi Tunnels. 
The Cu Chi tunnel complex was built by the 9th VC Division.  The tunnels 
consisted of hospitals, dormitories and a command and control centers.  Unknown to the 
Australians and the 173rd ABN, the tunnel complex stretched from Saigon to the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail in Cambodia, which was a distance of roughly 155 miles.  It later became a 
VC staging area for the Tet Offensive in 1968.  As Australian and U.S. troops began to 
discover more of the tunnel complex, numerous intelligence documents were discovered 
inside.  Thus, U.S. commanders were compelled to send even more soldiers into the 
tunnels.  The intent was to recover weapons caches and documents, and engage the VC 
face to face.  These subterranean soldiers were all volunteers and became known to U.S. 
troops as “Tunnel Rats” and to Australians troops as “Ferrets.”  This volunteer cadre was  
formed out of necessity and expanded the Vietnam War into two operational 
environments, evolving into operations above and below ground. 
As word spread of VC tunnel activity in Cu Chi, the U.S. Army soon realized that 
attempting to destroy a VC tunnel complex would be inconsequential.  If a tunnel was 
destroyed before it could be exploited, the opportunity to gather vital intelligence on the 
VC would be lost.  Moreover, the tunnel could not be bypassed since it would involve 
ignoring a threat and would enable the VC to attack from the rear.  Thus, there was the 
realization that a formal unit must be organized to enter and clear every tunnel 
discovered.  United States’ Army infantry units began to informally piece together 
volunteers to enter this foreign subterranean environment (see Figure 27). 
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Figure 25.  Tunnel Rat Unit Patch83 
3. Subterranean 
One of the first attempts to formalize such a unit of “Tunnel Rats” was by a 
chemical officer from the 1st Infantry Division, CPT Herbert Thornton.  In selecting 
volunteers “Thornton sought a special breed of solider. He had to have an even 
temperament, an inquisitive mind, a lot of common sense (in order to know what to touch 
and what not to), and to be exceptionally brave.”84  Most of Thornton’s men were small 
in stature.  They were intended to squeeze through tight trap doors and crawl along the 
narrow passages with relative ease.  Volunteers soon became part of standard operating 
procedure for most infantry units. 
Due to the operational tempo of infantry units in combat, there was not much time 
for formal training for most Tunnel Rat units.  Thus, a new Tunnel Rat recruit would be 
forced to learn from a more experienced Tunnel Rat, or through direct experience.  A 
Tunnel Rat soon realized that entering into a tunnel entrance was a terrifying experience.  
New techniques had to be developed in order to enter a tunnel entrance while maintaining 
security.  Before entering a tunnel, each Tunnel Rat would strip off any excess clothing 
and/or equipment.  This would allow the Tunnel Rat ease of movement underground.  
Equipment was kept to a minimum, usually just a flashlight, bayonet, pistol and spare 
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ammunition.  Sometimes a mask was carried if gas had been utilized prior (see Figure 28 
and 29).  Eventually, the U.S. Army developed tunnel exploration kits that consisted of a 
“headlamp, communication system (utilizing a wire and bone microphone), and a .38 
caliber revolver with silencer and aiming light.  These innovative kits rarely made it to 
the troops in the field conducting combats operations.”85  Thus, Tunnel Rats were more 
often reliant on a flashlight, 1911 pistol (.45 caliber automatic) and a bayonet (see Figure 
30).  Most Tunnel Rat units would operate in two to three man teams in order to support 
each other in case of enemy contact. 
 
Figure 26.  Australian and U.S. troops utilizing a blower to clear tunnel at Cu Chi86 
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Figure 27.  Tunnel Rat entering a tunnel wearing a gas mask87 
 
Figure 28.  Clearing tunnel with .45 caliber pistol and flashlight (Cu Chi 1967)88 
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One of the most difficult tasks for the troops above ground was tunnel detection.  
The VC was able to camouflage tunnel entrances so effectively that a U.S. solder would 
have to stomp his foot on the door of a VC tunnel entrance to locate it.  Eventually, some 
of the indicators for tunnel detection were clumps of bamboo that afforded a terrain 
advantage.  Even though an entrance was camouflaged, a very distinct trail could be seen 
leading through the bamboo.  This trail would inevitably end in the area of the tunnel 
entrance.  Also, air shafts could be detected by looking for bamboo stalks stuck in the 
ground meant to look like the surrounding bamboo.  These air shafts usually could be 
seen by detecting a stalk that had been cut.89 
Once a tunnel entrance had been detected, a Tunnel Rat would enter a narrow 
tunnel entrance head first, while his teammates would lower him into the tunnel by 
holding his ankles (see Figure 31).  This allowed the lead Tunnel Rat to have his M1911 
pistol in one hand and his flashlight in the other to engage enemy personnel (see Figure 
32).  Once inside, the lead Tunnel Rat would also utilize his bayonet to probe for mines 
or booby traps.  As a team would progress further into a tunnel, the lead man would 
continue to probe with a bayonet while the number two man would assist in pulling 
security while simultaneously checking for trip wires on the ceiling of the tunnel.  Some 
accounts describe how the VC would hang poisonous snakes (bamboo viper, or  krait) 
from the ceilings in a tunnel as a booby trap.  This created a psychological effect on U.S. 
Tunnel Rats that only the most resolute could overcome.  For some, the mental factor was 
a far biggest obstacle: 
…imagine yourself worrying that your heart is beating too loud, is there 
enough air, where is the trip wire, where are the snakes, will the pistol 
work, how fast can I crawl backwards and I hope the VC is moving away 
from me? 90   
These were the thoughts that could sometimes overwhelm a Tunnel Rat. 
                                                 
89 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Techniques for Detecting, Neutralizing and Destroying 
Enemy Tunnels, 1969, last accessed March 13, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=AD0683375&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf 
90 Fred Meurer (former Tunnel Rat commander), interview with Josh Bowes (author) August 12, 2013 
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Figure 29.  Tunnel Rat entering a tunnel head first91 
 
Figure 30.  Tunnel Rat inspecting entrance before entering tunnel92 
A typical VC tunnel was constructed with several 60 and 120 degree turns.  This 
would deny Tunnels Rats the ability to fire down a tunnel more that 10–20 yards.  It 
                                                 
91 “The Vietnam War Tunnel Rats,” [image], in Cherries: A Vietnam War Novel, accessed December 
12, 2013,http://cherrieswriter.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/the-vietnam-war-tunnel-rats-guest-blog/. 
92“Vietnamese Army Including the Viet Cong,” [image], accessed November 17, 2013, 
http://vietnamresearch.com/nvavc/vc_nva.html. 
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would also provide cover for VC in order to ambush a Tunnel Rat as he approached.  If 
enemy contact was made in the tunnel, a Tunnel Rat learned to fire his pistol reflexively, 
without taking careful aim, due to the close proximity.  After the engagement, a Tunnel 
Rat quickly conducted a magazine change regardless if his pistol was empty or not.  This 
was due to the VC knowing how many rounds an M1911 pistol would fire until it was 
empty and in need of a magazine change.  This delay would provide the VC an 
opportunity to engage a Tunnel Rat unopposed. 
It was well known to conventional forces above ground that Tunnel Rats would 
experience a very physically and mentally demanding task underground.  It could also 
push a Tunnel Rat’s emotional state to his breaking point.  Operating in a confined pitch- 
black environment, while crawling for hours looking for a heavily armed enemy, who 
have the advantage, would cause most soldiers to mentally break down.  According to 
Tunnel Warfare, “Occasionally, under the strain, a Tunnel Rat’s nerves would break and 
he’d be dragged from the tunnel screaming and crying.  Once this happened he would 
never be allowed down a tunnel again.”93  Only the strongest were allowed to continue. 
Some infantry units developed tear gas generators to utilize in conjunction with 
their Tunnel Rats.  In order to mitigate these efforts, the VC constructed water traps 
underground.  A water trap was an obstacle that was intended to seal off a tunnel from 
gas.  In order to clear a water trap, a person entering the tunnel would need to submerge 
under the water to clear the obstacle, in order to continue through the tunnel to the other 
side.  As a Tunnel Rat would clear a water trap and rise out of the pitch black water, he 
was completely defenseless.  A VC soldier could easily be waiting on the other side of 
the water trap in ambush.  The thought of an AK-47 waiting as they raised heads out of 
the water, was more that some Tunnel Rats could take.  The 25th Infantry Division had a 
standing rule for its Tunnel Rats.  If a Tunnel Rat cleared more than three water obstacles 
in one day, he was relieved by a teammate and was not allowed to continue for the next 
24 hours. 
                                                 
93 Irrp, “Tunnel Warfare: Vietnam Experience—Six Silent Men,” 2008, last accessed March 13, 2013, 
http://lrrp2.wordpress.com/2008/07/12/tunnel-warfare-vietnam-experience/ 
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Most Tunnel Rats would describe the experience by saying, “the feeling you get, 
crawling into a tunnel, knowing that someone or something is trying to kill you, can 
never be fully understood or explained.  At the time, we thought we were invincible.”94  
Another fear factor for a Tunnel Rat was not only what could happen underground but 
also what could happen above ground as they came out at a different tunnel entrance.  
The sight of a small man,  stripped of a uniform, covered in dirt, would surely be 
mistaken for a VC and shot by a fellow U.S. solider.  The Tunnel Rats developed signals, 
such as simply whistling “Dixie” before he exited a tunnel to alert any fellow U.S. 
soldiers. 
4. Effects 
This underground occupation transformed the Tunnel Rats into a position of 
respect and reverence by conventional troops.  Most soldiers saw Tunnel Rats in their 
units as “brave but crazy” to volunteer for such a job.  As for the Tunnel Rats, there were 
various reasons to continue in such an occupation.  Some enjoyed the admiration from 
their fellow soldiers, others were attached to the adrenaline “high” of facing death 
underground and living to tell the tale.  Regardless, these men were conducting a new 
type of subterranean warfare that had not been experienced in prior historical U.S. 
conflicts.  The U.S. military had not established training or doctrine to draw reference 
from.  It was simply developed in combat, out of necessity and with great success. 
Once a tunnel complex was clear of VC, a ground force commander would make 
the decision to destroy the tunnel and U.S. Army engineers would be called in.  The 
Tunnel Rats would then assist the engineers in destroying a tunnel complex in order to 
deny it from being used again by the VC.95  The demolition process would initiate with a 
Tunnel Rat having to re-enter the tunnel to place explosive charges.  The explosives were 
placed at intervals throughout the tunnel.  Each satchel charge was set in a descending 
order in reference to the time fuses.  This would enable the charges to detonate  
 
                                                 
94 Fred Meurer (former Tunnel Rat commander), interview with Josh Bowes (author) August 12, 2013 
95 “Tunnel Destruction pt1-2 1969 US Army Training Film Vietnam War” YouTube video, posted by 
“Jeff Quitney,” December 18, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeNP-aUT0sY 
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simultaneously while allowing the Tunnel Rat time to get to a safe distance away.  After 
total destruction of the tunnel, Tunnel Rats would consolidate, reorganize and move to 
the next tunnel complex to start the process again. 
5. Application of DOTMLPF 
By examining the applicability to today’s operations in subterranean warfare, U.S. 
subterranean operations in Vietnam can be analyzed in terms of DOTMLPF: 
• Doctrine—Doctrine did not exist in support of either side.  The U.S. began 
to refined subterranean tactics, techniques and procedure that remained at 
the unit level.  However, the U.S. military did not develop subterranean 
lessons learned into doctrine.  The VC refined their underground 
techniques and procedures but retained lessons learned at the unit level. 
• Organization—The U.S. established tunneling units that specialized in 
clearance and destruction of VC tunnel networks.  The VC utilized their 
entire force for tunnel construction and operation (untrained). 
• Training—Training for Tunnel Rats was not conducted in a formalized 
setting.  Each new Tunnel Rat depended on learning from more 
experienced members, within the unit, and on-the-job training.  The VC 
were untrained and refined their techniques from prior engagements prior. 
• Leadership—CPT Herbert Thornton’s initiative was the catalyst that 
encouraged the development of subterranean units throughout the U.S. 
military in Vietnam.  The VC chain of command encouraged underground 
operations because of the inability to maneuver in daylight due to U.S. 
aircraft.  This tactic was adopted out of necessity. 
• Matériel—Out of necessity, Tunnel Rats used tools that were already in 
the inventory (.45 caliber pistol and a flashlight).  The development of 
tunneling kits was also prevalent.  However, new equipment seldom made 
it out to troops in the field, and those that did were regarded as useless and 
cumbersome.  The flexibility to improvise and cannibalize resources 
enabled the VC to create vast tunnel networks undetected. 
• Personnel—Tunnel Rats volunteered and were selected at the unit level.  
However, those units were reabsorbed back into the regular force after the 
war and valuable subterranean experience was lost. 
• Facilities—Facilities for subterranean warfare consisted of combat 
operations that were ongoing at the time. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The tunnel networks during the Vietnam War presented an extensive dangerous 
combat environment for U.S. troops.  “By the end of 1970, 4,800 tunnels had been 
discovered by the United States and allied forces.”96  Viet Cong tunnels were able to 
delay and/or stop U.S. infantry units with a profound disruption to combat operations.  
With no choice but to clear newly discovered tunnels, the U.S. Army depended on the 
specialized skill set of the Tunnel Rats.  Without such a specialized force, U.S. troops 
would have most certainly incurred far more casualties and achieved far less success.  In 
future conflicts, much can be learned from references to tactics, techniques and 
procedures that were established by the Tunnel Rats.  Not to learn from that experience 
would constitute a lost opportunity for U.S. military efforts. 
During the Vietnam War, the utilization of uniquely skilled subterranean soldiers, 
organized into distinct units, was a huge leap forward in underground warfare.  It marked 
the creation and the disappearance of subterranean doctrine in a combat environment.  
Subterranean lessons learned began to be disseminated through the ranks from which 
other Tunnel Rat units could benefit.  However, valuable subterranean tactics, techniques 
and procedures were never established into formal military doctrine.  Most of the lesson 
learned were filed away into unit store rooms or lost over time. 
Rudimentary tunnel systems as experienced during the Vietnam War are not 
unique to that conflict; it is an underground pattern that continues today.  The U.S. must 
not ignore lessons from the past or current threats that are seeking advantages 
underground.  North Korea, Iran, transnational criminal organizations, and violent 
extremist organizations are all known to conduct tunneling activities.  Much like airborne 
forces are designed to conduct a vertical envelopment, subterranean forces may offer the 
strategic surprise of envelopment from below. 
 
                                                 
96 Allen D. Reece, A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary Perspective, 1998, 
last accessed March 11, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a339626.pdf 
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IV. CASE STUDY COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
A. TREND COMPARISON 
There are several trends that are apparent in warfare.  Even though the case 
studies that have been presented span many centuries of warfare, there are several 
elements that are common to all.  The most significant tendency is for militaries to seek a 
subterranean advantage when the ability to maneuver has been reduced.  In all five case 
studies, maneuver was disrupted by either a stalemate at the tactical level, or an 
insurgency that was forced underground for protection at the operational level. All 
scenarios have also indicated how the subterranean option became logical, to employ, 
when no other means of maneuver was possible.  A clear understanding of these 
subterranean trends will be invaluable to future conflict. 
During the siege of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks were unable to maneuver 
in order to defeat the Byzantines inside the city walls.  The Turks chose to employ 
rudimentary tunnels under the walls to breach the cities’ defenses.  During the siege of 
Petersburg, the Union army was at a stalemate due to the formable Confederate 
entrenchments around the city.  The Union army also chose to utilize a rudimentary 
tunnel under the Confederate defensive line to emplace an explosive breach.  During 
World War I, the Allies were also at a stalemate with German forces at Messines Ridge.  
To break the quagmire, 22 tunnels were dug in order to detonate simultaneous explosive 
breaches that were nested with massive Allied assault.  In Okinawa during World War II, 
the Japanese chose to construct mutually supporting underground bunker systems.  By 
going underground, the Japanese minimized their vulnerabilities while maneuvering from 
one defensive position to another.  In South Vietnam, the Viet Cong were also forced to 
seek an underground solution to mitigate being detected by U.S. aircraft or ground troop.  
The human instinct to go underground, when maneuver is disrupted, is a key factor in 
every case study.  It is also an indicator of what an adversary will be inclined to pursue 
when faced with in similar circumstances. 
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In terms of significant commonalities, there are also factors that have been 
repeated in the past that will provide awareness for the future.  In the case studies of the 
Byzantines and World War I, both involved tunneling and counter tunneling.  The ability 
of an attacker to approach a defensive line undetected is problematic for either side.  In 
both cases, counter tunnels were dug to interdict an attacker’s approach which 
demonstrates a defender’s ability to detect and locate an attacker’s tunnel.  Finally, both 
case studies involve intensive hand-to-hand combat that occurred when contact was made 
underground. 
The concealment of tunnels is also a repeated.  The Turks purposely dug tunnels 
at oblique angles, from the walls of Constantinople, to conceal their approach.  In 
Petersburg, Union miners made an effort to conceal their ventilation system between 
siege lines.  The use of a fire in the tunnel, for air circulation, was concealed by keeping 
multiple Union campfires burning to produce smoke which concealed the air/exhaust 
vent.  In Vietnam, the Viet Cong created numerous methods to conceal tunnel entrances, 
airshafts and exits in plain sight by utilizing what was natural to the landscape. 
The superiority of U.S. firepower has also been a factor causing adversaries to 
seek the subterranean environment for protection and/or concealment.  In Okinawa, the 
Japanese were forced to modify above ground operations into subterranean tactics for 
protection while inflicting massive U.S. casualties.  In the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong 
were also forced to go underground for protection in the face of superior U.S. firepower.  
However, VC tunnels were utilized as clandestine safe havens instead of fortified 
positions.  The Okinawa case study also illustrates how the decision for U.S. troops not to 
enter Japanese subterranean bunkers became instrumental in causing high U.S. casualties. 
To the contrary, the Vietnam case study validates the effectiveness of specialized 
U.S. troops to enter tunnel systems to mitigate the VC threat from their rear.  The shift in 
U.S. tactics became the catalyst for the development of subterranean tactics, techniques 
and procedures that remain relevant today.  This U.S. underground surgical approach also 




very successful in the construction of 22 tunnels that required dynamic subterranean skill 
sets.  The formation of underground units greatly contributed to the overall Allied success 
at Messines Ridge. 
B. DOTMLPF ANALYSIS OF CASE TRENDS 
Given the factors from all five historical case studies, it is easy to see why 
subterranean warfare is a trend that continues today.  Some broader conclusions from the 
cases of subterranean operations can be drawn through the application to DOTMLPF: 
• Doctrine—Doctrine did not exist in any of the case studies presented.  
However, the refinement of subterranean tactics, techniques and procedure 
remained at the unit level in all five case studies.  The U.S. military failed 
to establish these subterranean lessons into doctrine; the majority of the 
lessons it learned were poorly documented, limited to the participating 
unit, and not widely distributed throughout the U.S. military. 
• Organization—The formation of specialized underground units did not 
occur until World War I when the Allies temporally organized ex-miners, 
from their ranks, into tunneling companies.  The U.S. formation of Tunnel 
Rat units refined the organization into a semi-permanent element that was 
utilized throughout the war but afterwards disbanded. 
• Training—Formalized training for subterranean units did not exist in any 
of the case studies presented.  The majority of the case studies relied 
heavily on the experience and expertise of former miners within their 
ranks.  In Vietnam, the U.S. military did not provide standardized training 
to inexperienced soldiers when assigned to Tunnel Rat units.  As a result, 
inexperienced Tunnel Rats relied heavily on the lessons learned from more 
experienced members within the unit.  The high operational tempo of 
Tunnel Rat units forced new arrivals to learn by means of on the job 
training during combat operations. 
• Matériel—Out of necessity, in all five case studies, underground soldiers 
were forced to utilize organic resources to construct or clear tunnels.  Most 
utilized weapons and equipment that were already in their inventories, in a 
subterranean environment.  For example, in Okinawa, flame throwers 
were instrumental in clearing tunnels from above ground.  In Vietnam, 
Tunnel Rats simply relied on their senses, a .45 caliber pistol, and an 
elbow flashlight when entering a tunnel.   
• Leadership—The success or failure of all five case studies can be credited 
by the leadership of commanders that had a clear and definitive 
understanding of the subterranean environment.  Not understanding the 
capabilities and limitations of underground warfare can be catastrophic to 
U.S. forces operating underground. 
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• Personnel—In all five case studies, the majority of organizations relied on 
former miners that were already acclimated to a subterranean 
environment.  In Vietnam, due to lack of miner experience, Tunnel Rats 
were an all-volunteer force.  Most volunteers were small in stature and 
could easily traverse through restrictive rudimentary tunnels.  However, 
once a Tunnel Rat displayed any mental adversity (an emotional 
breakdown) to operating underground, he was never allowed into another 
tunnel and was sent back to the regular force.  
• Facilities—Training facilities, for subterranean warfare, consisted of 
combat operations that were on-going at the time (on the job training). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. ANALYSIS BY DOTMLPF FOR CURRENT U.S. LAND FORCES 
1. Doctrine 
The extent of subterranean warfare doctrine within the U.S. Army is found within 
the following current publications: FM 3-06 Urban Operations, ATTP 3-06.11 Combined 
Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, ATTP 3-21.50 Infantry Small-Unit Mountain 
Operations, and FM 3-34.170 Engineer Reconnaissance.  Historical doctrinal 
publications such as FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations, and FM 90-101-1 An 
Infantryman’s Guide to Urban Combat also contain fragments of subterranean doctrine.  
The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) combines a majority of this 
doctrine into a single publication titled, AWG Subterranean Handbook.  The limitations  
of these current publications is the lack of consideration beyond tunnels and urban and 
natural cavities, and the limited detail to which other DOTMLPF factors and operational 
considerations are discussed.  The subterranean environment, as described by this 
capstone’s  established typology, spans environments ranging from the most rudimentary 
tunnels to deep underground facilities; the totality of which current doctrine fails to 
address.  Today’s military forces, regardless of location or geographic orientation, must 
concern themselves with the preparedness to engage in subterranean operations.  This 
section of the analysis seeks to identify gaps in current publications and highlight the 
need for a more comprehensive doctrine.  
In order to develop a comprehensive doctrine on subterranean warfare, TRADOC 
should consolidate information currently scattered across doctrinal areas.  Information 
found in FM 3-34.170 on tunnel uses, detection, reconnaissance, and destruction is 
valuable to any unit conducting subterranean operations; however, it is unlikely to be 
sought after outside of the career engineer field.  Similarly, the information found in other 
publications is of value to more than their specifically illustrated environments.  Once 
consolidated, planning considerations, threats, and challenges associated with 
subterranean environments can be expanded to include the full scope of the subterranean 
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typology.  Integrating the identified subterranean attributes can assist leaders in focusing 
intelligence collection and can aid in determining resource allocation.  Finally, alternate 
approaches should be discussed to provide commanders with options other than 
committing forces underground. 
a. Planning Considerations 
Commanders and planners should have detailed knowledge of the types 
and general locations of subterranean systems and structures within their planned 
operational areas.  The need to plan a subterranean operation may result from a directed 
mission or in response to an immediate threat or intelligence opportunity.  Subterranean 
operations may occur across the full spectrum of combat and rules of engagement.  
Mission, enemy, time, terrain, troops available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) 
will often change.  The commander’s decision to commit soldiers into a subterranean 
environment must be thoroughly analyzed.97 
Existing methodologies dealing with intelligence preparation of the 
operational environment (IPOE) can assist in providing the best operational picture, and 
should include known or suspected subterranean systems or structures within the area of 
operation (AO).  A Subsurface Area Overlay,  such as that discussed in FM 3-06, applies 
not only to other environments beyond urban, but should be expanded to incorporate 
assessment of engagement factors described within the subterranean typology and 
illustrated using the subterranean graphical symbol.  In many areas, imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) exists or may be requested to support analysis.  Also, measurement and 
signature intelligence (MASINT) platforms can be leveraged to provide closer analysis of 
known underground structures.  Multi-spectrum imagery may be able to detect surface 
anomalies that could indicate subsurface vents, intakes, or portals.  Tunnels and existing 
underground infrastructure may extend into areas controlled by insurgents and even  
 
 
                                                 
97 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Subterranean Warfare Handbook (Fort Meade, MD: 
Headquarters, U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2009), 3-1. 
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among different parts of the population.  The IPOE process is a cycle and should be 
continually evaluated to assess changes in the environment and how these systems impact 
culture and economic conditions in the AO.98 
Conducting a thorough terrain analysis can reveal locations of 
subterranean activity.  Any areas that employ access control measures such as fences or 
walls could be undermined.  International borders, in particular, are targets for 
subterranean operations; this may be done in order to capitalize on the illicit 
transportation of smuggled goods and persons.  Areas of high typographical relief 
changes such as mountains and canyons should be analyzed for indicators of subterranean 
activity.  Roads or trails that seem to end abruptly or lead to nowhere may illuminate a 
transportation network supporting subterranean activity.  Roads, power and other utility 
lines must go somewhere.  Following these structures on imagery to places where they 
seemingly disappear can reveal an underground facility.  Unexplainable or isolated 
surface structures such as power transformers not near population centers, or buildings 
that radiate excessive amounts of heat may indicate infrastructure support to a UGF.  
Keeping this in mind, some surface structures may serve as decoys or deception 
mechanisms to disguise the extent or layout of subterranean areas.  Cut-and-cover 
facilities may be more difficult to detect, but can be exposed by human behavior.  Small 
isolated buildings that have more vehicles parked outside than would reasonably be 
expected could indicate a vertical shaft access portal.  It is important to conduct 
surveillance of these areas to identify suspicious anomalies. 
In order to identify and document all known vulnerabilities, a micro-
terrain analysis should be conducted of any suspected subterranean site to include any 
site occupied by friendly forces for an extended period of time.  These site surveys are 
important to IPOE in order to visualize where infrastructure and vulnerabilities may exist.  
Surface infrastructure and existing buried infrastructure that can be used to circumvent 
force protection measures must be identified.  Planners should plot site information on a 
map using imagery and identify the most likely areas from which the enemy can tunnel.  
                                                 
98 Ibid., 3-2. 
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Understanding the surrounding local infrastructure is critical to force protection.  
Intelligence should be gained on what residences or businesses have been recently 
purchase or rented.  Distances from perimeter protection to surface infrastructure and 
residences or businesses should be identified. 
Entering a subterranean structure should be a deliberately planned 
operation.  Once a subterranean structure is identified, the area should be isolated and 
surface structures cleared before entering.  Maneuvering forces above ground and below 
ground simultaneously should be avoided.  Above ground personnel need to be prepared 
to provide support to personnel deployed in subterranean environments.  Subterranean 
teams have a difficult task to provide situational awareness to above ground elements.  
Current doctrine that discusses the organization and techniques for Cordon and Search 
Operations can be applied.  Tactics described in current doctrine, including clearing 
hallways and establishing above ground cordon and security, are all applicable.  
However, the tactics in tunnel destruction described in FM 3-34.170 by “firing one or two 
magazines from a rifle into the tunnel entrance” prior to conducting a loudspeaker call-
out would not only be counterproductive, but likely a useless waste of ammunition.  
Additionally, there are much more effective ways to breach access portals than placing a 
grenade on portal covers.99  This method of destruction seems to be adapted from battle 
drill five, “Knockout a Bunker.”  If the friendly element is not engaged from the 
subterranean structure, clearing and site exploitation prior to destruction or access denial 
of the site would be a greater use of resources. 
b. Threats 
The environmental hazards of subterranean operations include flooding, 
cave-ins, and suffocation.  Air quality, degraded by smoke, gas, or airborne debris is a 
primary concern.  Soldiers will also face psychological challenges brought on by 
claustrophobic spaces, limited visibility, and disorientation.  Lack of ambient light will 
challenge night vision devices, and communication signals may be difficult to maintain in 
                                                 
99 Department of the Army, Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4, 
Engineer Reconnaissance (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 4-23. 
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a range of underground depths.  The risk of booby traps and unexploded ordinance will 
further increase the risk to force and degrade speed of movement.100 
An enemy that is prepared to use the subterranean environment can force 
the fight on two levels and extend resources beyond more than just street-level fighting, 
thus challenging traditional battle planning strategy.  Subterranean passages provide the 
enemy with covered and concealed routes into and through built-up areas.  This enables 
the enemy to launch attacks along roads that lead into the city while infiltrating a force 
behind established perimeters.  Document ATTP 3-06.11, section VII Subterranean 
Operations, discusses the advantages and disadvantages associated with the role of 
attacker and defender.  What is important to realize in the COE is that the role of attacker 
and defender changes often.  These roles become so blurred that the only clear reality is 
that the enemy, whether attacking or defending, has the advantage in the subterranean 
environment.  Only intelligence, planning, and preparation can lessen this advantage. 
Underground passageways provide tight fields of fire that force troops to 
advance in dangerous, funnel-like formation.  Obstacles placed at tunnel intersections set 
up excellent ambush sites and turn subterranean passages into deadly mazes.  The enemy 
can easily gain the element of surprise through selection of ambush positions and 
withdrawal routes.  The enemy’s familiarity with the subterranean systems will facilitate 
its use for ready-made lines of communication, movement of supplies and supply caches, 
and evacuation of casualties. 
c. Challenges 
Soldiers who find themselves within the subterranean operational 
environment will be faced, not only with the unique challenges of being underground, but 
will find these challenges compounded by effects of above ground combat.101  The 
placement of underground facilities in populated areas near schools, hospitals, religious 
buildings, and other civilian infrastructure makes detection and elimination of these 
facilities difficult.  Military planners must be able to conduct subterranean operations 
                                                 
100 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Subterranean Warfare Handbook, iii. 
101 Ibid. 
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with consideration not only for the operational safety of soldiers and mission 
accomplishment, but also with concern for civilian casualties and collateral damage. 
Traditional equipment found within today’s military is not designed for 
subterranean combat.  Load carrying equipment and body armor is too bulky to be worn 
inside restrictive subterranean environments.  Shedding this equipment becomes an 
operational necessity and an additional risk for commanders to consider.  Night vision 
devices are really light amplification devices and in environments where there is no 
ambient light, or with smoke, these devices are useless without the use of supplemental 
Infra-Red (IR) lighting.  Rifles may be too long to be effectively wielded in restrictive 
environments.  Pistols have shown to be of greater use, yet few soldiers are issued a 
secondary weapon.  The sound amplification caused by confined spaces in subterranean 
environments causes increased risk to soldiers’ hearing during the firing of weapons or 
use of explosives.  Radio communications systems typically operate along line-of-sight 
(LOS) and are limited in their ability to transmit or receive through terrain.  Maintaining 
communications with surface elements is difficult without “bread-crumbing” personnel 
throughout the subterranean system.  Air quality is a significant risk to forces in a 
subterranean environment, thus portable air monitors would need to be acquired.  Many 
solutions exist or are being developed to provide enhanced capability and mitigate risks 
in subterranean environments.  Unfortunately, this equipment is not widely fielded 
because the subterranean problem-set has not presented itself to enough forces to justify 
the cost.  Training with the equipment that units have, adapting it to any potential 
problem-set, and understanding its limitations becomes the priority. 
d. Indicators and Detection of Subterranean Activity 
The detection of tunnels and the identification of tunneling activity are key 
skills in eliminating an enemy’s ability to build and use underground facilities.  While 
innovations in tunnel detection technology offer promising long-term strategy, 
technology cannot be the sole solution.  Technology can assist in subterranean activity 
detection and is utilized on the U.S./Mexico border and other locations globally.  
Although a number of detection technologies exist, no single piece of equipment, 
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currently available, is sufficiently accurate for routine subterranean detection.  Inherent 
difficulty exists, in part, because of the varying sizes and depths of tunnels in diverse 
geological conditions.  Currently, subterranean detection technology is in use by the U.S. 
military only in Afghanistan.  Because the technology is not widely used, it is important 
for soldiers to know the indicators of subterranean activity to assist in non-technical 
detection.  Situational awareness is critical. 
Many of the indicators of subterranean activity require persistent 
surveillance, routine patrols, and human intelligence (HUMINT) reports.  Personnel 
should be suspicious of mounds of loose or disturbed soil and/or dirt scattered within 
close proximity to residences, businesses, or water sources.  Soil that is a different color 
from the surrounding soil can indicate that it has been displaced. 
During searches, all wires should be traced to determine both the power 
source and what is being powered.  Large amounts of wire are needed for communication 
lines and to power lights, fans, and digging equipment. 
Holes in the ground or pipes sticking out of the ground can be used to 
provide ventilation to a subterranean structure.  Hoses, metal piping, or PVC piping can 
be used to provide air to a tunnel, or to move water out.  Water is also needed to keep 
dust down to a minimum during construction.  As with wire, it is important to trace a 
hose, beginning to end, to determine its source and what is being watered. 
Increased truck/vehicle activity in a residential or commercial area may 
also provide an alert to the movement of loads of dirt from underground construction 
sites.  Particular attention should be given to dirt–laden trucks departing structures when 
there is no other discernible construction activity. 
Groups of people who enter an establishment and do not depart in a 
reasonable time may be suspect.  Also, people with muddy clothes or shoes in a dry 
climate provide clues.  Large quantities of empty barrels or rice/flour/fertilizer bags may 
be present to remove soil.  These items may contain dirt residue.  Digging hand tools, 
buckets and headlamps found in the absence of a construction site may also be reasons to 
investigate further. 
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e. Alternate Approaches 
The United States Army describes the mission of infantry as “to close with 
the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel 
his assault with fire, close combat, and counterattack.  The Infantry will engage the 
enemy with combined arms in all operational environments to bring about his defeat.”102  
This may not be the best way to proceed when dealing with subterranean operations.  
Placing troops in a subterranean environment must be carefully thought out.  
Commanders must determine the driving force requiring ground forces to enter a 
subterranean environment.  Personnel recovery, securing a high value target, or weapon 
of mass destruction may be that mission which requires the commitment of ground forces 
into the underground. 
Commanders may consider alternative approaches to committing forces 
underground.  One such alternative is called the Tactical Callout.  This technique can be 
used to assist in removing personnel from a tunnel or underground facility prior to 
committing soldiers to a subterranean environment.  A tactical callout is a non-lethal 
approach to getting a target out of a building or village.  The tactical callout gives the 
assault force the opportunity to cordon off the intended target area and gives the enemy 
an opportunity to walk out or surrender without duress or injury.103  It provides 
maximum force protection especially when the intended target is low priority or there is 
no immediate threat to U.S. forces or no chance of the target(s) fleeing.  It is important to 
know the location of tunnel exits or escape hatches so that they can be secured.  In 
addition, a tactical callout helps facilitate the information operations’ plan to further 
provide leads to future targets. 
Commanders might consider the use of a siege in an underground 
situation.  Siege warfare has been a tactic used since ancient times.  It was used when a 
city or fortress was too difficult to overtake and casualty count would be high.  Effective 
                                                 
102 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and 
Squad (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008). 
103Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009). 
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sieges involve surrounding the target and blocking the reinforcement, re-supply, or 
escape of troops.  This could be coupled with locating and sealing off entrances/exits, 
cutting off power, attacking ventilation, and other life support mechanisms.  
Unfortunately, a commander may not have the undetermined amount of time required for 
a siege to be effective and all exits may not have been secured. 
Robotic technology is another resource that is of value in working in 
subterranean environments.  Robots are particularly suitable for performing 
reconnaissance, breaching, and/or recovery operations.  They are extremely mobile, can 
negotiate stairs or obstacles, can be outfitted with day/night cameras, various grippers, 
and even saws mounted on double-jointed arms.  During a tactical call-out, robots can be 
mounted with a speaker to relay commands and can also be mounted with a weapon 
system. 
The subterranean environment can be extremely hazardous, with the 
presence of both natural and man-made obstacles.  When available, robots should be 
utilized for exploration of tunnels before personnel enter.  Once deployed, robots can 
safely detect such hazards as enemy personnel, booby traps, animals (snakes/insects), and 
if equipped with a gas meter, oxygen and hazardous gas levels.  Robots have different 
capabilities depending on the robot’s category, power source, weight, size, and mobility 
configuration.  Radio frequency (RF) robots operate on line-of-sight, so as the robot 
advances in a tunnel or takes a turn, the signal may degrade or be lost.  The particular 
mission set and tunnel configuration will dictate the best robot to utilize, should choices 
be available. 
Military working dogs (MWD) are quite popular with ground forces and 
bring a unique combat multiplier to the battlefield.  A dog can be used prior to sending a 
team into a subterranean structure, or can be used in conjunction with a clearing team.  
Some dogs are trained to detect explosives and can prevent the triggering of booby traps.  
Dogs are notorious for instilling fear in the opposition and can assist in locating 
personnel.  When planning operations, these advantages should be weighed against the 
military working dog’s potential vulnerability to drowning or lack of air, disorientation  
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from an enclosed environment, unusual sounds, and susceptibility to booby traps.  Dogs 
need to be screened and trained to identify which can operate in a subterranean 
environment. 
2. Organization 
The current organizational structures of Army maneuver forces are adequate for 
dealing with subterranean threats.  Light infantry, reconnaissance, combat engineers, and 
Special Forces are particularly adaptable to this type of warfare.  Although historical 
examples have shown the utility of specially organized subterranean units, these elements 
were formed during wartime in order to meet immediate threats.  Today’s military should 
anticipate future conflicts and recognize the value of having widely skilled and adaptable 
forces for any operational environment, to include subterranean. 
In terms of task organization for any given subterranean operation, every situation 
will be different and the extent of subterranean environments is difficult to assess from 
the surface.  Rudimentary tunnels may only require a two or three  man clearing team, 
while large underground facilities could require a battalion-level operation.  Tactical 
leaders can be expected to assess operational requirements and utilize the fundamental 
task organization of assault, support, and security elements.  The key to success is having 
available the right enabler(s) such as a NBC reconnaissance team, MWD handler, EOD 
technician, tactical MISO team, demolition team, and specialized SSE teams.  In a perfect 
world, all these enablers should be readily available in support of subterranean 
operations; however, units must strive to attain even the most basic internal capabilities 
within each of these areas. 
United States military forces are highly adaptable.  When given the task to 
conduct operations in subterranean environments no hesitation is likely to be found.  
However, commanders must understand that this environment is indeed unique and other 
DOTMLPF elements should be considered in order to mitigate risks and provide the best 
possible conditions for success.  The Army should develop skilled individuals across 




Realistic training is the decisive aspect of DOTMLPF that will determine success 
in subterranean operations.  The high operational tempo since 2001, and ever-increasing 
demand for technological solutions, has found many units training with and employing 
new equipment while engaged in combat operations.  Combat is not the first place 
soldiers should be exposed to operating underground.  As units conduct collective 
training prior to combat, they must be exposed to the challenges of subterranean 
operations. 
Although many urban training areas have underground tunnels, many units are not 
comfortable in their use, or mark them as “off limits” for risk mitigation.  Not since the 
Vietnam War has the Army had formalized training on operations against tunnels.  
Today, many soldiers that encounter caves, aqueducts, or tunnels in Afghanistan simply 
venture into these spaces without proper planning and equipment. 
Training for the complexities of the subterranean environment begins with 
fundamental skills that can be practiced in any environment.  Training that includes 
confined spaces with no ambient light can identify personnel that are best suited for 
subterranean operations.  Climbing techniques, obstacle courses, trench clearing, room 
clearing, and movement techniques in hallways are all fundamental skills that can apply 
to subterranean environments. 
In addition to training on operational techniques, training on specialty equipment 
is essential to the development of a specialized subterranean capability.  Soldiers 
preparing for subterranean operations should be comfortable with the use of various types 
of breaching equipment, respiration devices, and robotic vehicles that can greatly 
increase survivability.  Soldiers can easily adapt these devices into any training scenario, 
and familiarity with them will increase survivability across the range of operational 
environments.   
4. Matériel 
Through the U.S. Army’s acquisition processes and rapid fielding initiatives, new 
technologies and current equipment upgrades have flooded today’s battlefield.  There are 
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many current pieces of soldier equipment that can enhance capabilities during 
subterranean operations; however, much of this gear is not widely distributed beyond the  
SOF community.  Other equipment that has been found to be essential for subterranean 
operations is available on the civilian commercial market.  Available commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) items that can be adapted for military uses in subterranean environments 
are currently in use by the fire and rescue, commercial mining, industrial safety, and 
recreational climbing communities. 
a. Air Quality 
A significant risk to soldiers in subterranean environments is air quality.  
In urban environments and commercial mines, dangerous gases can be odorless, and can 
quickly incapacitate, or can ignite to create explosions.  Lethal particulates are bi-
products of mechanical and dynamic breaching tools used by personnel attempting to 
gain access to subterranean facilities.  Any unit entering a subterranean environment 
should carry an air quality meter, an example seen in Figure 33, to ensure necessary 
levels of oxygen exist, and alert to the presence of harmful gases.  Miner safety courses, 
such as those taught by Colorado School of Mines, can educate soldiers on appropriate 
levels of oxygen, lethal types of particulates and gasses, and how to determine the 
appropriate types of air quality meters.  
 
Figure 31.  MX6 iBrid on miner104 
                                                 




Although the use of night vision devices is essential in subterranean 
operations, these devices are severely degraded without the presence of ambient light.  
Due to the natural characteristics of the underground environment, there is no ambient 
light without the assistance of man-made devices.  Units employing night vision devices 
underground must possess light with infrared (IR) capabilities.  The latest night vision 
device is the AN/PSQ-20 Enhanced Night Vision Goggle (ENVG) which has enhanced 
capability in low-light situations and fuses thermal imaging (see Figure 34).  The 
AN/PSQ-20 has three operational modes: image intensifier only, thermal only, and image 
intensifier/ thermal fused.  The capability to use thermal optics greatly increases visibility 
when operating in no light or smoke conditions.  However, due to the limited fielding of 
items like the AN/PSQ-20 within GPF, soldiers should employ the use of IR filters or 
covers on tactical flashlights until the requirement can be filled.  Every soldier entering a 
subterranean environment should carry a weapon, helmet, and hand portable lights with 
IR filters.  The use of white lights should be avoided unless an area is secured. 
 
Figure 32.  View of soldier using AN/PSQ-20105 
When used in combination with night vision devices, IR laser 
aiming/targeting devices such as the AN/PEQ-4 or LA-5/PEQ can be used to “sparkle” 
                                                 
105Defense Update, “PSQ-20” [image], accessed December 18, 2013, http://defense-update.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/psq-20.jpg. 
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tripwires or illuminate areas.  Sparkling tripwires occurs when the IR light is reflected off 
metal or monofilament wire.  Although laser devices are typically mounted on rifles, they 
can be hand carried when operating in a restricted tunnel. 
c. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear  
Soldiers in subterranean environments should carry chemical detection 
paper such as the M8 or M9 papers when there is the potential for chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) exposure.  However, the M8 and M9 papers only detect 
liquid nerve and blister agents.  If the potential for WMD exists, additional chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detectors, alarms, and mission oriented 
protective posture (MOPP) equipment must be readily available.  Although the presence 
of WMD is not limited to the size of the environment, there is greater likelihood this type 
of threat would be seen in larger UGFs.  If this type of threat is suspected or discovered, 
the area should be isolated and SMU with CBRN reconnaissance capabilities employed. 
d. Hearing Protection 
The amplification of sound waves in confined subterranean environments 
demands the need for enhanced hearing protection and sound limiting devices.  Tactical 
electronic hearing protectors that limit decibel levels and use microphones to enhance 
hearing are excellent devices underground operations.  Specifically, the style of headsets 
that completely covers the ears, such as those shown in Figure 35, would be ideal for 
subterranean operations.  Some tactical electronic hearing protectors have 
communications connectors to allow radio communication directly through them.  Due to 
the increased sound amplification and decibel levels of gunfire and explosives, dual 
hearing protection, combining earplugs with hearing protectors, should be considered. 
Weapon suppressors, for both rifle and pistol, should be used underground.  The 
overpressure exerted by firing weapons underground results in excessive amounts of dust 
and debris to cloud the air.  This not only impairs visibility, but also degrades air quality.  
The use of a suppressor will reduce the decibel level of weapons fired as well as reduce 
the flash signature, making it harder for the enemy to effectively return fire.  Weapon 
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suppressors are not readily available outside of SOF.  Their utility goes beyond their use 
in the subterranean environment and fielding should be expanded to GPF. 
 
Figure 33.  Peltor Comtac II Electronic Headset106 
e. Breaching Equipment 
Subterranean areas in urban environments and particularly UGFs may 
require the use of advanced breaching tools.  Cutting devices such and “quickie-saws,” 
thermo-baric “broco” torches, hydraulic spreaders, and other power tools may be 
required.  It is important to keep in mind how the use of these devices can degrade the air 
quality and may require the use of a respirator or self-contained breathing apparatus 
(SCBA).  The exhaust of gas-power tools may also choke out the tool’s intake in 
confined spaces and render it inoperable.  Training with these mechanical breaching tools 
must be conducted so that operators can master the challenges associated with these 
devices in confined spaces. 
f. Incendiary Weapons 
Incendiary weapons have proven effective in the past in combating 
underground threats.  Though the M2 flamethrower (see Figure 36) is no longer in the 
U.S. military’s inventory, it would be an excellent addition to GPF currently conducting 
                                                 
106 Optics Planet, “Peltor Comtac II Electronic Headset 21db Hearing Protection” [image], accessed 
December 18, 2013, http://www.opticsplanet.com/peltor-comtact-ii-electronic-headsets-military-green-
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subterranean operations.  The AWG should be tasked to conduct research on the 
employment of flamethrowers by U.S. forces within subterranean environments.  
Incendiary weapons that are currently in the U.S. military’s inventory such as the 
AN/M14 incendiary grenade and the M15 white phosphorus grenade should be tested in 
subterranean training sites for possible TTPs. 
 
Figure 34.  Soldier demonstrates flamethrower107 
g. Remote Controlled Robotics 
The use of remote controlled robotics was previously discussed in 
alternate approaches.  Tactical robots are either RF operated or controlled by means of an 
electronic tether.  This tether is usually made up of a single fiber optic wire or multiple 
wires covered by a protective shroud.  Regardless of operation, robots in subterranean 
environments should be tethered in order to retrieve them in case of a loss in 
communication or if they become stuck on an obstacle.  The communications tether 
should not be used as a retrieval tether due to the risk of damaging the wiring.  Type III 
nylon, commonly referred to as 550-cord, is an effective tether and can be easily tied to 
most robots.  Tactical robots are designed for a multitude of environments and have 
various mobility platforms, optics, tool and sensor attachments, and even weapon 
attachments.  The utility of a robot operating in advance of soldiers in a subterranean 
                                                 
107 “Flamethrowers,” [image], accessed December 12,, 2103, Homemade Defense, 
http://homemadedefense.blogspot.com/2010/05/flamethrowers.html. 
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environment cannot be overstated.  However, operators must understand that obstacles 
such as debris and water in subterranean environments can significantly degrade the 
effective use of robots.  Soldiers should use them to clear entry points, corners, and other 
dead space (see Figure 37).  As technology advances, the effective use of robots will 
increase, improving the survivability of soldiers. 
 
Figure 35.  Soldier uses a robot to detect booby traps in an Afghanistan cave108 
h. Air blowers 
Ventilation is crucial in subterranean environments.  As previously 
discussed, poor air quality can endanger the lives of U.S. forces and render mechanical 
breaching tools inoperable.  Air blowers can be used as a hasty means to ventilate a 
subterranean structure.  Technical rescue and miner rescue teams have historically 
employed air blowers such as the one shown in Figure 38 to ventilate confined spaces. 
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Figure 36.  Technical rescue team using portable air-blower109 
Blowers can also be used against enemy forces occupying a subterranean 
environment.  For example, during the Vietnam War, engineer and chemical troops used 
a portable blower, called the M106 Mity Mite, to flush enemy forces out of tunnels by 
forcing smoke into the entrance.  At the same time, additional entrances were exposed by 
smoke exiting the ground.110 
5. Leadership and Education 
Tactical leaders and operational planners must be prepared to adapt to any 
operational environment.  In order to prepare ground forces for subterranean operations, 
scenarios involving tunnels, urban and natural cavities, and underground facilities should 
be incorporated into training exercises both in force generating schools and unit level 
training. 
Leaders must be creative and seek opportunities to learn about the subterranean 
domain.  Courses taught by civilian institutions on underground mining, confined space 
search and rescue, along with government agencies that specialize in intelligence 
collection and analysis of underground facilities can be just the beginning to gaining a 
high degree of preparedness for subterranean operations.  Due to the lack of emphasis on 
                                                 
109 Image taken by author during field research. 
110 Rottman, Gordon L. Viet Cong and NVA Tunnels and Fortifications of the Vietnam War. Oxford: 
Osprey Publishing, 2006. 
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training in the subterranean environment, leaders are only limited by their imagination 
and the unit’s willingness to resource training, not the availability of facilities. 
6. Personnel 
The operational environment underground is a dynamic problem set that is 
mentally and physically demanding.  Conventional techniques above-ground are 
impacted by additional mental and physical stresses when conducted below ground.  A 
former Tunnel Rat commander in Vietnam describes several discriminating factors that 
should be addressed in order to identify soldier with a natural capacity to operate in a 
subterranean environment.   
It is not the intent of this project to create an organization that specializes in 
underground operations.  However, historic data can be pulled from training programs 
similar to the Tunnel Rats of Vietnam to prepare leaders for what to expect.  Leaders 
must expose their forces to types of subterranean environments to observe which soldiers 
can endure the physical and mental stress associated with tunnel, urban and natural 
cavities, and UGFs.  For example, U.S. forces are administered swim tests in order for 
leaders to identify strong and weak swimmers.  This is not to say that those identified as 
weak swimmers will not conduct water crossings or bypass water hazards, but actions are 
taken to mitigate harm to the soldier.  If a soldier shows symptoms of claustrophobia in 
confined spaces then he should be employed in other ways, such as providing security at 
the opening of the underground structure.  Several hundred meters into a tunnel during 
combat operations should not be the first time a leader identifies a soldier as 
claustrophobic.  In addition to claustrophobia, Tunnel Rats were assessed for physical 
stature, physical endurance, mental aptitude, and comfort in confined spaces.  These 
personal attributes are applicable today and across the range of subterranean typology.  
7. Facilities 
United States Army installations do contain facilities that address some of the 
underground structures presented in this project; however, they fall short of the full range 
identified within the typological space.  Today’s fiscal environment requires creative 
training solutions and home station opportunities.  The following are training facility 
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environments the SWG experienced through field research that represents the range of 
subterranean typology.  Characteristics of these training areas can also be developed into 
existing home station training areas. 
a. Tunnel Training 
The tunnel is the easiest type of subterranean environment to replicate for 
training.  The CTCs and the majority of urban training sites have both rudimentary and 
sophisticated tunnels that can be used by U.S. forces.  In addition to the CTCs, the 
Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC), Butlerville, Indiana, offers over one mile 
of searchable tunnels in which a unit might conduct training.  Operated by the Indiana 
National Guard, the tunnels range from rudimentary to sophisticated, and can be modified 
to include opposing forces (OPFOR), weapons caches, or any number of other situations.  
The Joint Tunnel Testing Range (JTTR), at Yuma Proving Grounds is a recently opened 
underground tunnel facility designed to replicate the low-tech tunnels found along the 
U.S.-Mexico border, and those in Southwest Asia.  This training area was specifically 
chosen for the soil and dry ground composition that resembles what is currently seen in 
Afghanistan.  In addition to military facilities, access to civil underground structures 
should be researched to provide variety to underground training.  Coordination with local 
communities could assist in facilitating an enduring training relationship.   
b. Urban & Natural Cavity Training 
Similar to tunnel training areas, many CTCs and urban training areas 
contain opportunities for leaders to replicate urban cavity training.  Additionally, civil 
underground facilities such as subway systems and building sub-structures may be 
utilized through memorandums of agreement.  Locations that support training within 
natural cavities also exist at CTCs (see Figure 39); however, these areas may have 
restrictions that prevent employment of devices such as pyrotechnics and weapon 
simulators.  In addition to replicating combat effects, exercise control and safety 
procedures may be constrained by the natural complexities of subterranean environments.  
Complicating training factors include degraded radio communications and visibility. 
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Figure 37.  Cave locations at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA111 
c. Underground Facility Training 
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) offered an excellent opportunity for 
training in a shallow underground missile silo/bunker environment, and was recently host 
to 2013’s Network Evaluation Integration 14.1 and 14.2 distributive test events, which 
were meant to identify capability gaps in the force.  Within the event was a subterranean 
assessment hosted by the AWG for soldiers assigned to Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th 
Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division.  The AWG 
operational advisors utilized the WSMR facilities to replicate a series of complex and 
unpredictable subterranean environments and situations to build soldier confidence (see 
Figure 40). 
The majority of the techniques employed in UGFs are similar to those 
employed in above ground urban environments.  Therefore, training should focus on the 
understanding of vulnerabilities associated with UGFs.  The target audience for this type 
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of training should be tactical leaders and planners and should capitalize on existing 
opportunities offered by the DIA’s UFAC. 
 
Figure 38.  Soldiers move through an UGF during NIE 14.1112 
d. Other Training Opportunities 
In the conduct of field research for this project, it was discovered that most 
installations with maneuver units have trench complexes that can be modified to replicate 
rudimentary tunnels.  The AWG has devised effective means for conducting subterranean 
training.  One concept being proposed essentially modifies a unit’s subterranean training 
plan to address any of the three outlined typologies.  An installation could possibly 
procure shipping containers from the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office 
(DRMO), and create underground training environments by emplacing them 
underground. 
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B. AREAS FOR CONTINUED RESEARCH 
This project serves as a platform for future development of subterranean warfare 
awareness and operational proficiency within the U.S. Army and across the Department 
of Defense.  The project alone cannot possibly encompass the totality of research that 
should be sought in order to enhance the understanding and operational capability of 
ground forces within the subterranean operational environment.  This research was 
conducted concurrently with the AWG’s initiative on subterranean warfare, and select 
units are presently being exposed to the challenges that this research highlights.  Through 
the research and analysis of the subterranean warfare problem set, several topics have 
presented themselves for potential future exploration. 
In order for the dynamics of subterranean warfare to become inherent within unit 
level collective training, research should be conducted to evaluate how this unique 
environment could be incorporated into the force generation elements of the U.S. Army. 
Courses such as basic training, officer basic courses, and tactical leader courses such as 
the Sapper Leaders Course and Ranger School could potentially develop programs of 
instruction (POI) of TTPs when operating in the subterranean environment.  Part of this 
future research should be on the development and analysis of specific tasks essential to 
subterranean operations.  Potentially a course unique to subterranean warfare could be 
developed maximizing individual skill development in techniques for both differing 
subterranean categories and specialty equipment use training. 
Additional research and analysis could be conducted on the procurement and 
sustainment of specialty matériel solutions.  Equipment that enhances survivability, such 
as SCBA, rebreathers, respirators, and other PPE not currently widely available in 
maneuver units might be considered for rapid fielding.  Equipment identified as COTS 
may require unique training by industry subject matter experts at additional cost. 
In order to conduct operations against subterranean threats, such locations must 
first be found.  Throughout this research it was apparent that although many attempts at 
technological solutions for detection, mapping, and characterization have been pursued, 
all have fallen short in real-world defense applications.  An examination of current and 
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emerging technologies could be valuable to many different government agencies, 
potentially spurring the development of new capabilities. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The authors believe that this capstone provides sufficient support to confirm 
original arguments: 
• Current U.S. military doctrine does not properly prepare units for 
operations in subterranean environments. 
• Future conflicts will require GPF to deal with subterranean threats. 
• Understanding the use of incendiary weapons is critical in the conduct of 
subterranean operations. 
1. Case Studies 
Support of arguments has been based on the examination of five case studies that 
show multiple forms of subterranean environments, uses, and techniques.  These case 
studies cover over half a millennium, ranging from a single battle to an entire campaign.  
The main “take-away” from the case studies is that subterranean warfare has been a 
persistent aspect of warfare throughout history.  It has evolved from siege warfare, to 
conveyance of forces, to cross-border smuggling, and to storage of WMD.  This 
illustrates that, though considered primitive, it will always have an application in modern 
warfare.  Recent warfare has not been traditional siege warfare.  Maneuver forces have 
found tunnels used by the enemy and tried to exploit them for intelligence value as well 
as deny their further use to the enemy.  The enabling effects of the subterranean 
environment for enemy forces can be seen today in Israel, Afghanistan, Central America, 
Syria, and on the Korean Peninsula.  The predominant theme throughout the case studies 
is that of complexity.  The case studies show that the underground option is always taken 
when one side has the technological advantage; a primitive tactic to defeat a modern 
military. 
2. Typology 
The recommended typology and classification methodology provided in this 
capstone will allow ground elements and military planners to understand what 
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information is critical before leaders commit forces.  The coding system and graphical 
symbol provided will enable commanders and staffs the ability to use a template to 
quickly describe and communicate the subterranean threat in their areas of interest and 
operations. 
In defining the typology, attributes most relevant and significant for planning 
considerations have been identified.  By merging the efforts of the DIA, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the authors have created a 
lexicon that can be applied by any element conducting operations in a subterranean 
environment.  
As demonstrated below, the recommended typology and classification can be 
applied to the selected empirical case studies: 
 
Figure 39.  Siege of Constantinople 
 
Figure 40.  Petersburg (American Civil War) 
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Figure 41.  Messines (WWI) 
 
Figure 42.  Okinawa (WWII) 
  
Figure 43.  Cu Chi Tunnels (Vietnam War) 
Additionally, this typology and classification can be applied to current 
subterranean threats for allied forces: 
 
Figure 44.  Gaza, Israel 
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Figure 45.  A Karez tunnel in Afghanistan 
 
Figure 46.  Cross-border tunnels in Central America 
These examples show the flexibility of the proposed typology and classification 
which recognizes the widely varying uses for a subterranean system.  It also affords a 
leader the ability to control the collection process for planning operations in this complex 
environment.  By simply “plugging”  the information into the graphic, commanders and 
staffs are forced to acknowledge the multiple challenges that could be faced underground.  
3. DOTMLPF 
This research shows that when ground forces encounter a subterranean 
environment, leaders will commit forces into that underground site.  Not doing so 
provides enemy forces with a safe haven to conduct operations providing them with a 
military advantage.  
Most units that have encountered subterranean threats in the COE have limited 
formal training, and have had to learn on the job.  Subterranean pre-mission training 
should be included for deploying forces that are likely to encounter underground threats.  
As shown in the DOTMLPF analysis, most Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have 
rudimentary tunnel networks.  At a minimum, this provides leaders the opportunity to 
expose their soldiers to the psychological impacts of being in a confined space.  
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The AWG has developed a Subterranean Warfare Handbook that provides 
relevant information to units conducting operations within subterranean systems and 
underground structures and facilities.  Though a tactical application, it is a large step in 
the right direction and will assist leaders in prioritizing training tasks during a pre-
deployment phase for upcoming operations. 
4. Incendiary Weapons, Cyber-based Attacks, and MISO: 
This project has also provided possible non-traditional approaches to countering 
subterranean threats including the use of incendiary weapons, cyber-based attacks, and 
MISO (see Appendix A).  Considering the dangers associated with subterranean 
operations, non-traditional approaches must be considered in terms of either defeating the 
subterranean threat or mitigating some of the risks to ground forces.  These approaches 
provide the U.S. military with other options to countering such threats, other than 
airstrikes and committing ground forces.  
The paper’s case studies have shown that incendiary weapons such as 
flamethrowers and napalm have proved effective in the tunnels and UGFs of 
Constantinople, Okinawa, and Vietnam.  Incendiary weapons are a simple, cost-effective 
means of combating subterranean threats and have immediate psychological and physical 
effects.  
In some cases there may be a subterranean threat that cannot be engaged due to an 
overwhelming risk.  This research shows that although incendiary weapons would be the 
appropriate choice in such a scenario, leaders will not authorize their use due to a 
normative taboo.  Soldiers should not take unnecessary risks when there is a capability 
that could reduce or eliminate those risks.  This capstone has addressed this taboo and 
recommends that U.S. forces be properly trained on the effects of incendiary weapons, 
when they should be used, and how they should be used.  
Cyber-based attacks, as described in the Stuxnet incident, are a valid option 
against UGFs.  As with incendiary weapons, cyber-based attacks limit the exposure and 
risks to ground forces and have proven effective against underground threats in the past  
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(see Appendix A).  Due to the lack of training and doctrine for subterranean 
environments, electronic warfare should be further explored and incorporated to fill this 
gap.  
Military information support operations (MISO) are another historically proven 
indirect approach toward subterranean warfare (see Appendix A).  The advantage of 
MISO over cyber-based attacks is its flexibility to be applied to all types of underground 
environments (underground facilities, urban/natural cavities, and tunnels).  If proven 
credible, MISO can influence the audience through themes, messages, and actions such 
as contaminated air supply, structure collapse, food/supply shortages, fire/smoke 
inhalation, flooding, tunnel remediation, social media, and the local populace.  These 
operations can enable U.S. forces to shape the information battle-space in order to 
persuade, change, or influence the behaviors of those associated with the subterranean 
threat.  
5. Final Thoughts 
In recent conflicts, wherever U.S. forces have overwhelming combat power, 
adversaries have sought to fight on very primitive levels.  Enemies understand the value 
of hiding themselves and their sensitive equipment underground. Subterranean operations 
are conducted in the worst environments imaginable.  This is not merely a problem set for 
the U.S. military, but also, police forces, first responders, border patrol, and other security 
organizations.  Therefore, it is the recommendation of this research group that the 
TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity recognize “subterranean” as an operational 
environment. 
An instruction from the Commander-in Chief for the need of research such as that 
done with this capstone can be seen below: 
In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from 
achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to 
project power in areas which our access and freedom to operate are 
challenged.  In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric 
capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise 
missiles, advanced air defenses, mining and other methods, to complicate 
our operational calculus.  States such as China and Iran will continue to 
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pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, 
while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will 
extend to non-state actors as well.  Accordingly, the U.S. military will 
invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access 
and area denial environments.113 
By empowering ground forces with the proper understanding, training, and PPE 
to operate underground, the overall risk to forces is lowered while their ability to operate 
in an asymmetrical environment is raised.  Regardless of the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) employed, or special equipment developed to conduct subterranean 
operations, leaders should begin to consider the preparedness of forces to engage threats 
within this domain.  The subterranean environment has been mentioned in narratives of 
historical military campaigns, and its use is likely to continue as a valuable tactic in 
future engagements, large and small.  Additional analysis and research should be 
conducted on specific subterranean structures within emergent threat locations.  The 
DIA’s UFAC collects classified information for use by weapons developers and airborne 
attack planning.  This information would also be of value to those training facilities that 
might need to replicate these potential environments and structures as part of troop and 
mission preparedness.  
Military adversaries and unlawful civilians will continue to use subterranean 
structures and facilities because they are an inexpensive and effective means to provide 
sanctuary and move personnel and supplies.  The U.S. soldier must have the most current 
and in-depth training necessary for a successful mission in subterranean warfare. 
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APPENDIX A. INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
A. MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND MILITARY 
DECEPTION  
Military information support operations (MISO), formerly known as 
“psychological operations,” is another historically proven indirect approach toward 
subterranean warfare.  The advantage of MISO is its ability to target the full typology: 
tunnels, urban and natural cavities, and underground facilities.  Joint Publication 1-02 
defines MISO as follows: 
Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 
groups, and individuals.  The purpose of military support operations is to 
induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior formidable to the originator’s 
objectives.114 
Nested within MISO is the ability to conduct military deception or “MILDEC” 
which can target the full typology of subterranean warfare.  Also, from Joint Publication 
1-02, MILDEC is defined as: “Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by 
manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a 
manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interest.”115 
The authors of this capstone had the ability to conduct site visits on at least one 
example of each of the subterranean structures that encompass the full typology.  Based 
on those site visits, the proceeding areas were deemed possible points of interest for 
MISO and MILDEC which can possibly influence a subterranean target audience through 
themes, messages, and actions. 
1. Contaminated Air Supply 
Military deception (MILDEC) could be designed to influence combatants to 
believe that an underground structure’s air supply is compromised.  The most courageous 
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of personnel in an underground setting cannot avoid the mental stress associated with 
thoughts of contaminated air.  Contaminated air can stem from particulates associated 
with underground works or can come from above (e.g., chemical agents).  Soviet forces 
were reported to have used such agents against Mujahedeen hiding in karez systems in 
Afghanistan. 
2. Structure Collapse  
Also, MILDEC could be designed to influence combatants to believe that an 
underground structure is in jeopardy of collapsing or will be collapsed by air strike or 
ground force action.  Just recently, 21 entombed German soldiers were discovered by 
archeologists near the town of Carspach, along what was the Western Front during World 
War I.116  The men were German counter-miners who were buried alive when an Allied 
shell collapsed their tunnel.  In 2010, a Chilean mining shaft’s structure collapsed on its 
own, trapping 33 miners over 2,000 feet underground for just over two months. 
3. Food/Supply Shortages 
Designed MILDEC could influence combatants to believe that an underground 
structure’s supply lines are cut off, resulting in looming food and supply shortages.  
Despite a combatant’s best efforts, the human body cannot go more than three days 
without water or three weeks without food.  Messages to this effect can be used to 
concede surrender from underground structure inhabitants. 
4. Fire/Smoke Inhalation 
Military deception could be designed to influence combatants to believe that an 
underground structure’s ventilation systems are compromised and fire/smoke inhalation 
is imminent.  Incendiary weapons previously discussed in this capstone have proved their  
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mettle against subterranean environments in World War II and Vietnam.  The ability to 
vacuum oxygen out of a confined space is what makes the armament so effective and 
psychologically debilitating to combatants. 
5. Flooding  
Specific MILDEC could be designed to influence combatants to believe that an 
underground structure will be flooded.  Flooding is a relatively cheap way of functionally 
defeating an underground system, although only for a limited time.  Flooding does not 
always have to be through water.  In February 2013, Egyptian forces turned from water to 
sewage to flood cross-border tunnels used for smuggling and launching militant 
attacks.117  Sewage proved the deciding factor in maintaining an underground system 
inoperable for relatively long periods of time (see Figure 49). 
 
Figure 47.  A Palestinian attempts to clean out sewage from a tunnel in Rafah.118 
                                                 
117 Ibrahim Barzak, “Hamas Accuses Egypt of Flooding Gaza Tunnels,” Associated Press, February 
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6. Tunnel Remediation 
Further, MILDEC could be designed to influence combatants to believe that an 
underground structure will be remediated.  Tunnel Remediation occurs when a 
discovered underground structure is filled with cement (see Figure 50).  It is costly but 
achieves complete structure defeat.  For fiscal year 2013, the city of Tucson, Arizona 
spent $21,088 on 10.5 cubic yards of 3000 PSI concrete to remediate drug tunnels.119  An 
underground structure can never be used again if it has been properly remediated. 
 
Figure 48.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents contract cement trucks to fill a 
tunnel along the Tucson sector of Nogales.120 
7. Social Media 
The design of MISO could influence combatants to concede surrender from an 
underground structure through social media.  Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and YouTube are this generation’s leaflet technology for influencing emotions 
and behaviors.  The Arab Spring in 2012 and 2013 saw the power of the Twitter hashtag 
mobilize an Army of youth to revolt against the Egyptian government.  The combatant 
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age males that comprise both non-state and state actors operating underground are avid 
users of this technology despite some of their safe havens deemed “failed states.”  
military information support teams (MIST) can also target these mediums to observe 
patterns of life.  The CORE Lab located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California was able to map Twitter hashtags posted during the Arab Spring, to map 
patterns of life and movements of key personnel.121  Such creative adaptations of 
technology should be leveraged in order to draw combatants out of underground 
structures and prevent hostile actions on both sides. 
8. Local Populace Interaction 
Specific MISO design could influence the local populace surrounding 
subterranean structures to aid GPF in their location.  The local populace will almost 
always know the location of subterranean structures in the area.  They may be involved in 
one aspect or another (e.g., digging, smuggling, concealing) or have no role at all, but 
fear retribution for speaking out.  The fear – more times than not – comes from a lack of 
security.  Since 2008, over 30 drug smuggling tunnels have been discovered in three main 
cities along the U.S.-Mexico border in Otay Mesa, Tecate, and Calexico.122  An alarming 
TTP was the use of local businesses and warehouses for tunnel entrances and exits, as 
well as the use of electric outlets to power underground lighting and ventilation systems 
(see Figure 51).  Professional packing materials were used to simulate normal product 
distribution, but in reality carried spoilage for removal.  The locals found themselves in a 
dilemma.  If they reported the underground works to authorities, they risked retribution 
from the cartels.  If they complied with the cartels, they now provided a safe haven for 
drug smuggling. 
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Figure 49.  Cartels force local vendors to conceal tunnel entrances and exits 
In summary, MISO and MILDEC serve as force multipliers that shape the 
information environment in order to persuade, change, or influence the behaviors of a 
target audience.  To optimize their value, they must both be integrated early into planning 
at all levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical.  Effective MISO and MILDEC 
must also receive adequate intelligence, organization, and evaluation feedback from first-
line leaders. 
Additionally, products designed for MISO and MILDEC operations must be 
credible to their audience.  The effectiveness of any MISO or MILDEC operation 
depends on the enemy’s perception of what can be lost if there is no compliance.  This 
can best be achieved by those who themselves have experienced an underground 
environment.  While this caveat may seem unrealistic, many of the CTCs have included 
rudimentary tunnel complexes to their sites.  Personnel from MIST must themselves 
experience the environment if they are going to produce products related to it.   
Psychology is a significant factor of life underground that cannot be easily 
dismissed.  Details such as warm colors and pastels, paintings and furniture are often 
used underground to calm the human subconscious from focusing too much on the idea 
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of living and working underground.  Efforts made to understand this psychology further 
will enhance MISO and MILDEC operations and increase their probability of success. 
B. CYBER AND ELECTRONIC ATTACK 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this segment is to shed light on an already proven indirect 
approach towards achieving defeat of a subterranean complex: cyber-based attacks.  
There are several thousand cyber intrusions on a daily basis attempting to access an array 
of systems that range from commerce to government.  Domestically, in the last few years, 
the U.S. has been the victim of countless cyber-attacks.  More often than not, these 
intrusions stem from both nation state and non-state actor sponsorship, but attribution 
may not always be clear.  As the technical skill of attackers increases, the ability to 
identify the perpetrator’s identity decreases. 
The following description is of a  cyber-attack that not only made domestic and 
international news headlines, but is currently altering the way cyber activities in both the 
legal and ethical sense are being considered.  Many aspects of the events that unfolded in 
Natanz, Iran have been and are generally deemed still classified in nature.  There were, 
however, many open lessons learned of which state and non-state actors have taken 
notice, reevaluating internal cybernetic infrastructure intended to protect interests above 
and below ground.  The most important lesson remains that underground facilities, 
specifically HDBTs, capable of withstanding air and ground strikes, must now also 
contend with cyber-attacks.  Stuxnet, as the virus was termed, became the first ever 
cyber-attack used to cause physical destruction. 
2. Stuxnet 
What is known about Stuxnet began in June of 2010 when a highly sophisticated 
computer worm was first detected.  Stuxnet was discovered by a Belarus-based security 
company which traced the worm to an Iranian client after  a complaint of a software 
glitch.  Originally the virus was thought to have been designed to steal industry secrets.  
Stealing industry secrets by means of the web has long been a common practice within 
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the competitive business world.  This worm, however, was acting differently, targeting 
specific Siemens123 settings, and self-injecting malicious code into the program logic 
control (PLC).124  The code’s role was to change existing cybernetic infrastructure. 
The significance of the PLC is one that cannot be understated.  For Natanz, it was 
also a major point of vulnerability.  A PLC like the one in Figure 52 serves as the 
operations hub for many machinery and industrial-type systems.  Conveyor belts, 
elevators, and roller coasters are just a few examples that operate by means of a PLC.  As 
Stuxnet self-injected into the Natanz PLC, it cleverly remained undetected.  Investigators 
believe it was purposely built this way to avoid raising alarm; an indicator of the 
technical expertise of the code’s author(s).  By all best estimates, the PLC may have 
intruded well into a year before it was discovered. 
Reports on the damage caused by Stuxnet vary due to the sensitive and top-secret 
nature of nuclear facilities.  One source said the damage done to the centrifuges was 
significant enough to set back the nuclear program for at least three years.125  Nuclear 
centrifuges serve an important role of separating U-235 and U-238, the two isotopes 
required to power a nuclear plant or make a bomb.  By the first account, Stuxnet caused 
hundreds of centrifuges to essentially spin beyond control, ultimately breaking in the 
process.  A second report had the facility well on its way to recovery only six months 
after the attack.126  United Nations inspectors representing the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) witnessed over 900 centrifuges removed from the underground  
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facility and replaced with new centrifuges.127  Regardless of which explanation is true, 
Stuxnet achieved what has been previously defined as functional defeat of a subterranean 
facility. 
3. Subterranean Lessons Learned  
The underground facility at Natanz was by the definition laid out in this capstone, 
an HDBT.  The point of vulnerability was ultimately its cyber defenses, which lent access 
to the PLC where the disruption occurred.  Today’s underground facilities are typically 
used around the world for uranium mining, processing, enrichment, heavy/light water 
processing, and C3I structures.  Most of these operate cybernetically through a PLC, and 
vary in cryptic defense.  Since Stuxnet, Iran has positioned over 100 academics to work  
on  information security in an effort to prevent future mishaps.128 
The malware that Stuxnet loaded into Natanz’s subterranean  facility was aimed 
specifically to target the Siemens PLC.  What can be deduced is that the author(s) of 
Stuxnet had prior intelligence of the internal infrastructure and built the virus around that 
knowledge.  This validates the point that while cyber-attacks by themselves are extremely 
potent, when coupled with human intelligence (HUMINT), the probability of success 
naturally increases. 
If the manner in which Iran’s subterranean facility was infiltrated appeared 
simple, it is because deception was achieved on multiple fronts.  Though Stuxnet was 
deliberate and thorough in its attack, it was assumed to be time-consuming to plan and to 
cost millions to produce.  The virus was also tested prior to its infiltration, another key 
factor when planning cyber weapons.129 
The authors of Stuxnet may never be identified further than speculated.  What is 
known is that there are only a handful of technical experts worldwide capable of 
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conducting such an attack.  Like SOF, hackers are not mass produced.  While the U.S. is 
making strides in building tomorrow’s cyber warrior within the Armed Forces, hackers 
are the key.  The U.S. government seems to prosecute rather than cultivate such skills.  
Anyone can go from enemy to hero.  This was the case for the V2 rocket scientists in 
World War II that joined Allied Forces after leaving the Nazis, in itself a huge strategic 
narrative victory. 
Cyber-attacks may prevent the need for ground forces altogether.  However, 
cyber-attacks can also be coordinated with ground forces.  This scenario was almost a 
reality during the 2007 cyber-attack against Estonia, reportedly at the hands of Russia for 
retribution when a Red Army statue was removed in the Estonian capital of Tallinn.  
Troops were mobilized; however, cyber force never reached physical force.  To this day, 
a cyber-attack has yet to be retaliated against by ground forces.  
4. Conclusion 
Stuxnet is in the past; focus is now shifted to the next cyber-attack.  As FBI 
Director Robert Mueller said, “I do believe that the cyber-threat will equal or surpass the 
threat from counterterrorism in the foreseeable future.”130  State actors and non-state 
actors capable of conducting similar attacks understand that cyber has low entry costs and 
based on the skill of the “wizard” can be difficult to trace.  As for those capable of 
triggering a “Cybergeddon,” “Cyber Pearl Harbor,” or a “Cyber 9-11,” the number of 
master hackers, state-sponsored or not, are a limited few.  In the U.S., it has been  
traditional to alienate those whose capabilities could be harnessed for self-defense.  A 
disturbing thought is that some nation states have more Internet users than the U.S. has 
people.   
As stated, no doctrine exists in defining subterranean as its own operational 
environment.  This affects the training and implementation of ground forces in such 
structures and facilities.  Special operations forces have capability, but their capability to  
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affect the underground is limited by manpower.  Electronic warfare is a proven capacity 
against underground facilities that must be further explored and incorporated as a 
normative U.S. arsenal method of engagement. 
 
Figure 50.  Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad touring a centrifuge 
facility.131 
 
Figure 51.  Siemens PLC132 
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APPENDIX B. APPLICATION OF INCENDIARY WEAPONS 
Currently, U.S. forces conducting combat operations are having difficulties 
defeating enemy personnel in tunnels, urban/natural cavities, and underground facilities.  
In the past, the effective weapons used against these strongholds were incendiary 
weapons.  Specifically, ground flame weapons (flamethrowers and napalm) were 
documented as having positive results during World War II, the Korean War, and the 
Vietnam War.  According to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), incendiary weapons are defined as: 
Means of any weapons or munitions which is primarily designed to set fire 
to an object or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, 
heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction substance 
delivered on the target.133 
There are no national or international laws that prevent U.S. forces from using 
incendiary weapons against confirmed enemy forces and positions.  FM 27-10 The Law 
of Land Warfare states that: 
The use of weapons which employ fire, such as tracer ammunition, 
flamethrower, napalm and other incendiary agents, against targets 
requiring their use is not in violation of international law.  They should 
not, however, be employed in such way as to cause unnecessary suffering 
to individuals.134 
The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III) states the following: 
It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as 
such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons. 
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It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located 
within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered 
incendiary weapons. 
It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a 
concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary 
weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such 
military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians 
and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the 
incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any 
event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects. 
It is prohibited to make forest or other kinds of plant cover the object of 
attack by incendiary when such natural elements are used to cover, 
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are 
themselves military objectives.135 
Despite the absence of any legal prohibition, the U.S. military has developed a 
normative taboo against the use of incendiary weapons.  The term “normative taboos” 
refers to the widespread repulsion against incendiary weapons and the widely held 
inhibitions on their use.136  This normative taboo is hindering military ability to 
effectively defeat and destroy certain types of subterranean threats in the COE. This 
normative taboo stems from three catalysts: 
• Civilian deaths during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam 
war 
• The perception that incendiary weapons are only used by terrorists 
• The negative stigma that incendiary weapons cause the unnecessary 
suffering of enemy personnel 
Section One will provide a historical account of the use of incendiary weapons by 
U.S. forces during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.  This section 
will show how the irresponsible and improper use of such weapons contributed 
significantly to the current normative taboo against incendiary weapons.  The majority of 
research provided in this section was derived from the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) report, Weapons that may Cause Unnecessary Suffering or have 
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Indiscriminate Effects, and Dr. Malvern Lumsden’s Incendiary Weapons.  Both readings 
provided a detailed account of all incendiary weapons used by international military 
forces from World War I to the end of the Vietnam War.  Though the intent of both 
reports is to provide detailed information on incendiary weapons in order to prevent their 
use, they do point out when incendiary weapons had successful results. 
Section Two will show that the successful use of incendiary weapons by terrorist 
organizations has contributed more to the normative taboo by branding it as a “weapon 
used by terrorists.”  The following three cases where terrorist organizations have 
successfully used incendiary weapons will be examined: 
1. 2004 Beslan School massacre  
2. 2011 attack in Mumbai, India  
3. 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.  
For the Beslan School massacre and bombings in Mumbai the thesis, Braving the Swarm: 
Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units Facing Paramilitary 
Terrorism, conducted by Fire Department of New York CPT Sean Newman provides 
sufficient information on the attacks.  Captain Newman’s argument that terrorist 
organizations are shifting more towards the use of incendiary weapons and tactics adds 
credibility to the negativity that can be associated with this normative taboo.  Many 
people believe that the use of incendiary weapons projects an image of terrorism.  The 
Accountability Review Board Report (unclassified) on Benghazi Embassy Attack, 
provided information that showed a terrorist organization’s successful use of incendiary 
weapons and tactics resulted in catastrophic losses.  
Section Three addresses the stigma that incendiary weapons cause the 
unnecessary suffering of enemy personnel.  This stigma also drives the normative taboo 
against incendiary weapons through what Tannenwald refers to as “taboo talk.”  For 
example, she mentions lines like “this is simply wrong” and “we just don’t do things like 
this” and how they may help identify a normative taboo.137  The International Committee 
of the Red Cross report, Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have 
Indiscriminate Effects provides a great deal of data that spans what is called the 
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“principle categories of weapon and their effects.”  These principle categories consist of: 
explosive, penetrating, incendiary, nuclear, biological, and chemical.138  The report 
provides an excellent account of what medical risks come with each category, but could 
not show whether one principle category caused more suffering than the other. 
The conclusion will state the need for a paradigm shift away from the normative 
taboo against incendiary weapons to a responsible acceptance of these enabling 
capabilities.  Finally, the authors of the capstone will recommend how and when 
incendiary weapons should be employed in order to prevent future taboos. 
A. SECTION ONE: CIVILIAN DEATH DURING WORLD WAR II, THE 
KOREAN WAR, AND THE VIETNAM WAR 
In previous wars, the use of incendiary weapons was an obvious choice due to the 
psychological effect against enemy combatants.  Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary 
Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects, states “man seems to have an intense inbred 
fear of fire, and incendiary weapons, particularly those based on scatter-type agents, may 
unnerve him to an extent that other forms of attack may not.”139  Even the Old 
Testament: Book of Judges tells a story of Samson and his use of incendiary weapons 
when angered by the Philistines. Samson captured 300 foxes, set their tails on fires, and 
then released them into a cornfield occupied by his enemies.140  Though incendiary 
weapons can be traced as far back as the creation of fire, U.S. forces did not start 
employing incendiary weapons systematically until World War II. 
1. World War II 
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Member and 
author of Incendiary Weapons, Dr. Malvern Lumsden, the incendiary weapons employed 
by U.S. forces during World War II were: man-portable flamethrowers, mechanized 
                                                 
138 International Committee of the Red Cross, Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or 
have Indiscriminate Effects (Geneva: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973), accessed 
November 4, 2013, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC-Weapons.pdf, 22. 
139 International Committee of the Red Cross, 58. 
140 American Bible Society. Old Testament: Book of Judges. New York, NY: American Bible 
Society, 1816, 15, 3-6 
 131 
flamethrowers, and various incendiary bombs dropped by U.S. aircraft.141  The first 
successful employment of flamethrowers was used by U.S. forces on  January 15, 1943 at 
the battle of Guadalcanal against Japanese forces.142  The original report states that the 
flamethrowers were specifically successful “against caves and tunnels.”143  Though the 
flamethrower was employed in both theatres of World War II, it was used more 
frequently in the Pacific. Lumsden states that this was due to the fact that “the Japanese 
soldier was said to be less likely to surrender than his German counterpart, who might 
give up a position when confronted by a flamethrower.”144 
The primary use of incendiary weapons by U.S. forces during World War II was 
via strategic bombing.  The U.S. forces viewed strategic bombings as a means of bringing 
the war to the center of Germany and its industrial infrastructure.  The majority of these 
bombings were conducted at night and incendiary bombs were used at the beginning of 
each raid to mark targets for subsequent aircraft actions.145 
Lumsden states “incendiary bombs were used in Asia with much the same 
rationale as in Europe—as weapons for mass destruction.”146  The U.S. forces dropped 
over 650,000 tons of bombs in the Pacific Theatre.  Some of these bombing attacks 
consisted solely of incendiary weapons: 
Altogether during WWII, the U.S. Army Air Force dropped about 14,000 
tons of napalm bombs, over two-thirds of them the Pacific area.  U.S. 
military experts concluded that napalm bombs were most effective against 
human targets and in addition had a terrorizing effect, though prisoners of 
war state that widely dispersed napalm bomb hits had little or no effect on 
morale.147 
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The philosophy of destroying the enemy’s means of production through strategic 
bombing with incendiary munitions caused a catastrophic number of civilian deaths.  
General Curtis Lemay was quoted as saying, “I’ll tell you what war is about, you’ve got to kill people, and when you’ve killed enough they stop fighting.”148 This tragedy 
stimulated what is now the normative taboo against incendiary weapons.  What seemed to 
be a successful use of flamethrowers was overshadowed by the outlandish civilian death 
toll caused by incendiary bombing raids. 
2. Korea 
The Korean War witnessed the transition to napalm bombs via the U.S. Far East 
Air Force (FEAF).  Lumsden states that the FEAF “used a total of 32,557 tons of 
napalm” during the Korean War.149  Napalm tactics showed initial success against enemy 
forces, however, the irresponsible use of this enabler resulted in negative media attention.  
During the Korean War, U.S. ground forces also used flamethrowers, flame land-mines, 
and flammable liquids.  Due to the negative overshadowing outcomes of incendiary 
bombings, it is difficult to find data of successful uses, especially regarding incendiary 
weapons by ground forces.  Poor target selection and “cure-all-ism” with bombing raids 
added fuel to the growing normative taboo against incendiary weapons.   
3. Vietnam 
The Vietnam War saw the most profligate use of incendiary weapons.  The 
negative media alone might be responsible for the normative taboo against incendiary 
weapons.  Most notably was the Pulitzer price-winning photo of the “Napalm Girl” taken 
by Nick Ut (see Figure 54).  According to Lumsden, of the 6,650,543 tons of munitions 
dropped by aircraft, 400,000 tons were incendiary bombs.150  The blast from the atomic 
bomb dropped in Hiroshima was equivalent to 15,000–20,000 tons of TNT. 
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Figure 52.  Napalm Girl151 
The quantities of ground flame weapons procured by U.S. forces were 394 million 
AN-M14 thermite incendiary grenades and 379 million white phosphorus grenades.152  
The XM-191 was also fielded in 1969 and replaced the flamethrower.  This incendiary 
weapon fired up to four rockets filled with a pyrotechnic fuel that would ignite once it 
impacted its target.  Again, due to the overwhelming number of civilian deaths tied to 
aerial napalm and incendiary bombing attacks, little data has been reported of the positive 
effects of ground based incendiary weapons. 
Reports began to filter through to the West in the press and other mass media 
about the use of incendiaries, and in particular napalm, by U.S. troops in Vietnam.  The 
increasing number of these reports contributed to a wave of public concern.  This public 
interest, in turn, led to a number of investigations and it is possible that these were 
instrumental in the formation of more restrictive rules of engagement.153  Negative public 
opinions stemming from horrific scenes of napalm attacks in Vietnam have contributed 
greatly to the normative taboo against incendiary weapons.  However, instead of learning 
from mistakes made and correcting how incendiary weapons are used, incendiary 
weapons have simply been removed from  property books. 
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B. SECTION TWO: WEAPONS USED BY TERRORISTS 
Recent successful terrorist attacks that have benefited from the use of incendiary 
weapons have added to the normative taboo against these weapons.  Fire is a simple, 
cheap, and easily employed weapon for terrorist organizations.  The psychological and 
physical consequences of incendiary weapons used by terrorists are severe.  The idea of 
dying by fire is religiously symbolic, making this technique even more appealing to 
terrorists. 
1. 2004 Beslan School Massacre 
On September 1, 2004, a Chechen terrorist organization attacked School Number 
One in Beslan, North Ossetia (Russia).154  At the conclusion of the siege, a large fire was 
started in the gymnasium where most of the hostages were being held.155  Reports 
conflict as to whether a terrorist initiated the fire or if a bullet fired from the security 
force struck an explosive device.  Either way, the fire that ensued benefited the terrorists 
and caused confusion amongst the security forces.  The dilemma for the security forces 
was whether the priority was the fire, the terrorists, or the hostages.  Of the 400 people 
killed during the Beslan School Massacre, 160 were killed by the fire.156 
2. 2008 Attack in Mumbai 
In November 2008, members from the terrorist group Lashkar-e-taiba executed a 
series of attacks in Mumbai, India.157  The attacks targeted multiple high-profile 
structures and resulted in almost 200 deaths, with an additional 300 people injured.158  In 
addition to body armor and assault rifles, the terrorists used incendiary weapons to delay 
security forces, create more casualties, and cause damage to buildings.  Combining small  
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arms fire and incendiary weapons proved to be an effective tactic.  Firefighters and 
security forces were not trained to put out fires during a gunfight and the results were 
catastrophic. 
The most resonating image of the 2008 bombings in Mumbai was one with 
plumes of smoke and fire pouring out of the symbolic Taj Mahal.  Public safety first-
responders stood helpless as the civilians trapped inside perished.  This horrible scene is 
an example of how incendiary weapons can contribute to the creation of a normative 
taboo. 
3. 2012 Attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi 
On September 11, 2012 members of a terrorist organization attacked the U.S. 
Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.  The event was “a series of attacks, involving arson, small-
arms and machine-gun fire, and use of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and 
mortars, focused on two U.S. facilities.”159  As the attack progressed, the terrorists used 
fuel cans from the compound’s generators and set fire to the building where the 
Ambassador was located.  This use of fire resulted in confusion amongst the 
Ambassador’s security force and ultimately his death from smoke inhalation. 
The terrorists attack in Benghazi caused the “deaths of four U.S. government 
personnel, Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; 
seriously wounded two other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; 
and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound 
and Annex.”160  The terrorists’ use of incendiary weapons in Benghazi adds to the 
normative taboo against incendiary weapons and is responsible for the loss of life, 
injuries, and damage to U.S. property. 
This normative taboo creates a slippery slope logical fallacy that “terrorists use 
incendiary weapons.  Therefore, if U.S. forces use incendiary weapons then they are also 
                                                 
159 U.S. Department of State, Accountability Review Board Report (unclassified) on Benghazi 
Embassy Attack, December 2012, Accessed June, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf, 1. 
160 Ibid. 4.  
 136 
terrorists.”  However, like terrorists, U.S. forces also use body armor and assault rifles 
and that does not make them terrorists.  Nor does it make body armor and assault rifles 
“weapons of terrorists.”  If incendiary weapons are employed properly against enemy 
combatants (in accordance with international law and the Department of the Army FM 
27-10) then it is simply another way to achieve victory in combat. 
C. SECTION THREE: THE NEGATIVE STIGMA THAT INCENDIARY 
WEAPONS CAUSE THE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OF ENEMY 
PERSONNEL 
According to Weapons that may Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, there are three components to incendiary weapons.  These 
components are: incendiary agents; munitions for dispensing the agent; and a delivery 
system for transporting the munitions to the target.161  Due to the ranging vulnerability of 
targets (i.e., wood, concrete, metal) a variety of incendiary weapons have been 
developed.  An ICRC report categorizes incendiary weapons based on their chemical 
characteristics: metal, pyrotechnic, pyrophoric, and oil-based.162  Obviously, the human 
body suffers horribly from exposure to any category of incendiary weapons. 
Incendiary weapons cause deep and excessive burns since they have been 
engineered to the level required to damage targets that are more durable than the human 
body.163  Lumsden and the ICRC argue that victims of serious burns do not always die 
immediately.  Depending on the quality of accessible medical treatment, size of the burn, 
and the degree of burn, victims may suffer for “hours, days, or even weeks.”164  They 
also argue that “skin does not have the immediate impact of, say a bullet wound in the 
heart or brain.”165  This “suffering” from burns contributes to the normative taboo against 
incendiary weapons. 
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This project argues that not all bullets hit the “heart or brain” and not all explosive 
fragmentations or blasts result in immediate deaths.  Many injuries from explosive or 
penetrating weapons have prolonged physically painful and psychologically damaging 
effects.  In fact, Lumsden states that third degree burns destroy pain receptors and the 
victim may die without feeling much pain.166  This is not common with explosive and 
penetrating weapons that are currently employed by U.S. forces.  Unless the explosive or 
penetrating weapon causes damage to the spinal column, pain is instant and excruciating.  
In terms of pain, incendiary weapons could be less painful if the burns are deep enough. 
An obvious secondary lethal effect from incendiary weapons is the victim 
breathing in harmful smoke, carbon monoxide, and particulates.  According to British 
and German authorities, carbon monoxide turned out to be a major lethal agent in 
incendiary attacks on German cities during World War II.167  The most common cause of 
death as a result of fire is due to asphyxiation from smoke.  In their reports, neither the 
ICRC nor Lumsden could define how asphyxiation “feels” in terms of pain.  Many 
interviews with fire victims revived by CPR show that though their initial feeling was 
panic, some experienced a sense of euphoria and calmness before passing out from 
smoke inhalation.  Deaths by fire, explosions, penetration, and drowning have their own 
types of suffering.  None of which is more unnecessarily harmful than the other. 
All categories of weapons and their effects cause suffering.  However, just like a 
combatant can be taught to “shoot to wound” or “shoot to kill,”  soldiers can also be 
taught to employ incendiary weapons in a way that would not cause unnecessary 
suffering.  If employed against the proper type of targets, incendiary weapons could 
prevent the unnecessary loss of U.S. soldiers.  The matrix for whether a particular 
weapon should be employed should not be based on suffering, but on how well it can 
help win the fight, while not creating human-rights problems. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the U.S. military has developed a normative taboo against the use 
of incendiary weapons.  This normative taboo is preventing troops from effectively 
defeating the enemy in certain types of strongholds and fortified positions.  These 
positions include caves, underground tunnels, and subterranean complexes.  Given the 
fact that there are no national or international laws that expressly forbid them, there 
should be nothing preventing U.S. forces from using incendiary weapons.  Decision 
makers would not expect a soldier to clear a room with his or her knife, or engage a tank 
1,000 meters away with a shotgun.  With efficient training in proper use and rules of 
engagement, U.S. forces would benefit from the use of incendiary weapons. 
In the past, incendiary weapons have been used irresponsibly during World War 
II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.  In each case, the most negative results came 
primarily from incendiary weapons being used via aircraft.  In caves, underground 
tunnels, and subterranean complexes, incendiary weapons would be employed via man-
portable devices.  Man-portable devices are easier to control and do not indiscriminately 
destroy large areas at a time.  In World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, 
the reports of man-portable devices were positive, especially against “both caves and 
tunnels.”168  Any weapon can have a negative result if used incorrectly or irresponsibly.  
However, U.S. forces should not suffer today due to a normative taboo that has 
manifested from mistakes in the past. 
The fact that terrorists have used incendiary weapons also adds to the normative 
taboo.  Incendiary weapons are cheap, simple, and effective.  These characteristics are 
why terrorists use them, not because incendiary weapons are evil, but because they work.  
Terrorists have also successfully used social media and networks to plan and execute 
successful attacks.  Does this mean that having a Twitter or Facebook account implies 
conducting or planning acts of terror?  Due to the organizational design of terrorist 
groups they quickly adopt effective tactics and techniques for recruiting, supporting,  
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funding, training and executing their operations.  Today they may use incendiary 
weapons; tomorrow they may use cyber terror.  Not using a weapon or tactic simply 
because terrorists use it is unacceptable. 
The negative opinion that incendiary weapons cause unnecessary suffering of 
enemy personnel also contributes to the negative taboo.  It would be thoughtless to deny 
that the potential injuries and deaths from incendiary weapons are horrific.  However, this 
can also be said about deaths and injuries from any type of weapon.  The reality is, 
combatants have to fight each other.  The results of these fights are injuries and deaths on 
both sides of the conflict.  The authors of this project agree that means should be taken to 
prevent unnecessary suffering from incendiary weapons.  However, it is not agreed that 
the way to prevent unnecessary suffering is to not use them.  Combat is an unfortunate 
experience and no real soldier gains pleasure from taking someone’s life.  Still, this does 
not mean that U.S. forces should suffer from a normative taboo against a weapon that 
could save lives. 
United States forces should be properly trained on how and when to use 
incendiary weapons.  Leaders who irresponsibly use these weapons and cause the 
unnecessary suffering or death of civilians should be severely punished.  This project 
recommends that in order to overcome these normative taboos, incendiary weapons 
should be used in a way that shows their positive effects.  For example, they should be 
employed in an environment where they have been successful in the past (i.e., man-
portable devices in tunnels and caves).  Simply removing incendiary weapons as an 
option for U.S. forces does not increase the forces’ chances of survivability or success. 
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APPENDIX C. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS STUDIES 
In a February 2004 appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director of the DIA, stated that more than a dozen foreign military 
or defense related UGFs were under construction.  Several countries with known WMD 
programs are expanding their use of UGFs in order to protect and conceal equipment and 
leadership.169  Both nation states and non-state actors looking to tip the scale of 
vulnerability have recognized that conducting nefarious activities deep underground is 
the only way to escape the “unblinking eye” of U.S. ISR, and the kinetic effects of aerial 
delivered munitions.  Before military planners can commit ground forces to subterranean 
targets, they must be able to clearly distinguish the characteristics of the environment. 
1. Underground Structures of the Cold War: The World Below by Paul 
Ozorak 
Paul Ozorak’s book, Underground Structures of the Cold War: The World Below, 
is a historical compilation, detailing the use of bunkers and complex underground 
facilities by more than 60 countries during the Cold War.  The book describes the types 
of underground structures used by countries from Afghanistan to Vietnam.  The 
particular focus is on the threat posed by the use of nuclear weapons and the protection 
needed to ensure retaliatory capabilities, continuity of governments, and civil defense.  
Paul Ozarok, a Canadian military historian, allocates a large portion of text to the politics, 
protocols, defense capabilities, and planning associated with underground nuclear 
defense structures.  As expected, the largest sections are committed to the United States, 
Russia, Germany, China, and the author’s home, Canada.  Many critical characteristics of 
underground facilities such as depth, sizes of blast doors, ventilation systems, escape 
hatches, and life support elements are highlighted. 
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This compilation of research illustrates the global proliferation of underground 
structures during a very dark and unstable point in history.  As technology in the 
precision and effect of conventional munitions increases, more and more countries, 
interested in illicit activities, are turning to subterranean environments for cover and 
concealment of critical infrastructure and defense capabilities.  Defense community 
professionals must understand that even though many of the structures discussed are no 
longer in use, the use of underground facilities has continued, and the fundamental 
characteristics of these structures have not changed.  Advances in tunneling and 
construction technology have made newer facilities more concealable and hardened.  
Rather than building underground facilities under government buildings or in isolated 
areas, governments choosing to take advantage of aversions to collateral damage, are 
likely to build illicit underground facilities under traditional “no fire areas,” such as 
schools, hospitals, religious centers, and cemeteries.  As aerial delivered munitions are 
unlikely to be used in such environments, ground forces must be prepared to enter and 
clear these types of underground structures. 
2. Lexicon of Hardened Structure Definition and Terms, by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency 
The DIA has composed a Lexicon of Hardened Structure Definition and Terms, 
that establishes consistent terminology used by intelligence, operations, and weapon 
development communities.  The focus of this reference is on hardened structures and 
serves as a guide to understanding the construction of hard and deeply buried targets 
(HDBTs). 170  Subterranean environments used for military purposes can be both natural 
and man-made.  Understanding the mission of these underground structures is critical and 
proper identification and typology is the first step in assessing how effects can be applied.  
Scientists and engineers have studied the subterranean environment in great detail, and a 
goal of this project is to integrate terminology across disciplines in order to better 
communicate an understanding of the unique subterranean environment. 
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3. Classification of the Typologies of Artificial Cavities in the World, by 
the Speleological Society of Italy. 
Classification of the Typologies of Artificial Cavities in the World presents a 
typological tree of subterranean environments.  The Speleological Society of Italy 
subdivides the subterranean environment,  and its work, into seven categories: hydraulic, 
war, worship, civil settlement works, mines, transit, and other works.171  Each category 
has further sub-categories.  Further analysis could include historical examples of military 
uses found with each category. 
4. [Title Classified Secret] a Thesis by James Papineau at the Naval 
Postgraduate School 
In order to explore the vulnerabilities of subterranean structures, it is important to 
understand the different types of construction, as well as internal and external support 
systems.  By understanding the vulnerabilities, a classification of hardness can be 
distinguished to determine critical node targeting by ground forces.  A classified thesis by 
James Papineau in December 1994, outlined the need for this type of analysis.  
Unclassified elements can be extracted to build upon areas for continued research.  
Papineau focused on the problem-set of UGFs which are classified by Papineau as tunnel 
facilities and cut-and-cover types.  The DUGs are considered those with 20 or more 
meters of overburden. 172  Because the amount of overburden is primarily a consideration 
when discussing kinetic aerial munitions, this is an unnecessary distinction when 
applying ground forces; UGFs will be sufficient.  There are two types of tunneled UGFs, 
vertical shaft and hillside facilities.  Vertical shaft facilities, as the name suggests, are 
constructed by excavating a vertical shaft to a desired depth and then tunneling out the 
space required.  Hillside facilities are tunneled directly into steep-sided terrain.  The use 
of natural wall material or the installment of artificial walls, roofing and flooring should 
also be considered in characterization and vulnerability assessments.  Papineau’s thesis 
discussed elements commonly found in UGFs, including internal subsystems such as life 
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support, power, and environmental control.  He also discussed surface support elements 
such as ventilation openings, water supply, waste handling, municipal power, 
communication connections, and transportation corridors.  All of these characteristics 
will be considered in developing a typology of all military purposed subterranean 
environments.173 
Once a clear typology based on potential missions and common characteristics is 
determined, mission planning considerations and operational guidelines can be improved.  
Referencing unclassified portions of Papineau’s 1994 thesis, U.S. forces can implement 
principles discussed about UGFs, to all forms of subterranean structures.  Papineau 
discusses the application of the CARVER principle against UGFs.  The CARVER 
principle is a Special Operations target analysis process that considers criteria of 
criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability, in order 
to determine the best attribute of a particular target to attack to achieve the desired effect.  
Aside from offering a general description of characteristics and vulnerabilities in all 
UGFs, effects-based planning is also discussed.  Structural kills (destruction) versus 
mission kills (operational disruption) must be decided upon when targeting any 
underground structure, be it a tunnel, fortification, or facility.  Physical damage to 
ingress/egress route, restricting air intake/exhaust vents, disabling personnel, and causing 
failure of essential components can all be accomplished without committing ground 
forces into the subterranean environment.  Mission planners must be clear on the exact 
desired effect of mission of ground forces preparing to operate in the subterranean 
environment.  The characterization and mission of these structures is essential in 
determining if the use of ground forces is appropriate.174 
B. HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS 
1. The Fall of Constantinople 1453, by Steven Runciman 
During the fifteenth century, one of the most consequential struggles during the 
middle ages took place in the Byzantine Empire during the siege of Constantinople.  The 




forces of Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II laid siege to the ancient city of Constantinople.  
This forced its Christian inhabitants to seek refuge underground.  Entire underground 
cities began to form under Constantinople to mitigate the threat from their Muslim 
enemies.175 
2. The Battle of the Crater, by Alfred P. James 
The tendency for military units to seek defensive positions underground continued 
to play a significant role in defensive positions through the centuries.  This was again 
demonstrated in 1864 during the American Civil War.  Confederate forces were heavily 
entrenched and fortified around Petersburg, Virginia when Union forces laid siege to the 
city.  These elaborate, in many cases underground confederate defensive positions 
prompted Union forces to attempt an offensive tunneling campaign by emplacing a large 
amount of explosives underground to breach confederate lines.  Results of the explosion 
were disastrous and caused a catastrophic loss to union forces during the battle.  This 
required the Union forces to reevaluate their subterranean operations.176 
3. In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign, by Leon Wolff 
Subterranean warfare continued to evolve into a simultaneous struggle of 
offensive and defensive tunneling by the beginning of the 20th century in World War I.  
This was illustrated in the Battle of the Messines in 1917.  German and Allied Forces 
were locked in a stalemate of trench warfare in Flanders, Belgium along the Messines 
Ridge.  Both sides made valiant efforts to tunnel their way under the defenses of one 
another to break the stalemate.  However, as they tunneled towards each other, they 
began to interdict their enemy’s underground advances by counter-mining tunnels to 
intercept their foe.  Subsequently, several underground engagements occurred and 
resulted in a new and horrifying aspect of underground warfare for the troops on both  
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sides.177  The experiences of the British, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand 
contingent caused U.S. forces to approach subterranean defensive positions with caution 
during World War II.  
4. Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II, by Robert Leckie  
Towards the end of World War II, the Japanese Army made a tactical decision to 
use underground defensive positions throughout the Pacific in order to neutralize U.S. air 
power and naval gunfire.  The U.S. forces in the Pacific were ordered not to enter 
underground defensive positions occupied by the Japanese.  During the Battle of 
Okinawa in 1945, U.S. forces focused on using incendiary weapons such as 
flamethrowers to drive out or kill Japanese troops in their underground positions.  The 
mounting casualties and difficulties associated with an invasion of the fortified and 
entrenched Japanese homeland may have been a contributing factor in the Truman 
administration’s decision to use the first nuclear weapons in warfare, in order to save 
American lives.178 
5. The Tunnels of Cu Chi, by Tom Mangold 
The lessons learned from World War II, also played a role in future U.S. 
subterranean conflicts.  One of the most notable was during the Vietnam War.  Instead of 
attempting to drive North Vietnamese from their subterranean defensive positions, to 
engage the enemy above ground, U.S. forces adopted a new strategy of entering tunnels 
to engage the enemy in order to clear a tunnel.  This became evident in the Cu Chi 
tunnels east of Saigon.  The tunnel complex became so extensive it caused severe 
disruption to U.S. forces.179 
                                                 
177 Leon Wolff, In Flanders Fields: The 1917 Campaign (Alexandria, VA: Viking Press, 1958). 
178 Robert Leckie, Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II (Australia: Penguin Books, 1996). 
179 Tom Mangold, The Tunnels of Cu Chi (New York, NY: Random House, 1985). 
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6. A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary 
Perspective, by Major Allen Reece 
A monograph by then Major Allen Reece titled, “A Historical Analysis of Tunnel 
Warfare and the Contemporary Perspective,” examines the use of subterranean combat 
during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.  Each of these 
conflicts can illuminate unique characterizations and operational challenges to specific 
uses of the subterranean environment.  Major Reece’s monograph concludes by assessing 
that current U.S. doctrine is sufficient to combat the challenges of subterranean 
warfare.180  This assessment is challenged by the lack of organizations, training, and 
equipment found in today’s military, to combat subterranean threats. 
7. Underground Combat: Stereophonic Blasting, Tunnel Rats, and the 
Soviet-Afghan War by Lester W. Grau 
The current U.S. FMs also fail to address weaponry and personal protective 
equipment (PPE).  According to Lester W. Grau’s (1998) article, Underground Combat: 
Stereophonic Blasting, Tunnel Rats, and the Soviet-Afghan War, concussion, explosive, 
thermo-baric, incendiary, fire and smoke tactics and munitions were extremely effective 
against insurgents in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Vietnam.181  These forms of 
weaponry have been successful in combating tunnel networks in multiple theaters by 
many military organizations, yet U.S. doctrine has failed to provide what U.S. forces 
should use when conducting a subterranean operation. 
C. DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS 
1. ATTP 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain 
The subterranean environment that exists as part of the urban operational 
environment does not adequately emphasize the level of planning needed when 
considering all the possible subterranean threats used by today’s adversaries.  The newest 
2011 revision, ATTP 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, covers much 
                                                 
180 Allen D. Reece, “A Historical Analysis of Tunnel Warfare and the Contemporary Perspective” 
(monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1997). 
181 Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Underground Combat: Stereophonic Blasting, Tunnel Rats, 
and the Soviet-Afghan War,” Engineer 28, no. 4, (1998): 20–23. 
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of what the tactical planner or soldier should consider when preparing to enter urban 
tunnels and basements.  On the spectrum of typology, urban subterranean environments 
are one element, and although many of the same tactical considerations can be applied, 
understanding the environmental challenges from rudimentary tunnels to underground 
facilities and everything between is essential. 
2. FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 90-10 Urban Operations, 
and FM 90-10-1 An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built Up 
Areas 
FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 90-10 Urban Operations, and FM 90-
10-1 An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built Up Areas, only provide doctrine on 
subterranean in urban sewage systems and rudimentary tunnels similar to the Cu Chi 
Tunnels in Vietnam.182  Subterranean environments can range from rudimentary tunnels 
like the ones found in Gaza, Israel, to hardened underground facilities like the ones 
protecting nuclear weaponry for various nation states.  The types of underground 
environments are vast and though there are some similarities, each one will require its 
own special considerations and techniques. 
                                                 
182 Department of Defense, Field Manual, Counterguerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1986, 1993, 2003). 
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GLOSSARY 
Accessibility—Relates to the capabilities required to breach portal entrances, gain access 
to critical support infrastructure, and reduce obstacles between portals and 
functional workspaces.  An accessibility level I structure is one which requires 
little to none or only simple tools used in mechanical breaching to gain access, 
such as a Halligan tool, grappling hooks, sledge hammers, or bolt cutters.  An 
accessibility level II structure may contain hatches or doors that require explosive 
or ballistic breaching techniques.  An accessibility level III structure may contain 
blast doors, steel gates, or security doors that require dynamic breaching including 
advanced cutting and extrication tools.  An accessibility level IV hardened 
structure may be beyond the capabilities of the individual soldier and may require 
heavy engineer equipment or kinetic munitions to reduce exterior obstacles. 
Civil works—Such as sewers, subways, electrical and exhaust tunnels, and aqueducts, all 
support habitability in a growing urban population.  Although these structures are 
primarily used to support a civilian population, both state and non-state actors can 
use these same structures to facilitate clandestine movement of high value 
personnel and equipment, and storage of weapons and illicit matériel. 
Environmental hazards—Include naturally occurring gasses that affect air quality; 
dangerous insects, arachnids, reptiles, and other wildlife; unstable ground control; 
stagnant water that may release deadly gases such as hydrogen sulfide or deep 
water that creates a drowning hazard. 
Function—Attribute is used to describe the purpose of a particular subterranean target 
area. Functions within the subterranean environment include C3I (Command, 
Control, Communications, and Intelligence), production, storage, and 
conveyance. 
Hard and deeply buried target (HDBT) —This generic term refers to all types of 
intentionally hardened targets, either above ground or below ground, that are 
designed to withstand or minimize kinetic weapon effects. 183 
Hardened structure—A structure that is intentionally strengthened to provide protection 
from kinetic weapons effects.  This strengthening is in excess of the amount 
required for normal building design loads. 184 
 
                                                 
183 Defense Intelligence Agency, Lexicon of Hardened Structure Definitions and Terms 
(UNCLAS/FOUO) (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2011), 85. 
184 Ibid. 85. 
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Hard structure—Hard structures include those that are intentionally or unintentionally 
hardened.  Hard structures, such as highway or railroad tunnels, certain types of 
bridges, and some airfield runaways, may be inherently hard without special 
construction because of their normal design.185 
Incendiary weapons—Means of any weapons or munitions which is primarily designed 
to set fire to an object or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of 
flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction substance 
delivered on the target. 
Infrastructure—Attribute is used to describe the support systems tied to the particular 
subterranean target area.  Subterranean infrastructure includes ventilation, power 
supply, water supply, waste discharge, transportation, and communications. 
Matériel hazards—Include those hazards artificially introduced into the environment.  
These can include, explosives, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs); nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) storage or production equipment; 
fuel and other petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); as well as other man-made 
implements. 
Mobility—Within a subterranean passage typically coincides with the largest item to be 
conveyed through or housed within the functional workspace.  The mobility 
attributes are defined as restricted, semi-restricted, permissive, and unrestricted. 
Permissive—Adits that allow for the fully upright movement of persons in columns of 
two. 
Personnel hazards—Account for the presence of potentially hostile persons within the 
subterranean structure.  This could include armed defense forces or non-
combatants that may become hostile once encountered.  
Restricted—Adits that are characterized by their confined space permitting only the 
single file movement of persons in a prostrated or less than fully upright posture. 
Rudimentary tunnels—Are typically hand dug using mechanical and/or general purpose 
tools.  The walls of these tunnels are bare and have limited to no support features 
or shoring to prevent structural collapse.  Rudimentary tunnels have little to no 
infrastructure installed and instead rely on natural air flow ventilation and 
structurally designed water removal. 
Semi-restricted—Adits that allow for the fully upright movement of persons in single 
file. 
 
                                                 
185 Ibid. 
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Sophisticated tunnels—Are typically dug using mechanical tools or larger heavy 
equipment.  Equipment must rely on air compressors or electricity for power, 
unless significant ventilation is available to support the use of combustion 
engines.  A noticeable characteristic in sophisticated tunnels is the effort placed in 
shoring up of access portals and walls.  The use of concrete-like material or 
masonry and timber to line the walls indicates a deliberate effort to maintain a 
lasting subterranean passage. 
Substructures—Constitute basements and similar subterranean spaces that are attached 
to an above ground structure.  These basement facilities may be accessed from 
within the above ground structure, but may also have exterior access points and 
umbilical infrastructure. 
 Threat—Attribute characterizes the potential risk to forces entering the subterranean 
environment.  This threat attribute may also factor into the size, composition, 
weapons posture, and special equipment needed to effectively operate in a 
particular subterranean environment.  Threat characteristics within subterranean 
environments include environmental, personnel, and matériel. 
Tunnels—Tunnels are generally used as a means to clandestinely move people and items 
between two or more locations.  Tunnels can be classified into two subcategories, 
Rudimentary and Sophisticated. 
Unrestricted—Adits that are large enough to support upright movement of more than a 
two person column and may even support the movement of vehicles. 
Underground facilities (UGFs) —UGFs are characterized by their purpose-built design 
and construction to resist destruction by conventional and nuclear munitions.  The 
subcategories of UGFs are Shallow Underground Facilities (UGS) and Deep 
Underground Facilities (DUGs). 186 
Urban and natural cavities—Most have dual usage; meaning the original structure can 
be adapted for military purpose; cover a wide variety of structures, with the focus 
being on potential impacts on the civilian population.  The subcategories of Urban 
and Natural Cavities are Substructures and Civil Works. 
                                                 
186 Ibid. 
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